Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
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Шифрование данных

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as File and Directory Permissions Modification or System Shutdown/Reboot, in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020) In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)

ID: T1486
Тактика(-и): Impact
Платформы: IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
Источники данных: Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Network Share: Network Share Access, Process: Process Creation
Тип влияния: Availability
Версия: 1.4
Дата создания: 15 Mar 2019
Последнее изменение: 16 Jun 2022

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Maze

Maze has disrupted systems by encrypting files on targeted machines, claiming to decrypt files if a ransom payment is made. Maze has used the ChaCha algorithm, based on Salsa20, and an RSA algorithm to encrypt files.(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)
Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit has encrypted files and disks using AES-128-CBC and RSA-2048.(Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)
ThiefQuest

ThiefQuest encrypts a set of file extensions on a host, deletes the original files, and provides a ransom note with no contact information.(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)
APT38

APT38 has used Hermes ransomware to encrypt files with AES256.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)
Ragnar Locker

Ragnar Locker encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)(Citation: Cynet Ragnar Apr 2020)
JCry

JCry has encrypted files and demanded Bitcoin to decrypt those files. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)
Babuk

Babuk can use ChaCha8 and ECDH to encrypt data.(Citation: Sogeti CERT ESEC Babuk March 2021)(Citation: McAfee Babuk February 2021)(Citation: Medium Babuk February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware February 2021)
REvil

REvil can encrypt files on victim systems and demands a ransom to decrypt the files.(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)(Citation: Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019)(Citation: Talos Sodinokibi April 2019)(Citation: McAfee REvil October 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020)
Diavol

Diavol has encrypted files using an RSA key though the `CryptEncrypt` API and has appended filenames with ".lock64". (Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021)
Cuba

Cuba has the ability to encrypt system data and add the ".cuba" extension to encrypted files.(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021)

LockerGoga

LockerGoga has encrypted files, including core Windows OS files, using RSA-OAEP MGF1 and then demanded Bitcoin be paid for the decryption key.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Wired Lockergoga 2019)
DEATHRANSOM

DEATHRANSOM can use public and private key pair encryption to encrypt files for ransom payment.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
EKANS

EKANS uses standard encryption library functions to encrypt files.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)
ProLock

ProLock can encrypt files on a compromised host with RC6, and encrypts the key with RSA-1024.(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)
HELLOKITTY

HELLOKITTY can use an embedded RSA-2048 public key to encrypt victim data for ransom.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
BitPaymer

BitPaymer can import a hard-coded RSA 1024-bit public key, generate a 128-bit RC4 key for each file, and encrypt the file in place, appending .locked to the filename.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
WannaCry

WannaCry encrypts user files and demands that a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.(Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)
FIN7

FIN7 has encrypted virtual disk volumes on ESXi servers using a version of Darkside ransomware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
DCSrv

DCSrv has encrypted drives using the core encryption mechanism from DiskCryptor.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
WastedLocker

WastedLocker can encrypt data and leave a ransom note.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020)

Pysa

Pysa has used RSA and AES-CBC encryption algorithm to encrypt a list of targeted file extensions.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

During C0015, the threat actors used Conti ransomware to encrypt a compromised network.(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021)
MegaCortex

MegaCortex has used the open-source library, Mbed Crypto, and generated AES keys to carry out the file encryption process.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)(Citation: mbed-crypto)
SynAck

SynAck encrypts the victims machine followed by asking the victim to pay a ransom. (Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)
FIVEHANDS

FIVEHANDS can use an embedded NTRU public key to encrypt data for ransom.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)(Citation: NCC Group Fivehands June 2021)
Conti

Conti can use CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public encryption key that is unique for each victim. Conti can use “Windows Restart Manager” to ensure files are unlocked and open for encryption.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021)
Xbash

Xbash has maliciously encrypted victim's database systems and demanded a cryptocurrency ransom be paid.(Citation: Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018)
Pay2Key

Pay2Key can encrypt data on victim's machines using RSA and AES algorithms in order to extort a ransom payment for decryption.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: Check Point Pay2Key November 2020)
Egregor

Egregor can encrypt all non-system files using a hybrid AES-RSA algorithm prior to displaying a ransom note.(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)(Citation: Cybereason Egregor Nov 2020)

Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has encrypted domain-controlled systems using BitPaymer.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
NotPetya

NotPetya encrypts user files and disk structures like the MBR with 2048-bit RSA.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)
SamSam

SamSam encrypts victim files using RSA-2048 encryption and demands a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.(Citation: Sophos SamSam Apr 2018)
APT41

APT41 used a ransomware called Encryptor RaaS to encrypt files on the targeted systems and provide a ransom note to the user.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)
Ryuk

Ryuk has used a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files. Files have been encrypted with their own AES key and given a file extension of .RYK. Encrypted directories have had a ransom note of RyukReadMe.txt written to the directory.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)
Avaddon

Avaddon encrypts the victim system using a combination of AES256 and RSA encryption schemes.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)
Netwalker

Netwalker can encrypt files on infected machines to extort victims.(Citation: TrendMicro Netwalker May 2020)

KillDisk

KillDisk has a ransomware component that encrypts files with an AES key that is also RSA-1028 encrypted.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)
Clop

Clop can encrypt files using AES, RSA, and RC4 and will add the ".clop" extension to encrypted files.(Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Clop April 2021)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)

TA505

TA505 has used a wide variety of ransomware, such as Clop, Locky, Jaff, Bart, Philadelphia, and GlobeImposter, to encrypt victim files and demand a ransom payment.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)
XCSSET

XCSSET performs AES-CBC encryption on files under ~/Documents, ~/Downloads, and ~/Desktop with a fixed key and renames files to give them a .enc extension. Only files with sizes less than 500MB are encrypted.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)
Seth-Locker

Seth-Locker can encrypt files on a targeted system, appending them with the suffix .seth.(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware February 2021)
Shamoon

Shamoon has an operational mode for encrypting data instead of overwriting it.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)
RobbinHood

RobbinHood will search for an RSA encryption key and then perform its encryption process on the system files.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Use capabilities to prevent suspicious behavior patterns from occurring on endpoint systems. This could include suspicious process, file, API call, etc. behavior.
Data Backup

Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.
Data Encrypted for Impact Mitigation

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for regularly taking and testing data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP) In some cases, the means to decrypt files affected by a ransomware campaign is released to the public. Research trusted sources for public releases of decryptor tools/keys to reverse the effects of ransomware. Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)

Обнаружение

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.

Ссылки

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