Traffic Signaling: Простукивание портов
Other sub-techniques of Traffic Signaling (2)
ID | Название |
---|---|
.001 | Простукивание портов |
.002 | Фильтры сокета |
Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system. The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
Примеры процедур |
|
Название | Описание |
---|---|
Mafalda |
Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022) |
PROMETHIUM |
PROMETHIUM has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
cd00r |
cd00r can monitor for a single TCP-SYN packet to be sent in series to a configurable set of ports (200, 80, 22, 53 and 3 in the original code) before opening a port for communication.(Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002)(Citation: Lumen J-Magic JAN 2025) |
metaMain |
metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022) |
Контрмеры |
|
Контрмера | Описание |
---|---|
Filter Network Traffic |
Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Ingress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers. - Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges. Egress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications. - Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected. Protocol-Based Filtering: - Use Case: Restrict the use of specific protocols that are commonly abused by adversaries, such as SMB, RPC, or Telnet, based on business needs. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 on endpoints to prevent exploits like EternalBlue. Network Segmentation: - Use Case: Create network segments for critical systems and restrict communication between segments unless explicitly authorized. - Implementation: Implement VLANs to isolate IoT devices or guest networks from core business systems. Application Layer Filtering: - Use Case: Use proxy servers or Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to inspect and block malicious HTTP/S traffic. - Implementation: Configure a WAF to block SQL injection attempts or other web application exploitation techniques. |
Обнаружение
Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
Ссылки
- Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.
- SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.
- Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
- Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
- Black Lotus Labs. (2025, January 23). The J-Magic Show: Magic Packets and Where to find them. Retrieved February 17, 2025.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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