Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Диспетчер управления службами
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System Services:  Диспетчер управления службами

ID Название
.001 Утилита launchctl
.002 Диспетчер управления службами
.003 Systemctl

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and Net. PsExec can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as PsExec and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution. Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with Windows Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.

ID: T1569.002
Относится к технике:  T1569
Тактика(-и): Execution
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation, Service: Service Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Версия: 1.3
Дата создания: 10 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Net

The net start and net stop commands can be used in Net to execute or stop Windows services.(Citation: Savill 1999)
Proxysvc

Proxysvc registers itself as a service on the victim’s machine to run as a standalone process.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)
StrongPity

StrongPity can install a service to execute itself as a service.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)
Impacket

Impacket contains various modules emulating other service execution tools such as PsExec.(Citation: Impacket Tools)
TinyTurla

TinyTurla can install itself as a service on compromised machines.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit drops a file named infpub.datinto the Windows directory and is executed through SCManager and rundll.exe.
Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer utilizes PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
Empire

Empire can use PsExec to execute a payload on a remote host.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
Mafalda

Mafalda can create a remote service, let it run once, and then delete it.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022)
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware

BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware executes as a service when deployed.(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023)
HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT has used svchost.exe to execute a malicious DLL .(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)
WastedLocker

WastedLocker can execute itself as a service.(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)
InvisiMole

InvisiMole has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
WhisperGate

WhisperGate can download and execute AdvancedRun.exe via `sc.exe`.(Citation: Medium S2W WhisperGate January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 WhisperGate January 2022)
PoshC2

PoshC2 contains an implementation of PsExec for remote execution.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2)
Okrum

Okrum's loader can create a new service named NtmsSvc to execute the payload.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)
RemoteCMD

RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new service on the remote system.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)
xCmd

xCmd can be used to execute binaries on remote systems by creating and starting a service.(Citation: xCmd)
Ragnar Locker

Ragnar Locker has used sc.exe to execute a service that it creates.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
NotPetya

NotPetya can use PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
HyperBro

HyperBro has the ability to start and stop a specified service.(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)
Anchor

Anchor can create and execute services to load its payload.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)(Citation: Medium Anchor DNS July 2020)
BBSRAT

BBSRAT can start, stop, or delete services.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)
Clambling

Clambling can create and start services on a compromised host.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
DarkGate

DarkGate tries to elevate privileges to SYSTEM using PsExec to locally execute as a service, such as cmd /c c:\temp\PsExec.exe -accepteula -j -d -s [Target Binary].(Citation: Trellix Darkgate 2023)
LockBit 3.0

LockBit 3.0 can use PsExec to execute commands and payloads.(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory LockBit JUN 2023)
Hydraq

Hydraq uses svchost.exe to execute a malicious DLL included in a new service group.(Citation: Symantec Hydraq Persistence Jan 2010)
Netwalker

Operators deploying Netwalker have used psexec and certutil to retrieve the Netwalker payload.(Citation: Sophos Netwalker May 2020)
Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 can create Windows system services for execution.(Citation: Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022)
gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT can execute its service if the Service key exists. If the key does not exist, gh0st RAT will create and run the service.(Citation: Gh0stRAT ATT March 2019)
Shamoon

Shamoon creates a new service named “ntssrv” to execute the payload. Shamoon can also spread via PsExec.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: McAfee Shamoon December19 2018)
Attor

Attor's dispatcher can be executed as a service.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)
Winexe

Winexe installs a service on the remote system, executes the command, then uninstalls the service.(Citation: Secpod Winexe June 2017)
HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper can create system services to aid in executing the payload.(Citation: SentinelOne Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Qualys Hermetic Wiper March 2022)
Pysa

Pysa has used PsExec to copy and execute the ransomware.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)
Pandora

