Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Вход Регистрация
MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Диспетчер учетных записей безопасности
CVE уязвимости
БДУ ФСТЭК уязвимости
НКЦКИ уязвимости
MITRE ATT&CK
БДУ ФСТЭК
Новая БДУ ФСТЭК
EN
Риски
Каталоги
MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Диспетчер учетных записей безо...
Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
Подробнее
Наш канал

OS Credential Dumping:  Диспетчер учетных записей безопасности

ID Название
.001 Память процесса LSASS
.002 Диспетчер учетных записей безопасности
.003 Файл ntds.dit
.004 Секреты LSA
.005 Кэшированные доменные учетные данные
.006 DCSync
.007 Файловая система proc
.008 Содержимое файлов /etc/passwd и /etc/shadow

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques: * pwdumpx.exe * gsecdump * Mimikatz * secretsdump.py Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg: * reg save HKLM\sam sam * reg save HKLM\system system Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7) Notes: * RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator. * RID 501 is the guest account. * User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.

ID: T1003.002
Относится к технике:  T1003
Тактика(-и): Credential Access
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
Версия: 1.1
Дата создания: 11 Feb 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Oct 2024

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Daggerfly

Daggerfly used Reg to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM) hive from victim machines for follow-on credential extraction.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2023)
CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can dump usernames and hashed passwords from the SAM.(Citation: CME Github September 2018)
gsecdump

gsecdump can dump Windows password hashes from the SAM.(Citation: Microsoft Gsecdump)
GALLIUM

GALLIUM used reg commands to dump specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, and obtain password hashes.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)
Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
APT29

APT29 has used the `reg save` command to save registry hives.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)
Koadic

Koadic can gather hashed passwords by dumping SAM/SECURITY hive.(Citation: Github Koadic)
Night Dragon

Night Dragon has dumped account hashes with Carbanak and cracked them with Cain & Abel.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
FIN13

FIN13 has extracted the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives using the `reg.exe` binary for obtaining password hashes from a compromised machine.(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022)

During C0017, APT41 copied the `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives for credential harvesting.(Citation: Mandiant APT41)
pwdump

pwdump can be used to dump credentials from the SAM.(Citation: Wikipedia pwdump)
Dragonfly

Dragonfly has dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
Ke3chang

Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using gsecdump.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)
HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT has the capability to harvest credentials and passwords from the SAM database.(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)

Agrius

Agrius dumped the SAM file on victim machines to capture credentials.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can recover hashed passwords.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)

During Night Dragon, threat actors dumped account hashes using gsecdump.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
Mimikatz

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the SAM table.(Citation: Deply Mimikatz)(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module)(Citation: Directory Services Internals DPAPI Backup Keys Oct 2015)(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)
APT41

APT41 extracted user account data from the Security Account Managerr (SAM), making a copy of this database from the registry using the reg save command or by exploiting volume shadow copies.(Citation: Rostovcev APT41 2021)
Remsec

Remsec can dump the SAM database.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Technical Analysis)
APT5

APT5 has copied and exfiltrated the SAM Registry hive from targeted systems.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Update May 2021)
menuPass

menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Github AD-Pentest-Script)
CozyCar

Password stealer and NTLM stealer modules in CozyCar harvest stored credentials from the victim, including credentials used as part of Windows NTLM user authentication.(Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)
Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)
Mivast

Mivast has the capability to gather NTLM password information.(Citation: Symantec Backdoor.Mivast)
Impacket

SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.(Citation: Impacket Tools)

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors leveraged a custom tool to dump OS credentials and used following commands: `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.hiv`, `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.hiv`, and `reg save HKLM\\SECURITY security.hiv`, to dump SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.(Citation: Cybereason OperationCuckooBees May 2022)
POWERTON

POWERTON has the ability to dump password hashes.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has acquired credentials from the SAM/SECURITY registry hives.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)
CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke collects Windows account hashes.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can recover hashed passwords.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
IceApple

IceApple's Credential Dumper module can dump encrypted password hashes from SAM registry keys, including `HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\F` and `HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\*\V`.(Citation: CrowdStrike IceApple May 2022)
Ember Bear

Ember Bear acquires victim credentials by extracting registry hives such as the Security Account Manager through commands such as reg save.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)
Fgdump

Fgdump can dump Windows password hashes.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
Privileged Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Operating System Configuration

Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
User Training

Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.

Обнаружение

Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well.

Ссылки

  1. US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.
  2. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  3. McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  4. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  5. Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  6. Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.
  7. byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
  8. Vincent Tiu. (2017, September 15). HackTool:Win32/Gsecdump. Retrieved January 10, 2024.
  9. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.
  10. Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
  11. Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved September 27, 2024.
  12. Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
  13. Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022.
  14. Wikipedia. (2007, August 9). pwdump. Retrieved June 22, 2016.
  15. Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
  16. Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  17. US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
  18. Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  19. McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  20. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
  21. Grafnetter, M. (2015, October 26). Retrieving DPAPI Backup Keys from Active Directory. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
  22. Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
  23. Deply, B. (n.d.). Mimikatz. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
  24. Nikita Rostovcev. (2022, August 18). APT41 World Tour 2021 on a tight schedule. Retrieved February 22, 2024.
  25. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
  26. Perez, D. et al. (2021, May 27). Re-Checking Your Pulse: Updates on Chinese APT Actors Compromising Pulse Secure VPN Devices. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
  27. Twi1ight. (2015, July 11). AD-Pentest-Script - wmiexec.vbs. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
  28. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  29. F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  30. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
  31. Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.
  32. Stama, D.. (2015, February 6). Backdoor.Mivast. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  33. Microsoft. (2012, November 29). Using security policies to restrict NTLM traffic. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  34. SecureAuth. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2019.
  35. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2022, May 4). Operation CuckooBees: Deep-Dive into Stealthy Winnti Techniques. Retrieved September 22, 2022.
  36. Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  37. Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  38. F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  39. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  40. CrowdStrike. (2022, May). ICEAPPLE: A NOVEL INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES (IIS) POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK. Retrieved June 27, 2022.
  41. US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.
  42. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.
  43. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Навигация

Каталоги

Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.