Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Phishing:  Целевой фишинг с вложением

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.

ID: T1566.001
Относится к технике:  T1566
Тактика(-и): Initial Access
Платформы: Linux, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 2.2
Дата создания: 02 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
TrickBot

TrickBot has used an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware(Citation: TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019)

BLINDINGCAN

BLINDINGCAN has been delivered by phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents.(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)

Bumblebee

Bumblebee has gained execution through luring users into opening malicious attachments.(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022)(Citation: Symantec Bumblebee June 2022)(Citation: Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022)(Citation: Medium Ali Salem Bumblebee April 2022)

KOPILUWAK

KOPILUWAK has been delivered to victims as a malicious email attachment.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

ThreatNeedle

ThreatNeedle has been distributed via a malicious Word document within a spearphishing email.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Pony

Pony has been delivered via spearphishing attachments.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

OceanSalt

OceanSalt has been delivered via spearphishing emails with Microsoft Office attachments.(Citation: McAfee Oceansalt Oct 2018)

AppleSeed

AppleSeed has been distributed to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)

NETWIRE

NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious attachments.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint NETWIRE December 2020)

EnvyScout

EnvyScout has been distributed via spearphishing as an email attachment.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)

Emotet

Emotet has been delivered by phishing emails containing attachments. (Citation: CIS Emotet Apr 2017)(Citation: Malwarebytes Emotet Dec 2017)(Citation: Symantec Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: Picus Emotet Dec 2018)(Citation: Carbon Black Emotet Apr 2019)(Citation: IBM IcedID November 2017)

Woody RAT

Woody RAT has been delivered via malicious Word documents and archive files.(Citation: MalwareBytes WoodyRAT Aug 2022)

Squirrelwaffle

Squirrelwaffle has been distributed via malicious Microsoft Office documents within spam emails.(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

Snip3

Snip3 has been delivered to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021)

Rifdoor

Rifdoor has been distributed in e-mails with malicious Excel or Word documents.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020)

IcedID

IcedID has been delivered via phishing e-mails with malicious attachments.(Citation: Juniper IcedID June 2020)(Citation: DFIR_Sodinokibi_Ransomware)

BADFLICK

BADFLICK has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)

Flagpro

Flagpro has been distributed via spearphishing as an email attachment.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

DarkTortilla

DarkTortilla has been distributed via spearphishing emails containing archive attachments, with file types such as .iso, .zip, .img, .dmg, and .tar, as well as through malicious documents.(Citation: Secureworks DarkTortilla Aug 2022)

ROKRAT

ROKRAT has been delivered via spearphishing emails that contain a malicious Hangul Office or Microsoft Word document.(Citation: Malwarebytes RokRAT VBA January 2021)

DarkWatchman

DarkWatchman has been delivered via spearphishing emails that contain a malicious zip file.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)

Javali

Javali has been delivered as malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)

Bisonal

Bisonal has been delivered as malicious email attachments.(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)

Lumma Stealer

Lumma Stealer has been delivered through phishing emails with malicious attachments.(Citation: Cybereason LumaStealer Undated)

Clambling

Clambling has been delivered to victim's machines through malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)

Agent Tesla

The primary delivered mechanism for Agent Tesla is through email phishing messages.(Citation: Bitdefender Agent Tesla April 2020)

DarkGate

DarkGate can be distributed through emails with malicious attachments from a spoofed email address.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018)

SVCReady

SVCReady has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Mircrosoft Word documents.(Citation: HP SVCReady Jun 2022)

Latrodectus

Latrodectus has been distributed through reply-chain phishing emails with malicious attachments.(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)

Saint Bot

Saint Bot has been distributed as malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

Chaes

Chaes has been delivered by sending victims a phishing email containing a malicious .docx file.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

Metamorfo

Metamorfo has been delivered to victims via emails with malicious HTML attachments.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

Bandook

Bandook is delivered via a malicious Word document inside a zip file.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

KONNI

KONNI has been delivered via spearphishing campaigns through a malicious Word document.(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021)

