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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Существующие учетные записи

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare) The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)

ID: T1078
Суб-техники:  .001 .002 .003 .004
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Требуемые разрешения: Administrator, User
Источники данных: Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, User Account: User Account Authentication
Версия: 2.5
Дата создания: 31 May 2017
Последнее изменение: 19 Oct 2022

Примеры процедур

Название Описание

APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)


FIN8 has used valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)


UNC2452 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)


FIN4 has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Video Dec 2014)


FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)


Kinsing has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts.(Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)


Dragonfly has compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)


GALLIUM leveraged valid accounts to maintain access to a victim network.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)


APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.(Citation: RSA2017 Detect and Respond Adair)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)


Chimera has used a valid account to maintain persistence via scheduled task.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)


Some SeaDuke samples have a module to extract email from Microsoft Exchange servers using compromised credentials.(Citation: Symantec Seaduke 2015)


Dtrack used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)


Industroyer can use supplied user credentials to execute processes and stop services.(Citation: ESET Industroyer)

During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)


menuPass has used valid accounts including shared between Managed Service Providers and clients to move between the two environments.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)


Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on remote machines that executes the malware.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)


LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials and/or session tokens to gain access into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP, and IAMs.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)


Carbanak actors used legitimate credentials of banking employees to perform operations that sent them millions of dollars.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)


APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufacturer's passwords to gain initial access to corporate networks via IoT devices such as a VOIP phone, printer, and video decoder.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm April 2017)(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)

Night Dragon

Night Dragon has used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)


Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly May 2016)


Axiom has used previously compromised administrative accounts to escalate privileges.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)


Leviathan has obtained valid accounts to gain initial access.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)


PittyTiger attempts to obtain legitimate credentials during operations.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)


Silence has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)


OilRig has used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)

Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)


APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)

Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)


TEMP.Veles has used compromised VPN accounts.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)


Leviathan has used valid, compromised email accounts for defense evasion, including to send malicious emails to other victim organizations.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)


Ke3chang has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)


FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.(Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)


APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)


To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019)

Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)


POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)


FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.(Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)

Linux Rabbit

Linux Rabbit acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

Silent Librarian

Silent Librarian has used compromised credentials to obtain unauthorized access to online accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)


APT39 has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA).(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)


Контрмера Описание
Valid Accounts Mitigation

Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as OS Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access) Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege) These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA13-175A Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet) When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured.

Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.

User Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.

Privileged Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.

Application Developer Guidance

This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.

User Training

Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.


Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.


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Связанные риски

Ничего не найдено


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