Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique SID-History Injection
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MITRE ATT&CK
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SID-History Injection
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SID-History Injection

The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). Adversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.

ID: T1178
Tactic(s): Privilege Escalation
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Version: 1.0
Created: 16 Jan 2018
Last Modified: 18 Feb 2020

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Active Directory Configuration

Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.
SID-History Injection Mitigation

Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete. Consider applying SID Filtering to interforest trusts, such as forest trusts and external trusts, to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources. SID Filtering ensures that any authentication requests over a trust only contain SIDs of security principals from the trusted domain (i.e. preventing the trusted domain from claiming a user has membership in groups outside of the domain). SID Filtering of forest trusts is enabled by default, but may have been disabled in some cases to allow a child domain to transitively access forest trusts. SID Filtering of external trusts is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009) However note that SID Filtering is not automatically applied to legacy trusts or may have been deliberately disabled to allow inter-domain access to resources. SID Filtering can be applied by: (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) * Disabling SIDHistory on forest trusts using the netdom tool (netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no on the domain controller). * Applying SID Filter Quarantining to external trusts using the netdom tool (netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes on the domain controller) Applying SID Filtering to domain trusts within a single forest is not recommended as it is an unsupported configuration and can cause breaking changes. (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) (Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) If a domain within a forest is untrustworthy then it should not be a member of the forest. In this situation it is necessary to first split the trusted and untrusted domains into separate forests where SID Filtering can be applied to an interforest trust.

Detection

Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser Cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Monitor Account Management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory) Monitor Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)

References

  1. Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  2. Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  3. Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  4. Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  5. Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  6. Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  7. Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.
  8. Microsoft. (2012, September 11). Command-Line Reference - Netdom Trust. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  9. Microsoft. (n.d.). Configuring SID Filter Quarantining on External Trusts. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  10. Microsoft. (2014, November 19). Security Considerations for Trusts. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
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