Kerrdown

Kerrdown has been distributed through malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

RTM

RTM has been delivered via spearphishing attachments disguised as PDF documents.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

StrelaStealer

StrelaStealer has been distributed as a spearphishing attachment.(Citation: DCSO StrelaStealer 2022)

ZxxZ

ZxxZ has been distributed via spearphishing emails, usually containing a malicious RTF or Excel attachment.(Citation: Cisco Talos Bitter Bangladesh May 2022)

XLoader

XLoader has been delivered as a phishing attachment, including PDFs with embedded links, Word and Excel files, and various archive files (ZIP, RAR, ACE, and ISOs) containing EXE payloads.(Citation: Google XLoader 2017)(Citation: Acronis XLoader 2021)

REvil

REvil has been distributed via malicious e-mail attachments including MS Word Documents.(Citation: G Data Sodinokibi June 2019)(Citation: Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)

Valak

Valak has been delivered via spearphishing e-mails with password protected ZIP files.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)

Taidoor

Taidoor has been delivered through spearphishing emails.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)

DanBot

DanBot has been distributed within a malicious Excel attachment via spearphishing emails.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)

Ramsay

Ramsay has been distributed through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020)

OutSteel

OutSteel has been distributed as a malicious attachment within a spearphishing email.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

Lokibot

Lokibot is delivered via a malicious XLS attachment contained within a spearhpishing email.(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021)

PoetRAT

PoetRAT was distributed via malicious Word documents.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS has been distributed via spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)

Octopus

Octopus has been delivered via spearsphishing emails.(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)

Astaroth

Astaroth has been delivered via malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)

QakBot

QakBot has spread through emails with malicious attachments.(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot May 2020)(Citation: Kroll Qakbot June 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Cyberint Qakbot May 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)(Citation: Deep Instinct Black Basta August 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)

Hancitor

Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails with malicious attachments.(Citation: FireEye Hancitor)

JSS Loader

JSS Loader has been delivered by phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Excel attachments.(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)

WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT has been distributed as a malicious attachment within an email.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)

Frankenstein

Frankenstein has used spearphishing emails to send trojanized Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)

APT28

APT28 sent spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office and RAR attachments.(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)

Turla

Turla has used spearphishing emails to deliver BrainTest as a malicious attachment.(Citation: ESET Carbon Mar 2017)

Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office and fake installer file attachments.(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)(Citation: TrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015)(Citation: CitizenLab Tropic Trooper Aug 2018)(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

The White Company

The White Company has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to victims.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)

APT33

APT33 has sent spearphishing e-mails with archive attachments.(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has delivered spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to targets.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)(Citation: unit42_gamaredon_dec2022)

APT29

APT29 has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: ESET T3 Threat Report 2021)(Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile)

TA2541

TA2541 has sent phishing emails with malicious attachments for initial access including MS Word documents.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021)

WIRTE

WIRTE has sent emails to intended victims with malicious MS Word and Excel attachments.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)

Darkhotel

Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails with malicious RAR and .LNK attachments.(Citation: Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016)

APT1

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)

APT39

APT39 leveraged spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer February 2018)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)

APT38

APT38 has conducted spearphishing campaigns using malicious email attachments.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)

APT12

APT12 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents and PDFs attached.(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Trend Micro IXESHE 2012)

Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has sent spearphishing e-mails with attachments to deliver malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)

MuddyWater

MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) (Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Proofpoint TA450 Phishing March 2024)

Leviathan

Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including .rtf, .doc, and .xls files.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 used spearphishing with Microsoft Office attachments to target victims.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)

Ferocious Kitten

Ferocious Kitten has conducted spearphishing campaigns containing malicious documents to lure victims to open the attachments.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)

DarkHydrus

DarkHydrus has sent spearphishing emails with password-protected RAR archives containing malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy). The group has also sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office documents that use the “attachedTemplate” technique to load a template from a remote server.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Phishery Aug 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER used spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to infect victims.(Citation: Symantec Tick Apr 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)

