Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

APT32

APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)
ID: G0050
Associated Groups: SeaLotus, APT-C-00, OceanLotus, Canvas Cyclone, BISMUTH
Version: 3.0
Created: 14 Dec 2017
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2024

Associated Group Descriptions

Name Description
SeaLotus (Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)
APT-C-00 (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
OceanLotus (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
Canvas Cyclone (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
BISMUTH (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1087 .001 Account Discovery: Local Account

APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1583 .001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

APT32 has set up and operated websites to gather information and deliver malware.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services

APT32 has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

Enterprise T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

APT32 has used JavaScript that communicates over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to download additional frameworks. The group has also used downloaded encrypted payloads over HTTP.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.003 Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols

APT32 has used email for C2 via an Office macro.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

APT32 established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

Enterprise T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

APT32 has used PowerShell-based tools, PowerShell one-liners, and shellcode loaders for execution.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

APT32 has used cmd.exe for execution.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

APT32 has used macros, COM scriptlets, and VBS scripts.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

Enterprise T1543 .003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

APT32 modified Windows Services to ensure PowerShell scripts were loaded on the system. APT32 also creates a Windows service to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

Enterprise T1585 .001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts

APT32 has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

Enterprise T1048 .003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

APT32's backdoor can exfiltrate data by encoding it in the subdomain field of DNS packets.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

Enterprise T1222 .002 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification

APT32's macOS backdoor changes the permission of the file it wants to execute to 755.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019)

Enterprise T1589 .002 Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses

APT32 has collected e-mail addresses for activists and bloggers in order to target them with spyware.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

Enterprise T1564 .001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories

APT32's macOS backdoor hides the clientID file via a chflags function.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019)

.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window

APT32 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.004 Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes

APT32 used NTFS alternate data streams to hide their payloads.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1574 .002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading

APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder).(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

Enterprise T1070 .001 Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs

APT32 has cleared select event log entries.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)

.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

APT32's macOS backdoor can receive a “delete” command.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019)

.006 Indicator Removal: Timestomp

APT32 has used scheduled task raw XML with a backdated timestamp of June 2, 2016. The group has also set the creation time of the files dropped by the second stage of the exploit to match the creation time of kernel32.dll. Additionally, APT32 has used a random value to modify the timestamp of the file storing the clientID.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019)

Enterprise T1056 .001 Input Capture: Keylogging

APT32 has abused the PasswordChangeNotify to monitor for and capture account password changes.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1036 .003 Masquerading: Rename System Utilities

APT32 has moved and renamed pubprn.vbs to a .txt file to avoid detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick APT32 pubprn Masquerade)

.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service

APT32 has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade service names, such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name. APT32 has also impersonated the legitimate Flash installer file name "install_flashplayer.exe".(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)

.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update. APT32 has also renamed a Cobalt Strike beacon payload to install_flashplayers.exe. (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

Enterprise T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

APT32 used Mimikatz and customized versions of Windows Credential Dumper to harvest credentials.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1027 .001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding

APT32 includes garbage code to mislead anti-malware software and researchers.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

.010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation

APT32 has used the `Invoke-Obfuscation` framework to obfuscate their PowerShell.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: GitHub Invoke-Obfuscation)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.011 Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage

APT32's backdoor has stored its configuration in a registry key.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File

APT32 has performed code obfuscation, including encoding payloads using Base64 and using a framework called "Dont-Kill-My-Cat (DKMC). APT32 also encrypts the library used for network exfiltration with AES-256 in CBC mode in their macOS backdoor.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: GitHub Invoke-Obfuscation)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019)

Enterprise T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool

APT32 has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike, and a variety of other open-source tools from GitHub.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)

Enterprise T1566 .001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT32 April 2020)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT32 April 2020)(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

Enterprise T1598 .003 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link

APT32 has used malicious links to direct users to web pages designed to harvest credentials.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

Enterprise T1021 .002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

APT32 used Net to use Windows' hidden network shares to copy their tools to remote machines for execution.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1053 .005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

Enterprise T1505 .003 Server Software Component: Web Shell

APT32 has used Web shells to maintain access to victim websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)

Enterprise T1608 .001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

APT32 has hosted malicious payloads in Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive for use during targeting.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

.004 Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target

APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate, but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)

