Ramsay
Techniques Used |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1548 | .002 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control |
Ramsay can use UACMe for privilege escalation.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
Ramsay has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
Ramsay can compress and archive collected files using WinRAR.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
.003 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method |
Ramsay can store collected documents in a custom container after encrypting and compressing them using RC4 and WinRAR.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Ramsay has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1059 | .005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
Ramsay has included embedded Visual Basic scripts in malicious documents.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1132 | .001 | Data Encoding: Standard Encoding |
Ramsay has used base64 to encode its C2 traffic.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in |
Enterprise | T1546 | .010 | Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs |
Ramsay can insert itself into the address space of other applications using the AppInit DLL Registry key.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
Enterprise | T1574 | .001 | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking |
Ramsay can hijack outdated Windows application dependencies with malicious versions of its own DLL payload.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
Enterprise | T1559 | .001 | Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model |
Ramsay can use the Windows COM API to schedule tasks and maintain persistence.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
.002 | Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange |
Ramsay has been delivered using OLE objects in malicious documents.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Ramsay has masqueraded as a 7zip installer.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1027 | .003 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography |
Ramsay has PE data embedded within JPEG files contained within Word documents.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
Ramsay has been distributed through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
Enterprise | T1055 | .001 | Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection |
Ramsay can use |
Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Ramsay can schedule tasks via the Windows COM API to maintain persistence.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
Enterprise | T1204 | .002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
Ramsay has been executed through malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
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