Machete

Machete has delivered spearphishing emails that contain a zipped file with malicious contents.(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)

FIN4

FIN4 has used spearphishing emails containing attachments (which are often stolen, legitimate documents sent from compromised accounts) with embedded malicious macros.(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Video Dec 2014)

Molerats

Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachments.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

SideCopy

SideCopy has sent spearphishing emails with malicious hta file attachments.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)

Silence

Silence has sent emails with malicious DOCX, CHM, LNK and ZIP attachments. (Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)

Nomadic Octopus

Nomadic Octopus has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)

Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used spearphishing attachments to deliver Microsoft documents containing macros or PDFs containing malicious links to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)

Confucius

Confucius has crafted and sent victims malicious attachments to gain initial access.(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used e-mail to deliver malicious attachments to victims.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)

EXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY conducted an e-mail thread-hijacking campaign with malicious ISO attachments.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022)

APT32

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT32 April 2020)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

Saint Bear

Saint Bear uses a variety of file formats, such as Microsoft Office documents, ZIP archives, PDF documents, and other items as phishing attachments for initial access.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

Higaisa

Higaisa has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)

Dragonfly

Dragonfly has sent emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access.(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)

Sidewinder

Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)

Naikon

Naikon has used malicious e-mail attachments to deliver malware.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)

OilRig

OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious attachments to potential victims using compromised and/or spoofed email accounts.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)

APT19

APT19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits.(Citation: FireEye APT19)

APT37

APT37 delivers malware using spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Talos Group123)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019)

Inception

Inception has used weaponized documents attached to spearphishing emails for reconnaissance and initial compromise.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)

Andariel

Andariel has conducted spearphishing campaigns that included malicious Word or Excel attachments.(Citation: AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018)(Citation: MalwareBytes Lazarus-Andariel Conceals Code April 2021)

FIN7

FIN7 sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)

APT-C-36

APT-C-36 has used spearphishing emails with password protected RAR attachment to avoid being detected by the email gateway.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)

Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)

BITTER

BITTER has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious RTF document or Excel spreadsheet.(Citation: Cisco Talos Bitter Bangladesh May 2022)(Citation: Forcepoint BITTER Pakistan Oct 2016)

IndigoZebra

IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious password-protected RAR attachments.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has delivered malicious Microsoft Office and ZIP file attachments via spearphishing emails.(Citation: iSight Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Google_WinRAR_vuln_2023)(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)

Sharpshooter

Sharpshooter has sent malicious attachments via emails to targets.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018)

Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used personalized spearphishing attachments.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)

menuPass

menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)

Tonto Team

Tonto Team has delivered payloads via spearphishing attachments.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)

Mofang

Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious documents, PDFs, or Excel files attached.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)

Windshift

Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with attachment to harvest credentials and deliver malware.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)

Star Blizzard

Star Blizzard has sent emails with malicious .pdf files to spread malware.(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)

BlackTech

BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious password-protected archived files (ZIP or RAR) to deliver malware.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

Gallmaker

Gallmaker sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)

Patchwork

Patchwork has used spearphishing with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)

Moonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet delivered various payloads to victims as spearphishing attachments.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)

Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has used spearphishing attachments to deliver initial access payloads.(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 November 2020)(Citation: Google TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022)

Ember Bear

Ember Bear has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments in the form of PDFs, Word documents, JavaScript files, and Control Panel File (CPL) executables.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

RedCurl

RedCurl has used phishing emails with malicious files to gain initial access.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl1)(Citation: trendmicro_redcurl)

TA459

TA459 has targeted victims using spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)

Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group sent emails to victims with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)

Ajax Security Team

Ajax Security Team has used personalized spearphishing attachments.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)

Winter Vivern

Winter Vivern leverages malicious attachments delivered via email for initial access activity.(Citation: DomainTools WinterVivern 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: CERT-UA WinterVivern 2023)

CURIUM

CURIUM has used phishing with malicious attachments for initial access to victim environments.(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)

