Active Directory Configuration
Techniques Addressed by Mitigation |
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| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1134 | T1134.005 | Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection |
Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.
Consider applying SID Filtering to interforest trusts, such as forest trusts and external trusts, to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources. SID Filtering ensures that any authentication requests over a trust only contain SIDs of security principals from the trusted domain (i.e preventing the trusted domain from claiming a user has membership in groups outside of the domain).
SID Filtering of forest trusts is enabled by default, but may have been disabled in some cases to allow a child domain to transitively access forest trusts. SID Filtering of external trusts is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009) However note that SID Filtering is not automatically applied to legacy trusts or may have been deliberately disabled to allow inter-domain access to resources.
SID Filtering can be applied by: (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012)
* Disabling SIDHistory on forest trusts using the netdom tool ( |
| Enterprise | T1606 | T1606.002 | Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens |
For containing the impact of a previously forged SAML token, rotate the token-signing AD FS certificate in rapid succession twice, which will invalidate any tokens generated using the previous certificate.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper) |
| Enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping |
Manage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL) Consider adding users to the "Protected Users" Active Directory security group. This can help limit the caching of users' plaintext credentials.(Citation: Microsoft Protected Users Security Group) |
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| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials |
Consider adding users to the "Protected Users" Active Directory security group. This can help limit the caching of users' plaintext credentials.(Citation: Microsoft Protected Users Security Group) |
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| T1003.006 | DCSync |
Manage the access control list for "Replicating Directory Changes" and other permissions associated with domain controller replication.(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync)(Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL) |
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| Enterprise | T1072 | Software Deployment Tools |
Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of group policy. |
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| Enterprise | T1649 | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates |
Ensure certificate authorities (CA) are properly secured, including treating CA servers (and other resources hosting CA certificates) as tier 0 assets. Harden abusable CA settings and attributes. For example, consider disabling the usage of AD CS certificate SANs within relevant authentication protocol settings to enforce strict user mappings and prevent certificates from authenticating as other identifies.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned) Also consider enforcing CA Certificate Manager approval for the templates that include SAN as an issuance requirement. |
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| Enterprise | T1558 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets |
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.(Citation: STIG krbtgt reset) |
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| T1558.001 | Golden Ticket |
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.(Citation: STIG krbtgt reset) |
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| Enterprise | T1552 | Unsecured Credentials |
Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.(Citation: Microsoft MS14-025) |
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| T1552.006 | Group Policy Preferences |
Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.(Citation: Microsoft MS14-025) |
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| Enterprise | T1550 | T1550.003 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket |
To contain the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.(Citation: STIG krbtgt reset) |
References
- Microsoft. (2014, November 19). Security Considerations for Trusts. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). Configuring SID Filter Quarantining on External Trusts. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
- Microsoft. (2012, September 11). Command-Line Reference - Netdom Trust. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
- Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.
- Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
- UCF. (n.d.). The password for the krbtgt account on a domain must be reset at least every 180 days. Retrieved November 5, 2020.
- Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021.
- Schroeder, W. & Christensen, L. (2021, June 22). Certified Pre-Owned - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services. Retrieved August 2, 2022.
- Microsoft. (2016, October 12). Protected Users Security Group. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences could allow elevation of privilege. Retrieved January 28, 2015.
- Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). How to grant the "Replicating Directory Changes" permission for the Microsoft Metadirectory Services ADMA service account. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
- Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
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