Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension). (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Mitigations |
|
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation |
Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) |
| Privileged Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
| User Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. |
Detection
Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)
References
- Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
- French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
- Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.
- Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
- Kazanciyan, R. & Hastings, M. (2014). Defcon 22 Presentation. Investigating PowerShell Attacks [slides]. Retrieved November 3, 2014.
- Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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