Enterprise T1218 .005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta

APT32 has used mshta.exe for code execution.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32

APT32 created a Scheduled Task/Job that used regsvr32.exe to execute a COM scriptlet that dynamically downloaded a backdoor and injected it into memory. The group has also used regsvr32 to run their backdoor.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

APT32 malware has used rundll32.exe to execute an initial infection process.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1216 .001 System Script Proxy Execution: PubPrn

APT32 has used PubPrn.vbs within execution scripts to execute malware, possibly bypassing defenses.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Status Update APT32 PubPrn)

Enterprise T1569 .002 System Services: Service Execution

APT32's backdoor has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload. (Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)

Enterprise T1552 .002 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry

APT32 used Outlook Credential Dumper to harvest credentials stored in Windows registry.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1550 .002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

APT32 has used pass the hash for lateral movement.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Enterprise T1204 .001 User Execution: Malicious Link

APT32 has lured targets to download a Cobalt Strike beacon by including a malicious link within spearphishing emails.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

.002 User Execution: Malicious File

APT32 has attempted to lure users to execute a malicious dropper delivered via a spearphishing attachment.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT32 April 2020)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

Enterprise T1078 .003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts

APT32 has used legitimate local admin account credentials.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)

Software

ID Name References Techniques
S0039 Net (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility) (Citation: Savill 1999) Password Policy Discovery, Domain Groups, System Time Discovery, Domain Account, Local Account, System Service Discovery, Remote System Discovery, Network Share Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, Network Share Connection Removal, Service Execution, Local Account, Additional Local or Domain Groups, Local Groups, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Domain Account
S1078 RotaJakiro (Citation: netlab360 rotajakiro vs oceanlotus) (Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis) Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, Native API, Standard Encoding, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, System Information Discovery, Systemd Service, Shared Modules, Non-Standard Port, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Match Legitimate Name or Location, Inter-Process Communication, Process Discovery, Automated Collection, XDG Autostart Entries, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Symmetric Cryptography
S0100 ipconfig (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig) System Network Configuration Discovery
S0099 Arp (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) (Citation: TechNet Arp) Remote System Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery
S0108 netsh (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) (Citation: TechNet Netsh) Disable or Modify System Firewall, Netsh Helper DLL, Proxy, Security Software Discovery
S0156 KOMPROGO (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) System Information Discovery, Windows Management Instrumentation, Windows Command Shell
S0585 Kerrdown (Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) (Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019) Spearphishing Link, Visual Basic, Spearphishing Attachment, Obfuscated Files or Information, System Information Discovery, DLL Side-Loading, Ingress Tool Transfer, Lateral Tool Transfer, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Malicious File, Malicious Link
S0155 WINDSHIELD (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) Custom Command and Control Protocol, Non-Application Layer Protocol, System Owner/User Discovery, Query Registry, System Information Discovery, File Deletion
S0157 SOUNDBITE (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) System Information Discovery, Modify Registry, DNS, Application Window Discovery, File and Directory Discovery
S0154 Cobalt Strike (Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) (Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019) (Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) Domain Fronting, Sudo and Sudo Caching, Code Signing, Scheduled Transfer, JavaScript, Remote Desktop Protocol, Native API, Pass the Hash, Domain Accounts, Indicator Removal from Tools, Bypass User Account Control, System Network Configuration Discovery, Service Execution, PowerShell, Web Protocols, Application Layer Protocol, Data from Local System, Disable or Modify Tools, Dynamic-link Library Injection, Local Accounts, Multiband Communication, Keylogging, Distributed Component Object Model, Process Discovery, BITS Jobs, Process Hollowing, Software Discovery, Local Accounts, BITS Jobs, Remote Desktop Protocol, Internal Proxy, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Screen Capture, Process Argument Spoofing, Modify Registry, Domain Groups, System Network Connections Discovery, Protocol or Service Impersonation, Parent PID Spoofing, Token Impersonation/Theft, Protocol Tunneling, Windows Service, Visual Basic, Native API, Parent PID Spoofing, Process Injection, System Service Discovery, Timestomp, System Network Configuration Discovery, SSH, File and Directory Discovery, DNS, Token Impersonation/Theft, DNS, Bypass