Pandora has the ability to install itself as a Windows service.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can use PsExec to execute a payload on a remote host. It can also use Service Control Manager to start new services.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cobalt Strike TTPs Dec 2017)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can use PsExec to execute a payload on a remote host. It can also use Service Control Manager to start new services.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cobalt Strike TTPs Dec 2017)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
Wingbird

Wingbird uses services.exe to register a new autostart service named "Audit Service" using a copy of the local lsass.exe file.(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)(Citation: Microsoft Wingbird Nov 2017)
IPsec Helper

IPsec Helper is run as a Windows service in victim environments.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
SysUpdate

SysUpdate can manage services and processes.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)
Koadic

Koadic can run a command on another machine using PsExec.(Citation: Github Koadic)
Pupy

Pupy uses PsExec to execute a payload or commands on a remote host.(Citation: GitHub Pupy)
ZxShell

ZxShell can create a new service for execution.(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014)
Winnti for Windows

Winnti for Windows can run as a service using svchost.exe.(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)
DEADWOOD

DEADWOOD can be executed as a service using various names, such as ScDeviceEnums.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
LoudMiner

LoudMiner started the cryptomining virtual machine as a service on the infected machine.(Citation: ESET LoudMiner June 2019)
Net Crawler

Net Crawler uses PsExec to perform remote service manipulation to execute a copy of itself as part of lateral movement.(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
SLOTHFULMEDIA

SLOTHFULMEDIA has the capability to start services.(Citation: CISA MAR SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)
PsExec

Microsoft Sysinternals PsExec is a popular administration tool that can be used to execute binaries on remote systems using a temporary Windows service.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)
HermeticWizard

HermeticWizard can use `OpenRemoteServiceManager` to create a service.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)
Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has created services on remote systems for execution purposes.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
APT39

APT39 has used post-exploitation tools including RemCom and the Non-sucking Service Manager (NSSM) to execute processes.(Citation: BitDefender Chafer May 2020)(Citation: Symantec Chafer February 2018)
APT38

APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)
Honeybee

Honeybee launches a DLL file that gets executed as a service using svchost.exe(Citation: McAfee Honeybee)
BlackByte

BlackByte created malicious services for ransomware execution.(Citation: Symantec BlackByte 2022)(Citation: Cisco BlackByte 2024)
Silence

Silence has used Winexe to install a service on the remote system.(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used `services.exe` to execute scripts and executables during lateral movement within a victim's network. Wizard Spider has also used batch scripts that leverage PsExec to execute a previously transferred ransomware payload on a victim's network.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk in 5 Hours October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)
APT32

APT32's backdoor has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload. (Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)
INC Ransom

INC Ransom has run a file encryption executable via `Service Control Manager/7045;winupd,%SystemRoot%\winupd.exe,user mode service,demand start,LocalSystem`.(Citation: Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023)
Chimera

Chimera has used PsExec to deploy beacons on compromised systems.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)
Velvet Ant

Velvet Ant executed and installed PlugX as a Windows service.(Citation: Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024A)
Ke3chang

Ke3chang has used a tool known as RemoteExec (similar to PsExec) to remotely execute batch scripts and binaries.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)
Moonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet used intermediate loader malware such as YouieLoader and SplitLoader that create malicious services.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)
Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs by configuring them to execute via the "wercplsupport" service.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)

FIN6

FIN6 has created Windows services to execute encoded PowerShell commands.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)
APT41

APT41 used svchost.exe and Net to execute a system service installed to launch a Cobalt Strike BEACON loader.(Citation: FireEye APT41 March 2020)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Suspicious Process Behavior: - Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts. - Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action. Unauthorized File Access: - Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization. - Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it. Abnormal API Calls: - Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities. - Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like `OpenProcess` and `WriteProcessMemory` and terminates the offending process. Exploit Prevention: - Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access. - Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.
Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files. Enforce Least Privilege Permissions: - Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs. Harden File Shares: - Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): - Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions. Audit File System Access: - Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities. Restrict Startup Directories: - Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`. - On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`.

Обнаружение

Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.

Ссылки

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