Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Valid Accounts:  Локальные учетные записи

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through OS Credential Dumping. Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement.

ID: T1078.003
Относится к технике:  T1078
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Containers, ESXi, Linux, Network Devices, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, User Account: User Account Authentication
Версия: 1.5
Дата создания: 13 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Emotet

Emotet can brute force a local admin password, then use it to facilitate lateral movement.(Citation: Malwarebytes Emotet Dec 2017)

Umbreon

Umbreon creates valid local users to provide access to the system.(Citation: Umbreon Trend Micro)

NotPetya

NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)

LockBit 3.0

LockBit 3.0 can use a compromised local account for lateral movement.(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory LockBit 3.0 MAR 2023)

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a local user account.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: CobaltStrike Daddy May 2017)

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a local user account.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: CobaltStrike Daddy May 2017)

Turla

Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim’s network.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)

Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has used known administrator account credentials to execute the backdoor directly.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)

APT29

APT29 targets dormant or inactive user accounts, accounts belonging to individuals no longer at the organization but whose accounts remain on the system, for access and persistence.(Citation: NCSC et al APT29 2024)

APT29

APT29 has used compromised local accounts to access victims' networks.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

Stolen Pencil

Stolen Pencil has a tool to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them to ensure continued access via RDP. (Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)

APT32

APT32 has used legitimate local admin account credentials.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)

FIN7

FIN7 has used compromised credentials for access as SYSTEM on Exchange servers.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)

Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)

Velvet Ant

Velvet Ant accessed vulnerable Cisco switch devices using accounts with administrator privileges.(Citation: Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024B)

PROMETHIUM

PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)

Play

Play has used valid local accounts to gain initial access.(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023)

FIN10

FIN10 has moved laterally using the Local Administrator account.(Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)

Sea Turtle

Sea Turtle compromised cPanel accounts in victim environments.(Citation: Hunt Sea Turtle 2024)

HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has used the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account to create files on Exchange servers.(Citation: FireEye Exchange Zero Days March 2021)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Multi-factor Authentication

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). Authentication Tools and Methods: - Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications. Secure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. Monitoring and Alerting: - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations. Training and Policy Enforcement: - Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications.

Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Windows Systems: - Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure: - Minimum password length (e.g., 12+ characters). - Password complexity requirements. - Password history (e.g., disallow last 24 passwords). - Account lockout duration and thresholds. Linux Systems: - Configure Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): - Use `pam_pwquality` to enforce complexity and length requirements. - Implement `pam_tally2` or `pam_faillock` for account lockouts. - Use `pwunconv` to disable password reuse. Password Managers: - Enforce usage of enterprise password managers (e.g., Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) to generate and store strong passwords. Password Blacklisting: - Use tools like Have I Been Pwned password checks or NIST-based blacklist solutions to prevent users from setting compromised passwords. Regular Auditing: - Periodically audit password policies and account configurations to ensure compliance using tools like LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) and vulnerability scanners. *Tools for Implementation* Windows: - Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce password policies. - Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS): Enforce random, unique admin passwords. Linux/macOS: - PAM Modules (pam_pwquality, pam_tally2, pam_faillock): Enforce password rules. - Lynis: Audit password policies and system configurations. Cross-Platform: - Password Managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass): Manage and enforce strong passwords. - Have I Been Pwned API: Prevent the use of breached passwords. - NIST SP 800-63B compliant tools: Enforce password guidelines and blacklisting.

User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Обнаружение

Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours.

Ссылки

  1. Chen, J.. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air gapped Environments. Retrieved May 20, 2020.
  2. US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
  3. UK National Cyber Security Center et al. (2024, February). SVR cyber actors adapt tactics for initial cloud access. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
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  5. Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
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  19. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  20. Mudge, R. (2017, May 23). Cobalt Strike 3.8 – Who’s Your Daddy?. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
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  22. Sygnia Team. (2024, July 1). China-Nexus Threat Group ‘Velvet Ant’ Exploits Cisco Zero-Day (CVE-2024-20399) to Compromise Nexus Switch Devices – Advisory for Mitigation and Response. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
  23. Margosis, A.. (2018, December 10). Remote Use of Local Accounts: LAPS Changes Everything. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
  24. FBI et al. (2023, March 16). #StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0. Retrieved February 5, 2025.
  25. CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
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