Access Token Manipulation: Создание процесса с помощью токена
Other sub-techniques of Access Token Manipulation (5)
Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW
and runas
.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
Creating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via Token Impersonation/Theft or created via Make and Impersonate Token before being used to create a process.
While this technique is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft, the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process.
Примеры процедур |
|
Название | Описание |
---|---|
Azorult |
Azorult can call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with local system privileges.(Citation: Unit42 Azorult Nov 2018) |
Turla |
Turla RPC backdoors can impersonate or steal process tokens before executing commands.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) |
PipeMon |
PipeMon can attempt to gain administrative privileges using token impersonation.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) |
Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call |
PoshC2 |
PoshC2 can use Invoke-RunAs to make tokens.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) |
Aria-body |
Aria-body has the ability to execute a process using |
REvil |
REvil can launch an instance of itself with administrative rights using runas.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019) |
ZxShell |
ZxShell has a command called RunAs, which creates a new process as another user or process context.(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
WhisperGate |
The WhisperGate third stage can use the AdvancedRun.exe tool to execute commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group via `%TEMP%\AdvancedRun.exe" /EXEFilename "C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "stop WinDefend" /StartDirectory "" /RunAs 8 /Run`.(Citation: Cisco Ukraine Wipers January 2022) |
KONNI |
KONNI has duplicated the token of a high integrity process to spawn an instance of cmd.exe under an impersonated user.(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021) |
Bankshot |
Bankshot grabs a user token using WTSQueryUserToken and then creates a process by impersonating a logged-on user.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot) |
Empire |
Empire can use |
Контрмеры |
|
Контрмера | Описание |
---|---|
Privileged Account Management |
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy. |
User Account Management |
User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access. |
Обнаружение
If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. Windows Command Shell), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas
command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW
and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
Ссылки
- Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
- Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
- Yan, T., et al. (2018, November 21). New Wine in Old Bottle: New Azorult Variant Found in FindMyName Campaign using Fallout Exploit Kit. Retrieved November 29, 2018.
- Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
- Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Tools Report. Retrieved March 10, 2016.
- Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
- CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
- Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Replace a process level token. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
- Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Create a token object. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
- Allievi, A., et al. (2014, October 28). Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell. Retrieved September 24, 2019.
- Biasini, N. et al.. (2022, January 21). Ukraine Campaign Delivers Defacement and Wipers, in Continued Escalation. Retrieved March 14, 2022.
- Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, August 23). New variant of Konni malware used in campaign targetting Russia. Retrieved January 5, 2022.
- Karmi, D. (2020, January 4). A Look Into Konni 2019 Campaign. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
- Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 08). Hidden Cobra Targets Turkish Financial Sector With New Bankshot Implant. Retrieved May 18, 2018.
- Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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