Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Поиск
Работа с текстом
Сравнение текстов Генератор паролей IP-калькулятор Base64 Контрольные суммы JSON-форматирование JWT-декодер URL-кодирование CSV/JSON конвертер Конвертер времени Cron-расшифровщик Генератор QR-кодов
Вход Регистрация
MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Кража токена и имперсонация
EN
Каталоги
MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Кража токена и имперсонация
Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
Подробнее
Наш канал

Access Token Manipulation:  Кража токена и имперсонация

ID Название
.001 Кража токена и имперсонация
.002 Создание процесса с помощью токена
.003 Создание токена и имперсонация
.004 Подмена родительского PID
.005 Внедрение в sIDHistory

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread. An adversary may perform Token Impersonation/Theft when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system. When an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally Create Process with Token using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. Token Impersonation/Theft is also distinct from Make and Impersonate Token in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.

ID: T1134.001
Относится к технике:  T1134
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution
Версия: 1.3
Дата создания: 18 Feb 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Stuxnet

Stuxnet attempts to impersonate an anonymous token to enumerate bindings in the service control manager.(Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011)
SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can find a process owned by a specific user and impersonate the associated token.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)
Aria-body

Aria-body has the ability to duplicate a token from ntprint.exe.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)
Emotet

Emotet has the ability to duplicate the user’s token.(Citation: Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader) For example, Emotet may use a variant of Google’s ProtoBuf to send messages that specify how code will be executed.(Citation: emotet_hc3_nov2023)
BADHATCH

BADHATCH can impersonate a `lsass.exe` or `vmtoolsd.exe` token.(Citation: BitDefender BADHATCH Mar 2021)

Okrum

Okrum can impersonate a logged-on user's security context using a call to the ImpersonateLoggedOnUser API.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)
Siloscape

Siloscape impersonates the main thread of CExecSvc.exe by calling NtImpersonateThread.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021)
Shamoon

Shamoon can impersonate tokens using LogonUser, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, and ImpersonateNamedPipeClient.(Citation: McAfee Shamoon December 2018)
Tarrask

Tarrask leverages token theft to obtain `lsass.exe` security permissions.(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task)

FinFisher

FinFisher uses token manipulation with NtFilterToken as part of UAC bypass.(Citation: FinFisher Citation)(Citation: Microsoft FinFisher March 2018)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can steal access tokens from exiting processes.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can steal access tokens from exiting processes.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
REvil

REvil can obtain the token from the user that launched the explorer.exe process to avoid affecting the desktop of the SYSTEM user.(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)
Pupy

Pupy can obtain a list of SIDs and provide the option for selecting process tokens to impersonate.(Citation: GitHub Pupy)
BitPaymer

BitPaymer can use the tokens of users to create processes on infected systems.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
APT28

APT28 has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation.(Citation: FireEye Op RussianDoll)
FIN8

FIN8 has used a malicious framework designed to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)(Citation: Symantec FIN8 Jul 2023)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Обнаружение

If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.

Ссылки

  1. Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
  2. FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  3. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  4. Binary Defense. (n.d.). Emotet Evolves With new Wi-Fi Spreader. Retrieved September 8, 2023.
  5. Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Replace a process level token. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
  6. Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Create a token object. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
  7. Prizmant, D. (2021, June 7). Siloscape: First Known Malware Targeting Windows Containers to Compromise Cloud Environments. Retrieved June 9, 2021.
  8. Office of Information Security, Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center. (2023, November 16). Emotet Malware: The Enduring and Persistent Threat to the Health Sector. Retrieved June 19, 2024.
  9. Vrabie, V., et al. (2021, March 10). FIN8 Returns with Improved BADHATCH Toolkit. Retrieved September 8, 2021.
  10. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  11. Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  12. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion. Retrieved June 1, 2022.
  13. Allievi, A.,Flori, E. (2018, March 01). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
  14. Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022.
  15. Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
  16. McAfee. (2019, October 2). McAfee ATR Analyzes Sodinokibi aka REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – What The Code Tells Us. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
  17. MSTIC. (2022, September 8). Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  18. Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  19. Mundo, A., Roccia, T., Saavedra-Morales, J., Beek, C.. (2018, December 14). Shamoon Returns to Wipe Systems in Middle East, Europe . Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  20. Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.
  21. Martin Zugec. (2021, July 27). Deep Dive Into a FIN8 Attack - A Forensic Investigation. Retrieved September 1, 2021.
  22. Microsoft. (2021, October 12). DuplicateToken function (securitybaseapi.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.
  23. Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2023, July 18). FIN8 Uses Revamped Sardonic Backdoor to Deliver Noberus Ransomware. Retrieved August 9, 2023.
  24. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  25. CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
  26. Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
  27. FireEye Labs. (2015, April 18). Operation RussianDoll: Adobe & Windows Zero-Day Exploits Likely Leveraged by Russia’s APT28 in Highly-Targeted Attack. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
Навигация

Связанные риски

Ничего не найдено

Каталоги

Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.