TA551

TA551 has sent spearphishing attachments with password protected ZIP files.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN)

RTM

RTM has used spearphishing attachments to distribute its malware.(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)

FIN6

FIN6 has targeted victims with e-mails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019)

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has sent spearphishing emails with various attachment types to corporate and personal email accounts of victim organizations. Attachment types have included .rtf, .doc, .xls, archives containing LNK files, and password protected archives containing .exe and .scr executables.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Cobalt Gang Oct 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)

Elderwood

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)

APT41

APT41 sent spearphishing emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)

Malteiro

Malteiro has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious .zip files.(Citation: SCILabs Malteiro 2021)

FIN8

FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing Word documents with embedded malicious macros.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)

APT30

APT30 has used spearphishing emails with malicious DOC attachments.(Citation: FireEye APT30)

TA505

TA505 has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: ProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)

LazyScripter

LazyScripter has used spam emails weaponized with archive or document files as its initial infection vector.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)

PLATINUM

PLATINUM has sent spearphishing emails with attachments to victims as its primary initial access vector.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)

admin@338

admin@338 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.(Citation: FireEye admin@338)

Rancor

Rancor has attached a malicious document to an email to gain initial access.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Antivirus/Antimalware

Antivirus/Antimalware solutions utilize signatures, heuristics, and behavioral analysis to detect, block, and remediate malicious software, including viruses, trojans, ransomware, and spyware. These solutions continuously monitor endpoints and systems for known malicious patterns and suspicious behaviors that indicate compromise. Antivirus/Antimalware software should be deployed across all devices, with automated updates to ensure protection against the latest threats. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Signature-Based Detection: - Implementation: Use predefined signatures to identify known malware based on unique patterns such as file hashes, byte sequences, or command-line arguments. This method is effective against known threats. - Use Case: When malware like "Emotet" is detected, its signature (such as a specific file hash) matches a known database of malicious software, triggering an alert and allowing immediate quarantine of the infected file. Heuristic-Based Detection: - Implementation: Deploy heuristic algorithms that analyze behavior and characteristics of files and processes to identify potential malware, even if it doesn’t match a known signature. - Use Case: If a program attempts to modify multiple critical system files or initiate suspicious network communications, heuristic analysis may flag it as potentially malicious, even if no specific malware signature is available. Behavioral Detection (Behavior Prevention): - Implementation: Use behavioral analysis to detect patterns of abnormal activities, such as unusual system calls, unauthorized file encryption, or attempts to escalate privileges. - Use Case: Behavioral analysis can detect ransomware attacks early by identifying behavior like mass file encryption, even before a specific ransomware signature has been identified. Real-Time Scanning: - Implementation: Enable real-time scanning to automatically inspect files and network traffic for signs of malware as they are accessed, downloaded, or executed. - Use Case: When a user downloads an email attachment, the antivirus solution scans the file in real-time, checking it against both signatures and heuristics to detect any malicious content before it can be opened. Cloud-Assisted Threat Intelligence: - Implementation: Use cloud-based threat intelligence to ensure the antivirus solution can access the latest malware definitions and real-time threat feeds from a global database of emerging threats. - Use Case: Cloud-assisted antivirus solutions quickly identify newly discovered malware by cross-referencing against global threat databases, providing real-time protection against zero-day attacks. **Tools for Implementation**: - Endpoint Security Platforms: Use solutions such as EDR for comprehensive antivirus/antimalware protection across all systems. - Centralized Management: Implement centralized antivirus management consoles that provide visibility into threat activity, enable policy enforcement, and automate updates. - Behavioral Analysis Tools: Leverage solutions with advanced behavioral analysis capabilities to detect malicious activity patterns that don’t rely on known signatures.

