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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

OS Credential Dumping:  DCSync

Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation.(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)

ID: T1003.006
Относится к технике:  T1003
Тактика(-и): Credential Access
Платформы: Windows
Требуемые разрешения: Administrator
Источники данных: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 1.0
Дата создания: 11 Feb 2020
Последнее изменение: 22 Apr 2021

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Mimikatz

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from DCSync/NetSync.(Citation: Deply Mimikatz)(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module)(Citation: Directory Services Internals DPAPI Backup Keys Oct 2015)(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)

Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has used a DCSync command with Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from an exploited controller.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)

APT29

APT29 leveraged privileged accounts to replicate directory service data with domain controllers.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

UNC2452

UNC2452 leveraged privileged accounts to replicate directory service data with domain controllers.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)

LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has used DCSync attacks to gather credentials for privilege escalation routines.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)

Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.

Active Directory Configuration

Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.

Privileged Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.

Обнаружение

Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)

Ссылки

  1. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  2. Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  3. Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  4. Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  5. Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.
  6. Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
  7. Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  8. Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
  9. Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
  10. Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  11. SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  12. Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  13. Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  14. CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
  15. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  16. Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
  17. Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
  18. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
  19. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  20. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
  21. Grafnetter, M. (2015, October 26). Retrieving DPAPI Backup Keys from Active Directory. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
  22. Deply, B. (n.d.). Mimikatz. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
  23. Microsoft. (n.d.). How to grant the "Replicating Directory Changes" permission for the Microsoft Metadirectory Services ADMA service account. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  24. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.

Связанные риски

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Каталоги

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