Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Web Service:  Двусторонняя связь

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

ID: T1102.002
Относится к технике:  T1102
Тактика(-и): Command and Control
Платформы: Linux, macOS, Windows
Требуемые разрешения: User
Источники данных: Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 1.0
Дата создания: 14 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 26 Mar 2020

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
PowerStallion

PowerStallion uses Microsoft OneDrive as a C2 server via a network drive mapped with net use.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)

BoxCaon

BoxCaon has used DropBox for C2 communications.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)

Crutch

Crutch can use Dropbox to receive commands and upload stolen data.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)

Clambling

Clambling can use Dropbox to download malicious payloads, send commands, and receive information.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)(Citation: Talent-Jump Clambling February 2020)

Orz

Orz has used Technet and Pastebin web pages for command and control.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)

CALENDAR

The CALENDAR malware communicates through the use of events in Google Calendar.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)

CozyCar

CozyCar uses Twitter as a backup C2 channel to Twitter accounts specified in its configuration file.(Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)

yty

yty communicates to the C2 server by retrieving a Google Doc.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used Blogspot pages for C2.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)

SLOWDRIFT

SLOWDRIFT uses cloud based services for C2.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro can utilize web services including Google sites to send and receive C2 data.(Citation: IBM Grandoreiro April 2020)(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)

POLONIUM

POLONIUM has used OneDrive and DropBox for C2.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

APT37

APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Talos Group123)

Comnie

Comnie uses blogs and third-party sites (GitHub, tumbler, and BlogSpot) to avoid DNS-based blocking of their communication to the command and control server.(Citation: Palo Alto Comnie)

BADNEWS

BADNEWS can use multiple C2 channels, including RSS feeds, Github, forums, and blogs.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)(Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)

UBoatRAT

UBoatRAT has used GitHub and a public blog service in Hong Kong for C2 communications.(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

APT12

APT12 has used blogs and WordPress for C2 infrastructure.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)

CreepyDrive

CreepyDrive can use OneDrive for C2.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

APT39

APT39 has communicated with C2 through files uploaded to and downloaded from DropBox.(Citation: BitDefender Chafer May 2020)

CloudDuke

One variant of CloudDuke uses a Microsoft OneDrive account to exchange commands and stolen data with its operators.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)

ComRAT

ComRAT has the ability to use the Gmail web UI to receive commands and exfiltrate information.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020)(Citation: CISA ComRAT Oct 2020)

Revenge RAT

Revenge RAT used blogpost.com as its primary command and control server during a campaign.(Citation: Cofense RevengeRAT Feb 2019)

Magic Hound

Magic Hound malware can use a SOAP Web service to communicate with its C2 server.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)

Turla

A Turla JavaScript backdoor has used Google Apps Script as its C2 server.(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito May 2018)

HEXANE

HEXANE has used cloud services, including OneDrive, for C2.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

RogueRobin

RogueRobin has used Google Drive as a Command and Control channel. (Citation: Unit42 DarkHydrus Jan 2019)

LOWBALL

LOWBALL uses the Dropbox cloud storage service for command and control.(Citation: FireEye admin@338)

BLUELIGHT

BLUELIGHT can use different cloud providers for its C2.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)

APT29

APT29 has used social media platforms to hide communications to C2 servers.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Kazuar

Kazuar has used compromised WordPress blogs as C2 servers.(Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)

Carbanak

Carbanak has used a VBScript named "ggldr" that uses Google Apps Script, Sheets, and Forms services for C2.(Citation: Forcepoint Carbanak Google C2)

RegDuke

RegDuke can use Dropbox as its C2 server.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Empire

Empire can use Dropbox and GitHub for C2.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)

FIN7

FIN7 used legitimate services like Google Docs, Google Scripts, and Pastebin for C2.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)

ROKRAT

ROKRAT has used legitimate social networking sites and cloud platforms (including but not limited to Twitter, Yandex, Dropbox, and Mediafire) for C2 communications.(Citation: Talos ROKRAT)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019)(Citation: Volexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021)

GLOOXMAIL

GLOOXMAIL communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: CyberESI GTALK)

KARAE

KARAE can use public cloud-based storage providers for command and control.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

DOGCALL

DOGCALL is capable of leveraging cloud storage APIs such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex for C2.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)

POORAIM

POORAIM has used AOL Instant Messenger for C2.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive commands to its Python backdoor. Sandworm Team also used legitimate M.E.Doc software update check requests for sending and receiving commands and hosted malicious payloads on putdrive.com.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)

APT28

APT28 has used Google Drive for C2.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)

Small Sieve

Small Sieve has the ability to use the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive messages.(Citation: NCSC GCHQ Small Sieve Jan 2022)

MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used web services including OneHub to distribute remote access tools.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)

ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used Dropbox for C2 allowing upload and download of files as well as execution of arbitrary commands.(Citation: Google Election Threats October 2020)(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)

BLACKCOFFEE

BLACKCOFFEE has also obfuscated its C2 traffic as normal traffic to sites such as Github.(Citation: FireEye APT17)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Restrict Web-Based Content

Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.

Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

Обнаружение

Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)

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