User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks. Permission Audits: - Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions. Software Audits: - Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives. Configuration Audits: - Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems. Network Audits: - Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

Software Configuration

Software configuration refers to making security-focused adjustments to the settings of applications, middleware, databases, or other software to mitigate potential threats. These changes help reduce the attack surface, enforce best practices, and protect sensitive data. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Conduct a Security Review of Application Settings: - Review the software documentation to identify recommended security configurations. - Compare default settings against organizational policies and compliance requirements. Implement Access Controls and Permissions: - Restrict access to sensitive features or data within the software. - Enforce least privilege principles for all roles and accounts interacting with the software. Enable Logging and Monitoring: - Configure detailed logging for key application events such as authentication failures, configuration changes, or unusual activity. - Integrate logs with a centralized monitoring solution, such as a SIEM. Update and Patch Software Regularly: - Ensure the software is kept up-to-date with the latest security patches to address known vulnerabilities. - Use automated patch management tools to streamline the update process. Disable Unnecessary Features or Services: - Turn off unused functionality or components that could introduce vulnerabilities, such as debugging interfaces or deprecated APIs. Test Configuration Changes: - Perform configuration changes in a staging environment before applying them in production. - Conduct regular audits to ensure that settings remain aligned with security policies. *Tools for Implementation* Configuration Management Tools: - Ansible: Automates configuration changes across multiple applications and environments. - Chef: Ensures consistent application settings through code-based configuration management. - Puppet: Automates software configurations and audits changes for compliance. Security Benchmarking Tools: - CIS-CAT: Provides benchmarks and audits for secure software configurations. - Aqua Security Trivy: Scans containerized applications for configuration issues. Vulnerability Management Solutions: - Nessus: Identifies misconfigurations and suggests corrective actions. Logging and Monitoring Tools: - Splunk: Aggregates and analyzes application logs to detect suspicious activity.

User Training

User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques. Comprehensive training programs create a human firewall by empowering users to be an active component of the organization's cybersecurity defenses. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Create Comprehensive Training Programs: - Design training modules tailored to the organization's risk profile, covering topics such as phishing, password management, and incident reporting. - Provide role-specific training for high-risk employees, such as helpdesk staff or executives. Use Simulated Exercises: - Conduct phishing simulations to measure user susceptibility and provide targeted follow-up training. - Run social engineering drills to evaluate employee responses and reinforce protocols. Leverage Gamification and Engagement: - Introduce interactive learning methods such as quizzes, gamified challenges, and rewards for successful detection and reporting of threats. Incorporate Security Policies into Onboarding: - Include cybersecurity training as part of the onboarding process for new employees. - Provide easy-to-understand materials outlining acceptable use policies and reporting procedures. Regular Refresher Courses: - Update training materials to include emerging threats and techniques used by adversaries. - Ensure all employees complete periodic refresher courses to stay informed. Emphasize Real-World Scenarios: - Use case studies of recent attacks to demonstrate the consequences of successful phishing or social engineering. - Discuss how specific employee actions can prevent or mitigate such attacks.

Restrict Web-Based Content

Restricting web-based content involves enforcing policies and technologies that limit access to potentially malicious websites, unsafe downloads, and unauthorized browser behaviors. This can include URL filtering, download restrictions, script blocking, and extension control to protect against exploitation, phishing, and malware delivery. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Deploy Web Proxy Filtering: - Use solutions to filter web traffic based on categories, reputation, and content types. - Enforce policies that block unsafe websites or file types at the gateway level. Enable DNS-Based Filtering: - Implement tools to restrict access to domains associated with malware or phishing campaigns. - Use public DNS filtering services to enhance protection. Enforce Content Security Policies (CSP): - Configure CSP headers on internal and external web applications to restrict script execution, iframe embedding, and cross-origin requests. Control Browser Features: - Disable unapproved browser features like automatic downloads, developer tools, or unsafe scripting. - Enforce policies through tools like Group Policy Management to control browser settings. Monitor and Alert on Web-Based Threats: - Use SIEM tools to collect and analyze web proxy logs for signs of anomalous or malicious activity. - Configure alerts for access attempts to blocked domains or repeated file download failures.

Обнаружение

Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution or usage of malicious scripts. Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)

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