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SECURITM это SGRC система, автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

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Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as Andariel, APT37, APT38, and Kimsuky.

ID: G0032

Associated Groups: Labyrinth Chollima, Diamond Sleet, ZINC, NICKEL ACADEMY, Guardians of Peace, HIDDEN COBRA

Version: 4.0

Created: 31 May 2017

Last Modified: 11 Apr 2024

Name	Description
Associated Group Descriptions
Labyrinth Chollima	(Citation: CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022)
Diamond Sleet	(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
ZINC	(Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017)
NICKEL ACADEMY	(Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017)
Guardians of Peace	(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)
HIDDEN COBRA	The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)

Domain	ID		Name	Use
Techniques Used
Enterprise	T1134	.002	Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token	Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call `CreateProcessAsUserA` under that user's context.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)
Enterprise	T1087	.002	Account Discovery: Domain Account	Lazarus Group has queried an active directory server to obtain the list of accounts, including administrator accounts.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)
Enterprise	T1583	.001	Acquire Infrastructure: Domains	Lazarus Group has acquired domains related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)
		.004	Acquire Infrastructure: Server	Lazarus Group has acquired servers to host their malicious tools.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)
		.006	Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services	Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)
Enterprise	T1557	.001	Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command `[Responder file path] -i [IP address] -rPv` on a compromised host to harvest credentials and move laterally.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Enterprise	T1071	.001	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)
Enterprise	T1560	.002	Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library	Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)
		.003	Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method	A Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)
Enterprise	T1547	.001	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
		.005	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider	Lazarus Group has rebooted victim machines to establish persistence by installing a SSP DLL.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
		.009	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification	Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)
Enterprise	T1110	.003	Brute Force: Password Spraying	Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)
Enterprise	T1059	.001	Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)
		.001	Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	Lazarus Group has used Powershell to download malicious payloads.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
		.003	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell	Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus) A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)
		.005	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic	Lazarus Group has used VBA and embedded macros in Word documents to execute malicious code.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
		.005	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic	Lazarus Group has used VBScript to gather information about a victim machine. (Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1584	.001	Compromise Infrastructure: Domains	Lazarus Group has compromised legitimate domains, including those hosted in the US and Italy, for C2.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)
		.004	Compromise Infrastructure: Server	Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Enterprise	T1543	.003	Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service	Several Lazarus Group malware families install themselves as new services.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
Enterprise	T1132	.001	Data Encoding: Standard Encoding	A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)
Enterprise	T1001	.003	Data Obfuscation: Protocol or Service Impersonation	Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee-GhostSecret-fixurl)
Enterprise	T1074	.001	Data Staged: Local Data Staging	Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)
Enterprise	T1491	.001	Defacement: Internal Defacement	Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a Disk Structure Wipe.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
Enterprise	T1587	.001	Develop Capabilities: Malware	Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)
Enterprise	T1561	.001	Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe	Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
		.002	Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe	Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Enterprise	T1573	.001	Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography	Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)
Enterprise	T1585	.001	Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts	Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)
		.002	Establish Accounts: Email Accounts	Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Enterprise	T1048	.003	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)
Enterprise	T1567	.002	Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	Lazarus Group has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox using a customized version of dbxcli.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1589	.002	Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses	Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Enterprise	T1591	.004	Gather Victim Org Information: Identify Roles	Lazarus Group has targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1564	.001	Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories	Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
Enterprise	T1574	.002	Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading	Lazarus Group has replaced `win_fw.dll`, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload.(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)
		.013	Hijack Execution Flow: KernelCallbackTable	Lazarus Group has abused the `KernelCallbackTable` to hijack process control flow and execute shellcode.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
Enterprise	T1562	.001	Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools	Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018).
		.004	Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall	Various Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using netsh. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)
Enterprise	T1070	.003	Indicator Removal: Clear Command History	Lazarus Group has routinely deleted log files on a compromised router, including automatic log deletion through the use of the logrotate utility.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
		.004	Indicator Removal: File Deletion	Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim. Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)
