Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Специальные возможности
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Специальные возможности
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Event Triggered Execution:  Специальные возможности

ID Название
.001 Замена ПО по умолчанию для запуска файла
.002 Экранная заставка
.003 Подписка на события WMI
.004 .bash_profile и .bashrc
.005 Команда trap
.006 Добавление LC_LOAD_DYLIB
.007 DLL-библиотеки загружаемые с помощью Netsh
.008 Специальные возможности
.009 DLL-библиотеки AppCert
.010 DLL-библиотеки AppInit
.011 Оболочка совместимости приложений
.012 Изменение IFEO
.013 Профиль PowerShell
.014 Демон мониторинга событий emond
.015 Перехват COM-объектов
.016 Установщики

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. Two common accessibility programs are C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit) Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The Image File Execution Options Injection debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014) Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)(Citation: Narrator Accessibility Abuse) * On-Screen Keyboard: C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe * Magnifier: C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe * Narrator: C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe * Display Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe * App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe

ID: T1546.008
Относится к технике:  T1546
Тактика(-и): Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Windows
Требуемые разрешения: Administrator
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Версия: 1.0
Дата создания: 24 Jan 2020
Последнее изменение: 13 May 2020

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Empire

Empire can leverage WMI debugging to remotely replace binaries like sethc.exe, Utilman.exe, and Magnify.exe with cmd.exe.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
APT41

APT41 leveraged sticky keys to establish persistence.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)

APT3

APT3 replaces the Sticky Keys binary C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe for persistence.(Citation: aptsim)
Deep Panda

Deep Panda has used the sticky-keys technique to bypass the RDP login screen on remote systems during intrusions.(Citation: RSA Shell Crew)
Axiom

Axiom actors have been known to use the Sticky Keys replacement within RDP sessions to obtain persistence.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)
Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)
APT29

APT29 used sticky-keys to obtain unauthenticated, privileged console access.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Limit Access to Resource Over Network

Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.
Operating System Configuration

Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
Execution Prevention

Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.

Обнаружение

Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options.

Ссылки

  1. Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
  2. Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  3. Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
  4. Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.
  5. Microsoft. (n.d.). Overview of Remote Desktop Gateway. Retrieved June 6, 2016.
  6. RSA Incident Response. (2014, January). RSA Incident Response Emerging Threat Profile: Shell Crew. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
  7. CISA. (2020, September 15). Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
  8. Microsoft. (n.d.). Configure Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services Connections. Retrieved June 6, 2016.
  9. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
  10. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  11. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  12. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  13. Gorzelany, A., Hall, J., Poggemeyer, L.. (2019, January 7). Windows Defender Application Control. Retrieved July 16, 2019.
  14. Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  15. valsmith. (2012, September 21). More on APTSim. Retrieved September 28, 2017.
  16. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  17. Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  18. Dunwoody, M. (2017, March 27). APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR. Retrieved March 27, 2017.
  19. Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016.
  20. Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
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