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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Туннелирование протокола
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Туннелирование протокола
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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
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Туннелирование протокола

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) Protocol Tunneling may also be abused by adversaries during Dynamic Resolution. Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) Adversaries may also leverage Protocol Tunneling in conjunction with Proxy and/or Protocol Impersonation to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.

ID: T1572
Тактика(-и): Command and Control
Платформы: Linux, macOS, Windows
Источники данных: Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 1.0
Дата создания: 15 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 27 Mar 2020

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Heyoka Backdoor

Heyoka Backdoor can use spoofed DNS requests to create a bidirectional tunnel between a compromised host and its C2 servers.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)
FIN6

FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)
Duqu

Duqu uses a custom command and control protocol that communicates over commonly used ports, and is frequently encapsulated by application layer protocols.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)
FunnyDream

FunnyDream can connect to HTTP proxies via TCP to create a tunnel to C2.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Kevin

Kevin can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
Industroyer

Industroyer attempts to perform an HTTP CONNECT via an internal proxy to establish a tunnel.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017)
Ngrok

Ngrok can tunnel RDP and other services securely over internet connections.(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: MalwareBytes Ngrok February 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Ngrok September 2020)
Chimera

Chimera has encapsulated Cobalt Strike's C2 protocol in DNS and HTTPS.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)
Milan

Milan can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
OilRig

OilRig has used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as Ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)
Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)
Mythic

Mythic can use SOCKS proxies to tunnel traffic through another protocol.(Citation: Mythc Documentation)

During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote SSH tunneling into the victim's environment from a malicious domain.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)

FLIPSIDE

FLIPSIDE uses RDP to tunnel traffic from a victim environment.(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)
QakBot

The QakBot proxy module can encapsulate SOCKS5 protocol within its own proxy protocol.(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)
Cyclops Blink

Cyclops Blink can use DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to resolve C2 nodes.(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)
Leviathan

Leviathan has used protocol tunneling to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Filter Network Traffic

Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.
Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

Обнаружение

Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)

Ссылки

  1. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  2. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
  3. Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
  4. SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
  5. Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.
  6. CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.
  7. Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017.
  8. Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  9. FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
  10. Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
  11. Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021.
  12. Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.
  13. Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.
  14. Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
  15. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  16. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  17. ClearSky. (2020, December 17). Pay2Key Ransomware – A New Campaign by Fox Kitten. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
  18. CISA. (2020, September 15). Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
  19. Orleans, A. (2020, August 31). Who Is PIONEER KITTEN?. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
  20. Borja, A. Camba, A. et al (2020, September 14). Analysis of a Convoluted Attack Chain Involving Ngrok. Retrieved September 15, 2020.
  21. Segura, J. (2020, February 26). Fraudsters cloak credit card skimmer with fake content delivery network, ngrok server. Retrieved September 15, 2020.
  22. Cyware. (2019, May 29). Cyber attackers leverage tunneling service to drop Lokibot onto victims’ systems. Retrieved September 15, 2020.
  23. Kennelly, J., Goody, K., Shilko, J. (2020, May 7). Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
  24. Thomas, C. (n.d.). Mythc Documentation. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  25. Bromiley, M., et al.. (2019, July 18). Hard Pass: Declining APT34’s Invite to Join Their Professional Network. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
  26. Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
  27. Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
  28. Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018.
  29. Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.
  30. Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018.
  31. Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
  32. The BlackBerry Research and Intelligence Team. (2020, November 12). The CostaRicto Campaign: Cyber-Espionage Outsourced. Retrieved May 24, 2021.
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