		.006	Indicator Removal: Timestomp	Several Lazarus Group malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)
Enterprise	T1056	.001	Input Capture: Keylogging	Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)
Enterprise	T1036	.003	Masquerading: Rename System Utilities	Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as `wscript.exe` and `mshta.exe`.(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
		.004	Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service	Lazarus Group has used a scheduled task named `SRCheck` to mask the execution of a malicious .dll.(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)
		.004	Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service	A Lazarus Group custom backdoor implant included a custom PE loader named "Security Package" that was added into the lsass.exe process via registry key.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
		.005	Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location	Lazarus Group has renamed malicious code to disguise it as Microsoft's narrator and other legitimate files.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
Enterprise	T1003	.001	OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory	Lazarus Group leveraged Mimikatz to extract Windows Credentials of currently logged-in users and steals passwords stored in browsers.(Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) Lazarus Group has also used a custom version Mimikatz to capture credentials.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1027	.002	Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing	Lazarus Group has used Themida to pack at least two separate backdoor implants.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
		.002	Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing	Lazarus Group has used Themida to pack malicious DLLs and other files.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)
		.007	Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution	Lazarus Group has used a custom hashing method to resolve APIs used in shellcode.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
		.013	Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File	Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for Native API function names.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
Enterprise	T1588	.002	Obtain Capabilities: Tool	Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder and PuTTy PSCP.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
		.003	Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates	Lazarus Group has used code signing certificates issued by Sectigo RSA for some of its malware and tools.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)
		.004	Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates	Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)
Enterprise	T1566	.001	Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment	Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
		.002	Phishing: Spearphishing Link	Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
		.003	Phishing: Spearphishing via Service	Lazarus Group has used social media platforms, including LinkedIn and Twitter, to send spearphishing messages.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)
		.003	Phishing: Spearphishing via Service	Lazarus Group has used fake job advertisements sent via LinkedIn to spearphish victims.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1542	.003	Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit	Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
Enterprise	T1055	.001	Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection	A Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
Enterprise	T1090	.001	Proxy: Internal Proxy	Lazarus Group has used a compromised router to serve as a proxy between a victim network's corporate and restricted segments.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
		.002	Proxy: External Proxy	Lazarus Group has used multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.(Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)
Enterprise	T1021	.001	Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol	Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)
		.002	Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa accesses the `ADMIN$` share via SMB to conduct lateral movement.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)
		.004	Remote Services: SSH	Lazarus Group used SSH and the PuTTy PSCP utility to gain access to a restricted segment of a compromised network.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Enterprise	T1053	.005	Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task	Lazarus Group has used `schtasks` for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)
Enterprise	T1593	.001	Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media	Lazarus Group has used LinkedIn to identify and target specific employees within a chosen organization.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1608	.001	Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware	Lazarus Group has hosted malicious files on compromised as well as Lazarus Group-controlled servers.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)
		.002	Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool	Lazarus Group has hosted custom and open-source tools on compromised as well as Lazarus Group-controlled servers.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)
Enterprise	T1553	.002	Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing	Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
Enterprise	T1218	.001	System Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File	Lazarus Group has used CHM files to move concealed payloads.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood APR 2017)
		.005	System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta	Lazarus Group has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts and download programs.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)
		.005	System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta	Lazarus Group has used `mshta.exe` to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
		.010	System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32	Lazarus Group has used rgsvr32 to execute custom malware.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)
		.011	System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32	Lazarus Group has used rundll32 to execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)
Enterprise	T1614	.001	System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery	Lazarus Group has deployed malware designed not to run on computers set to Korean, Japanese, or Chinese in Windows language preferences.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1204	.001	User Execution: Malicious Link	Lazarus Group has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious link.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
		.002	User Execution: Malicious File	Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
Enterprise	T1497	.001	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks	Lazarus Group has used tools to detect sandbox or VMware services through identifying the presence of a debugger or related services.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
Enterprise	T1102	.002	Web Service: Bidirectional Communication	Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