User Account Control, Process Hollowing, Scheduled Transfer, Security Account Manager, Local Groups, PowerShell, SSH, Python, Reflective Code Loading, Remote System Discovery, LSASS Memory, Screen Capture, Commonly Used Port, Query Registry, Domain Account, Data Transfer Size Limits, Network Service Discovery, Pass the Hash, Domain Accounts, Network Share Discovery, Web Protocols, Asymmetric Cryptography, Windows Command Shell, Process Injection, Browser Session Hijacking, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Remote System Discovery, Visual Basic, Protocol Tunneling, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Windows Management Instrumentation, Keylogging, Browser Session Hijacking, Windows Remote Management, Symmetric Cryptography, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Standard Encoding, Ingress Tool Transfer, Indicator Removal from Tools, Domain Account, Internal Proxy, Service Execution, Windows Remote Management, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Rundll32, Windows Service, File Transfer Protocols, Python, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Windows Management Instrumentation, Security Account Manager, Make and Impersonate Token, Exploitation for Client Execution, Network Service Discovery, Timestomp, Distributed Component Object Model, Multiband Communication, Commonly Used Port, Network Share Discovery, Custom Command and Control Protocol, Process Discovery, Make and Impersonate Token, Data from Local System, Office Template Macros, Windows Command Shell, Obfuscated Files or Information
S0002 Mimikatz (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) (Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) DCSync, Credentials from Password Stores, Rogue Domain Controller, Private Keys, SID-History Injection, Security Support Provider, Pass the Hash, Account Manipulation, Pass the Ticket, Credentials from Web Browsers, Golden Ticket, Security Account Manager, LSASS Memory, Silver Ticket, Windows Credential Manager, Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, LSA Secrets
S0352 OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D (Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) (Citation: Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F) (Citation: Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020) (Citation: TrendMicro MacOS April 2018) (Citation: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017) Encrypted/Encoded File, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification, File Deletion, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Checks, Symmetric Cryptography, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Unix Shell, System Information Discovery, Non-Standard Port, Launch Agent, Ingress Tool Transfer, Visual Basic, Hidden Files and Directories, Timestomp, Web Protocols, Standard Encoding, Launch Daemon, Software Packing, Archive via Library, Masquerade Task or Service, Data from Local System, Archive via Custom Method, Shared Modules, Gatekeeper Bypass, PowerShell, Masquerade File Type
S0477 Goopy (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) DNS, Visual Basic, Indicator Removal, Obfuscated Files or Information, Windows Command Shell, System Owner/User Discovery, Disable or Modify Tools, Web Protocols, Process Discovery, Clear Mailbox Data, Data from Local System, Native API, Mail Protocols, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, DLL Side-Loading, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Match Legitimate Name or Location, Scheduled Task, Binary Padding
S0354 Denis (Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) (Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) DNS, File Deletion, System Checks, Ingress Tool Transfer, Process Hollowing, System Information Discovery, Query Registry, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Command Obfuscation, System Network Configuration Discovery, Standard Encoding, Archive via Library, Hijack Execution Flow, File and Directory Discovery, Native API, PowerShell, System Owner/User Discovery, DLL Side-Loading, Obfuscated Files or Information, Windows Command Shell
S0158 PHOREAL (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) Modify Registry, Custom Command and Control Protocol, Windows Command Shell, Non-Application Layer Protocol

References

  1. Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017.
  2. Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.
  3. Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  4. Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
  5. Mudge, R. (2014, July 14). Github Malleable-C2-Profiles safebrowsing.profile. Retrieved June 18, 2017.
  6. Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.
  7. Dumont, R.. (2019, April 9). OceanLotus: macOS malware update. Retrieved April 15, 2019.
  8. Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
  9. Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  10. Ray, V. and Hayashi, K. (2019, February 1). Tracking OceanLotus’ new Downloader, KerrDown. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
  11. Carr, N. (2017, December 22). ItsReallyNick Status Update. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  12. Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
  13. Henderson, S., et al. (2020, April 22). Vietnamese Threat Actors APT32 Targeting Wuhan Government and Chinese Ministry of Emergency Management in Latest Example of COVID-19 Related Espionage. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
  14. Bohannon, D.. (2017, March 13). Invoke-Obfuscation - PowerShell Obfuscator. Retrieved June 18, 2017.
  15. Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
  16. Alex Turing. (2021, May 6). RotaJakiro, the Linux version of the OceanLotus. Retrieved June 14, 2023.
  17. Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

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