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MITRE ATT&CK - Инструмент NotPetya
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NotPetya
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NotPetya

NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)
ID: S0368
Associated Software: ExPetr Diskcoder.C GoldenEye Petrwrap Nyetya
Type: MALWARE
Platforms: Windows
Version: 2.0
Created: 26 Mar 2019
Last Modified: 25 Apr 2022

Associated Software Descriptions
Name Description
ExPetr (Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)
Diskcoder.C (Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)
GoldenEye (Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)
Petrwrap (Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)
Nyetya (Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)

Techniques Used
Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1070 .001 Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs

NotPetya uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)
Enterprise T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

NotPetya contains a modified version of Mimikatz to help gather credentials that are later used for lateral movement.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)
Enterprise T1021 .002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

NotPetya can use PsExec, which interacts with the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: PsExec Russinovich)
Enterprise T1053 .005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)
Enterprise T1518 .001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery

NotPetya determines if specific antivirus programs are running on an infected host machine.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)
Enterprise T1218 .011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

NotPetya uses rundll32.exe to install itself on remote systems when accessed via PsExec or wmic.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)
Enterprise T1569 .002 System Services: Service Execution

NotPetya can use PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
Enterprise T1078 .003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts

NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)

Groups That Use This Software
ID Name References
G0034 Sandworm Team

(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) (Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) (Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING ) (Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)

References

  1. Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
  2. US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
  3. Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
  4. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  5. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
  6. NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  7. UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.
  8. Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  9. Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
  10. Russinovich, M. (2004, June 28). PsExec. Retrieved December 17, 2015.
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