ID	Name	References	Techniques
Software
S0520	BLINDINGCAN	(Citation: NHS UK BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020) (Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)	System Information Discovery, Windows Command Shell, Web Protocols, Ingress Tool Transfer, Data from Local System, Match Legitimate Name or Location, Standard Encoding, Encrypted/Encoded File, Code Signing, File Deletion, Software Packing, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, System Network Configuration Discovery, Timestomp, Shared Modules, Malicious File, Rundll32, File and Directory Discovery, Spearphishing Attachment, Symmetric Cryptography, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
S0238	Proxysvc	(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)	Data from Local System, Web Protocols, Commonly Used Port, File Deletion, Automated Collection, Service Execution, File and Directory Discovery, System Information Discovery, Process Discovery, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Query Registry, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Time Discovery, Windows Command Shell, Data Destruction
S0678	Torisma	(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)	Encrypted/Encoded File, Native API, System Information Discovery, System Time Discovery, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Standard Encoding, Execution Guardrails, System Network Connections Discovery, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Software Packing, Symmetric Cryptography, Web Protocols, System Network Configuration Discovery
S0271	KEYMARBLE	(Citation: US-CERT KEYMARBLE Aug 2018)	System Network Configuration Discovery, Process Discovery, Windows Command Shell, File and Directory Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, System Information Discovery, Commonly Used Port, Screen Capture, Modify Registry, Symmetric Cryptography, File Deletion
S0665	ThreatNeedle	(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Malicious File, Windows Service, Ingress Tool Transfer, System Information Discovery, File and Directory Discovery, Data from Local System, Encrypted/Encoded File, Fileless Storage, Modify Registry, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Spearphishing Attachment, Match Legitimate Name or Location
S0239	Bankshot	(Citation: McAfee Bankshot) (Citation: Trojan Manuscript)	Web Protocols, Data from Local System, File Deletion, File and Directory Discovery, Timestomp, Exploitation for Client Execution, Process Discovery, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, System Information Discovery, Windows Service, Native API, Query Registry, Non-Standard Encoding, Automated Collection, Protocol or Service Impersonation, Ingress Tool Transfer, Local Account, Domain Account, Modify Registry, Create Process with Token, Uncommonly Used Port, Windows Command Shell, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Indicator Removal, Non-Standard Port
S0347	AuditCred	(Citation: Roptimizer) (Citation: TrendMicro Lazarus Nov 2018)	File and Directory Discovery, Proxy, File Deletion, Process Injection, Ingress Tool Transfer, Windows Command Shell, Commonly Used Port, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Windows Service, Encrypted/Encoded File
S0497	Dacls	(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020) (Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)	Ingress Tool Transfer, Web Protocols, Process Discovery, Launch Agent, Encrypted/Encoded File, Launch Daemon, Hidden Files and Directories, File and Directory Discovery, Masquerading
S0364	RawDisk	(Citation: EldoS RawDisk ITpro) (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)	Disk Structure Wipe, Disk Content Wipe, Data Destruction
S0376	HOPLIGHT	(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)	Device Driver Discovery, Modify Registry, Fallback Channels, Query Registry, Proxy, Non-Standard Port, Commonly Used Port, Pass the Hash, File and Directory Discovery, Security Account Manager, Windows Command Shell, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Standard Encoding, System Information Discovery, Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription, Service Execution, Ingress Tool Transfer, Windows Management Instrumentation, Uncommonly Used Port, Disable or Modify System Firewall, System Time Discovery, Process Injection
S0180	Volgmer	(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014) (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017) (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)	File and Directory Discovery, Uncommonly Used Port, Windows Service, Commonly Used Port, Query Registry, System Information Discovery, Custom Command and Control Protocol, Native API, Symmetric Cryptography, System Service Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Process Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Windows Command Shell, Asymmetric Cryptography, Fileless Storage, Modify Registry, Masquerade Task or Service, Encrypted/Encoded File, System Network Connections Discovery, File Deletion, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
S0108	netsh	(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders) (Citation: TechNet Netsh)	Disable or Modify System Firewall, Netsh Helper DLL, Proxy, Security Software Discovery
S0366	WannaCry	(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) (Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) (Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry) (Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) (Citation: US-CERT WannaCry 2017) (Citation: WanaCry) (Citation: WanaCrypt) (Citation: WanaCrypt0r) (Citation: Washington Post WannaCry 2017) (Citation: WCry)	Exploitation of Remote Services, Service Stop, File and Directory Discovery, Peripheral Device Discovery, Data Encrypted for Impact, Windows Management Instrumentation, RDP Hijacking, Inhibit System Recovery, Remote System Discovery, Hidden Files and Directories, System Network Configuration Discovery, Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification, Multi-hop Proxy, Asymmetric Cryptography, Windows Service, Lateral Tool Transfer
