Wizard Spider
Associated Group Descriptions |
|
Name | Description |
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Grim Spider | (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019) |
UNC1878 | (Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) |
TEMP.MixMaster | (Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019) |
ITG23 | (Citation: IBM X-Force ITG23 Oct 2021) |
FIN12 | (Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Periwinkle Tempest | (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023) |
DEV-0193 | (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023) |
GOLD BLACKBURN | (Citation: Secureworks Gold Blackburn Mar 2022) |
Techniques Used |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Wizard Spider has identified domain admins through the use of `net group "Domain admins" /DOMAIN`. Wizard Spider has also leveraged the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-ADComputer` to collect account names from Active Directory data.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1557 | .001 | Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay |
Wizard Spider has used the Invoke-Inveigh PowerShell cmdlets, likely for name service poisoning.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
Wizard Spider has used HTTP for network communications.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019) |
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
Wizard Spider has archived data into ZIP files on compromised machines.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Wizard Spider has established persistence via the Registry key |
.004 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL |
Wizard Spider has established persistence using Userinit by adding the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Wizard Spider has used macros to execute PowerShell scripts to download malware on victim's machines.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019) It has also used PowerShell to execute commands and move laterally through a victim network.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Wizard Spider has used `cmd.exe` to execute commands on a victim's machine.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | Create Account: Local Account |
Wizard Spider has created local administrator accounts to maintain persistence in compromised networks.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
.002 | Create Account: Domain Account |
Wizard Spider has created and used new accounts within a victim's Active Directory environment to maintain persistence.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
Wizard Spider has installed TrickBot as a service named ControlServiceA in order to establish persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1555 | .004 | Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager |
Wizard Spider has used PowerShell cmdlet `Invoke-WCMDump` to enumerate Windows credentials in the Credential Manager in a compromised network.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
Wizard Spider has staged ZIP files in local directories such as, `C:\PerfLogs\1\` and `C:\User\1\` prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1585 | .002 | Establish Accounts: Email Accounts |
Wizard Spider has leveraged ProtonMail email addresses in ransom notes when delivering Ryuk ransomware.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1048 | .003 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Wizard Spider has exfiltrated victim information using FTP.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020) |
Enterprise | T1567 | .002 | Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Wizard Spider has exfiltrated stolen victim data to various cloud storage providers.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1222 | .001 | File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification |
Wizard Spider has used the icacls command to modify access control to backup servers, providing them with full control of all the system folders.(Citation: Sophos New Ryuk Attack October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Wizard Spider has shut down or uninstalled security applications on victim systems that might prevent ransomware from executing.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
Wizard Spider has used file deletion to remove some modules and configurations from an infected host after use.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019) |
Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service |
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks to install TrickBot, using task names to appear legitimate such as WinDotNet, GoogleTask, or Sysnetsf.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019) It has also used common document file names for other malware binaries.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Wizard Spider has dumped the lsass.exe memory to harvest credentials with the use of open-source tool LaZagne.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
.002 | OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager |
Wizard Spider has acquired credentials from the SAM/SECURITY registry hives.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) |
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.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
Wizard Spider has gained access to credentials via exported copies of the ntds.dit Active Directory database. Wizard Spider has also created a volume shadow copy and used a batch script file to collect NTDS.dit with the use of the Windows utility, ntdsutil.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1027 | .010 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation |
Wizard Spider used Base64 encoding to obfuscate an Empire service and PowerShell commands.(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
Wizard Spider has utilized tools such as Empire, Cobalt Strike, Cobalt Strike, Rubeus, AdFind, BloodHound, Metasploit, Advanced IP Scanner, Nirsoft PingInfoView, and SoftPerfect Network Scanner for targeting efforts.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
.003 | Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates |
Wizard Spider has obtained code signing certificates signed by DigiCert, GlobalSign, and COMOOD for malware payloads.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1069 | .002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups |
Wizard Spider has used |
Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
Wizard Spider has used spearphishing attachments to deliver Microsoft documents containing macros or PDFs containing malicious links to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
.002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link |
Wizard Spider has sent phishing emails containing a link to an actor-controlled Google Drive document or other free online file hosting services.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1055 | .001 | Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection |
Wizard Spider has injected malicious DLLs into memory with read, write, and execute permissions.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020) |
Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
.002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Wizard Spider has used SMB to drop Cobalt Strike Beacon on a domain controller for lateral movement.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020) |
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.006 | Remote Services: Windows Remote Management |
Wizard Spider has used Window Remote Management to move laterally through a victim network.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery |
Wizard Spider has used WMI to identify anti-virus products installed on a victim's machine.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1558 | .003 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting |
Wizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing |
Wizard Spider has used Digicert code-signing certificates for some of its malware.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020) |
Enterprise | T1218 | .011 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 |
Wizard Spider has utilized `rundll32.exe` to deploy ransomware commands with the use of WebDAV.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1569 | .002 | System Services: Service Execution |
Wizard Spider has used `services.exe` to execute scripts and executables during lateral movement within a victim's network. Wizard Spider has also used batch scripts that leverage PsExec to execute a previously transferred ransomware payload on a victim's network.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk in 5 Hours October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1552 | .006 | Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences |
Wizard Spider has used PowerShell cmdlets `Get-GPPPassword` and `Find-GPOPassword` to find unsecured credentials in a compromised network group policy.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1550 | .002 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash |
Wizard Spider has used the `Invoke-SMBExec` PowerShell cmdlet to execute the pass-the-hash technique and utilized stolen password hashes to move laterally.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link |
Wizard Spider has lured victims into clicking a malicious link delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020) |
.002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
Wizard Spider has lured victims to execute malware with spearphishing attachments containing macros to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1078 | .002 | Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
Wizard Spider has used administrative accounts, including Domain Admin, to move laterally within a victim network.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) |
References
- Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
- The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.
- DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
- John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
- Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.
- Sean Gallagher, Peter Mackenzie, Elida Leite, Syed Shahram, Bill Kearney, Anand Aijan, Sivagnanam Gn, Suraj Mundalik. (2020, October 14). They’re back: inside a new Ryuk ransomware attack. Retrieved October 14, 2020.
- Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
- The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
- The DFIR Report. (2020, October 18). Ryuk in 5 Hours. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
- Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
- Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
- Brewster, T. (2017, May 4). https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/04/dyre-hackers-stealing-millions-from-american-coporates/#601c77842a0a. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
- Feeley, B. and Stone-Gross, B. (2019, March 20). New Evidence Proves Ongoing WIZARD SPIDER / LUNAR SPIDER Collaboration. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
- Umawing, J. (2019, September 3). TrickBot adds new trick to its arsenal: tampering with trusted texts. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
- Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
- Secureworks Counter Threat Unit. (2022, March 1). Gold Blackburn Threat Profile. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
- Villadsen, O., et al. (2021, October 13). Trickbot Rising - Gang Doubles Down on Infection Efforts to Amass Network Footholds. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
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