Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Туннелирование протокола
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MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Туннелирование протокола
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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
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Туннелирование протокола

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)(Citation: Sygnia Abyss Locker 2025) Protocol Tunneling may also be abused by adversaries during Dynamic Resolution. Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) Adversaries may also leverage Protocol Tunneling in conjunction with Proxy and/or Protocol or Service Impersonation to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.

ID: T1572
Тактика(-и): Command and Control
Платформы: ESXi, Linux, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 1.1
Дата создания: 15 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
reGeorg

reGeorg can tunnel TCP sessions including RDP, SSH, and SMB through HTTP.(Citation: Fortinet reGeorg MAR 2019)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)
FLIPSIDE

FLIPSIDE uses RDP to tunnel traffic from a victim environment.(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)
ngrok

ngrok can tunnel RDP and other services securely over internet connections.(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: MalwareBytes Ngrok February 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Ngrok September 2020)
FRP

FRP can tunnel SSH and Unix Domain Socket communications over TCP between external nodes and exposed resources behind firewalls or NAT.(Citation: FRP GitHub)
Duqu

Duqu uses a custom command and control protocol that communicates over commonly used ports, and is frequently encapsulated by application layer protocols.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)
Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 can use DNS over HTTPS for C2.(Citation: Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022)
Uroburos

Uroburos has the ability to communicate over custom communications methodologies that ride over common network protocols including raw TCP and UDP sockets, HTTP, SMTP, and DNS.(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023)
Ngrok

Ngrok can tunnel RDP and other services securely over internet connections.(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: MalwareBytes Ngrok February 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Ngrok September 2020)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Milan

Milan can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
Cyclops Blink

Cyclops Blink can use DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to resolve C2 nodes.(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)
Neo-reGeorg

Neo-reGeorg can tunnel data in and out of targeted networks.(Citation: GitHub Neo-reGeorg 2019)
FunnyDream

FunnyDream can connect to HTTP proxies via TCP to create a tunnel to C2.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)
Mythic

Mythic can use SOCKS proxies to tunnel traffic through another protocol.(Citation: Mythc Documentation)
Heyoka Backdoor

Heyoka Backdoor can use spoofed DNS requests to create a bidirectional tunnel between a compromised host and its C2 servers.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)
LunarWeb

LunarWeb can run a custom binary protocol under HTTPS for C2.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)
Industroyer

Industroyer attempts to perform an HTTP CONNECT via an internal proxy to establish a tunnel.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017)
Kevin

Kevin can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
QakBot

The QakBot proxy module can encapsulate SOCKS5 protocol within its own proxy protocol.(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)
Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)
Leviathan

Leviathan has used protocol tunneling to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)
OilRig

OilRig has used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Crambus OCT 2023)
Chimera

Chimera has encapsulated Cobalt Strike's C2 protocol in DNS and HTTPS.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)
FIN13

FIN13 has utilized web shells and Java tools for tunneling capabilities to and from compromised assets.(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022)
Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has used the Iox and NPS proxy and tunneling tools in combination create multiple connections through a single tunnel.(Citation: Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)
Ember Bear

Ember Bear has used ProxyChains to tunnel protocols to internal networks.(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)
Salt Typhoon

Salt Typhoon has modified device configurations to create and use Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels.(Citation: Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025)

FIN6

FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)
Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Filter Network Traffic

Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Ingress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers. - Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges. Egress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications. - Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected. Protocol-Based Filtering: - Use Case: Restrict the use of specific protocols that are commonly abused by adversaries, such as SMB, RPC, or Telnet, based on business needs. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 on endpoints to prevent exploits like EternalBlue. Network Segmentation: - Use Case: Create network segments for critical systems and restrict communication between segments unless explicitly authorized. - Implementation: Implement VLANs to isolate IoT devices or guest networks from core business systems. Application Layer Filtering: - Use Case: Use proxy servers or Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to inspect and block malicious HTTP/S traffic. - Implementation: Configure a WAF to block SQL injection attempts or other web application exploitation techniques.
Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

Обнаружение

Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)

Ссылки

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