S0263	TYPEFRAME	(Citation: US-CERT TYPEFRAME June 2018)	Fileless Storage, Ingress Tool Transfer, Disable or Modify System Firewall, Uncommonly Used Port, Encrypted/Encoded File, Malicious File, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Proxy, Commonly Used Port, Visual Basic, Windows Service, Custom Command and Control Protocol, Modify Registry, System Information Discovery, Non-Standard Port, Windows Command Shell, File Deletion, File and Directory Discovery
S0586	TAINTEDSCRIBE	(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)	Remote System Discovery, Binary Padding, Timestomp, File and Directory Discovery, Archive Collected Data, Process Discovery, Match Legitimate Name or Location, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Windows Command Shell, Symmetric Cryptography, Protocol or Service Impersonation, Ingress Tool Transfer, System Time Discovery, Fallback Channels, File Deletion, System Information Discovery
S0241	RATANKBA	(Citation: Lazarus RATANKBA) (Citation: RATANKBA)	System Owner/User Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, Windows Command Shell, System Service Discovery, Web Protocols, Dynamic-link Library Injection, Windows Management Instrumentation, Local Account, Process Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Remote System Discovery, Query Registry, Commonly Used Port, Ingress Tool Transfer, PowerShell, System Information Discovery
S0245	BADCALL	(Citation: US-CERT BADCALL)	Disable or Modify System Firewall, Symmetric Cryptography, Protocol or Service Impersonation, Proxy, Modify Registry, System Information Discovery, Commonly Used Port, Non-Standard Port, System Network Configuration Discovery
S0498	Cryptoistic	(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)	Data from Local System, Encrypted Channel, File Deletion, File and Directory Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Non-Application Layer Protocol, System Owner/User Discovery
S0174	Responder	(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020) (Citation: GitHub Responder)	Network Sniffing, LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
S0431	HotCroissant	(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020) (Citation: US-CERT HOTCROISSANT February 2020)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Symmetric Cryptography, File Deletion, Native API, Software Packing, File and Directory Discovery, Service Stop, Ingress Tool Transfer, Windows Command Shell, Process Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, Encrypted/Encoded File, Application Window Discovery, Software Discovery, System Information Discovery, Screen Capture, System Network Configuration Discovery, Scheduled Task, Hidden Window
S0002	Mimikatz	(Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)	DCSync, Credentials from Password Stores, Rogue Domain Controller, Private Keys, SID-History Injection, Security Support Provider, Pass the Hash, Account Manipulation, Pass the Ticket, Credentials from Web Browsers, Golden Ticket, Security Account Manager, LSASS Memory, Silver Ticket, Windows Credential Manager, Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, LSA Secrets
S0246	HARDRAIN	(Citation: US-CERT HARDRAIN March 2018)	Non-Standard Port, Proxy, Windows Command Shell, Protocol or Service Impersonation, Commonly Used Port, Disable or Modify System Firewall
S0103	route	(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) (Citation: TechNet Route)	System Network Configuration Discovery
S0584	AppleJeus	(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, File Deletion, Installer Packages, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Spearphishing Link, Windows Service, Hidden Files and Directories, Launchctl, Web Protocols, Code Signing, Unix Shell, System Information Discovery, Msiexec, Scheduled Task, Bypass User Account Control, Malicious File, Obfuscated Files or Information, Time Based Evasion, Launch Daemon, Malicious Link
S0593	ECCENTRICBANDWAGON	(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020)	File Deletion, Obfuscated Files or Information, Windows Command Shell, Screen Capture, Keylogging, Local Data Staging
S0567	Dtrack	(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack) (Citation: Dragos WASSONITE) (Citation: Kaspersky Dtrack) (Citation: Securelist Dtrack) (Citation: ZDNet Dtrack)	Data from Local System, Local Data Staging, System Information Discovery, Hijack Execution Flow, Keylogging, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution, Windows Service, Windows Command Shell, Valid Accounts, File Deletion, Browser Information Discovery, Match Legitimate Name or Location, System Network Connections Discovery, Embedded Payloads, Query Registry, Process Hollowing, File and Directory Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Archive Collected Data, Shared Modules, Ingress Tool Transfer, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
S0181	FALLCHILL	(Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)	File and Directory Discovery, Timestomp, Symmetric Cryptography, File Deletion, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Windows Service, Protocol or Service Impersonation

References

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Lazarus Group

Associated Group Descriptions

Techniques Used

Software

References