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Phishing:  Целевой фишинг со ссылкой

ID Название
.001 Целевой фишинг с вложением
.002 Целевой фишинг со ссылкой
.003 Целевой фишинг через сторонние сервисы

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to Steal Application Access Tokens.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)

ID: T1566.002
Относится к технике:  T1566
Тактика(-и): Initial Access
Платформы: Google Workspace, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Источники данных: Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 2.3
Дата создания: 02 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 21 Oct 2022

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
BlackTech

BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with links to cloud services to deliver malware.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)
Kerrdown

Kerrdown has been distributed via e-mails containing a malicious link.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
MuddyWater

MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing e-mails with malicious links.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
Confucius

Confucius has sent malicious links to victims through email campaigns.(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Aug 2021)
Night Dragon

Night Dragon sent spearphishing emails containing links to compromised websites where malware was downloaded.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
Mofang

Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious links included.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)
Kimsuky

Kimsuky has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a document that contained malicious macros or took the victim to an actor-controlled domain.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)
Sidewinder

Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links often crafted for specific targets.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)
GuLoader

GuLoader has been spread in phishing campaigns using malicious web links.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)
OutSteel

OutSteel has been distributed through malicious links contained within spearphishing emails.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

During Night Dragon, threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing links to compromised websites where malware was downloaded.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS has been distributed as a malicious link within an email.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
Elderwood

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing a link to malicious content hosted on an uncommon Web server.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)
Javali

Javali has been delivered via malicious links embedded in e-mails.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
Squirrelwaffle

Squirrelwaffle has been distributed through phishing emails containing a malicious URL.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)
Machete

Machete has sent phishing emails that contain a link to an external server with ZIP and RAR archives.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)
AppleJeus

AppleJeus has been distributed via spearphishing link.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)
FIN7

FIN7 has conducted broad phishing campaigns using malicious links.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
Emotet

Emotet has been delivered by phishing emails containing links. (Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: CIS Emotet Apr 2017)(Citation: Malwarebytes Emotet Dec 2017)(Citation: Symantec Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: Talos Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: Picus Emotet Dec 2018)

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails to victims that contained a malicious link.(Citation: ESET Operation Spalax Jan 2021)
Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has crafted phishing emails containing malicious hyperlinks.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)
Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Evilnum

Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a zip file hosted on Google Drive.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)
SpicyOmelette

SpicyOmelette has been distributed via emails containing a malicious link that appears to be a PDF document.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018)
Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has delivered web bugs and malicious links to their intended targets.(Citation: McAfee Dianxun March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)
FIN8

FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing links to malicious documents with embedded macros.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)
APT32

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT32 April 2020)(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
Pony

Pony has been delivered via spearphishing emails which contained malicious links.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

APT3

APT3 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)
APT1

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing hyperlinks to malicious files.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)
Leviathan

Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with links, often using a fraudulent lookalike domain and stolen branding.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)
Saint Bot

Saint Bot has been distributed through malicious links contained within spearphishing emails.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
APT33

APT33 has sent spearphishing emails containing links to .hta files.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019)
ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used malicious links and web beacons in e-mails for malware download and to track hits to attacker-controlled URL's.(Citation: Microsoft Targeting Elections September 2020)(Citation: Google Election Threats October 2020)(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)
EXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY has relied on victims to open malicious links in e-mails for execution.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)
AADInternals

AADInternals can send "consent phishing" emails containing malicious links designed to steal users’ access tokens.(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)
Bumblebee

Bumblebee has been spread through e-mail campaigns with malicious links.(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022)(Citation: Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022)

During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent emails containing a malicious link to student targets in India.(Citation: Cisco Talos Transparent Tribe Education Campaign July 2022)
TrickBot

TrickBot has been delivered via malicious links in phishing e-mails.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
Molerats

Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has sent malicious URL links through email to victims. In some cases the URLs were shortened or linked to Word documents with malicious macros that executed PowerShells scripts to download Pupy.(Citation: Secureworks Cobalt Gypsy Feb 2017)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)
OilRig

OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious links to potential victims.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)
Windshift

Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with links to harvest credentials and deliver malware.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)
Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has sent emails with URLs pointing to malicious documents.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018)
NETWIRE

NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious links.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)
APT29

APT29 has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL USAID Phish May 2021)
FIN4

FIN4 has used spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts) containing malicious links.(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Video Dec 2014)
QakBot

QakBot has spread through emails with malicious links.(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot May 2020)(Citation: Kroll Qakbot June 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)

Hancitor

Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails which contained malicious links.(Citation: Threatpost Hancitor)
APT28

APT28 sent spearphishing emails which used a URL-shortener service to masquerade as a legitimate service and to redirect targets to credential harvesting sites.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)
Bazar

Bazar has been spread via emails with embedded malicious links.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)
Stolen Pencil

Stolen Pencil sent spearphishing emails containing links to domains controlled by the threat actor.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)
Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has sent spearphishing emails to potential targets that contained a malicious link.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)
Ember Bear

Ember Bear has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
Turla

Turla attempted to trick targets into clicking on a link featuring a seemingly legitimate domain from Adobe.com to download their malware and gain initial access.(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has sent phishing emails containing a link to an actor-controlled Google Drive document or other free online file hosting services.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)
Patchwork

Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims. The group has also used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.(Citation: Symantec Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)
TA505

TA505 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)
LazyScripter

LazyScripter has used spam emails that contain a link that redirects the victim to download a malicious document.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
Melcoz

Melcoz has been spread through malicious links embedded in e-mails.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious link.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro has been spread via malicious links embedded in e-mails.(Citation: IBM Grandoreiro April 2020)(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)
Valak

Valak has been delivered via malicious links in e-mail.(Citation: SentinelOne Valak June 2020)
APT39

APT39 leveraged spearphishing emails with malicious links to initially compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)
Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 used spearphishing with PDF attachments containing malicious links that redirected to credential harvesting websites.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Software Configuration

Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.
Restrict Web-Based Content

Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
Audit

Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.
User Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
User Training

Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.

Обнаружение

URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021). Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once User Execution occurs.

Ссылки

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