Impair Defenses: Отключение или перенастройка системного межсетевого экрана
Other sub-techniques of Impair Defenses (11)
Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel. Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. Non-Standard Port).(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti) Adversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.(Citation: Huntress BlackCat) Settings related to enabling abuse of various Remote Services may also indirectly modify firewall rules. In ESXi, firewall rules may be modified directly via the esxcli command line interface (e.g., via `esxcli network firewall set`) or via the vCenter user interface.(Citation: Trellix Rnasomhouse 2024)(Citation: Broadcom ESXi Firewall)
Примеры процедур |
|
Название | Описание |
---|---|
InvisiMole |
InvisiMole has a command to disable routing and the Firewall on the victim’s machine.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2018) |
Hannotog |
Hannotog can modify local firewall settings via `netsh` commands to open a listening UDP port.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022) |
Carbanak |
Carbanak may use netsh to add local firewall rule exceptions.(Citation: Group-IB Anunak) |
Salt Typhoon |
Salt Typhoon has made changes to the Access Control List (ACL) and loopback interface address on compromised devices.(Citation: Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025) |
NanoCore |
NanoCore can modify the victim's firewall.(Citation: DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016) |
BADCALL |
BADCALL disables the Windows firewall before binding to a port.(Citation: US-CERT BADCALL) |
Rocke |
Rocke used scripts which killed processes and added firewall rules to block traffic related to other cryptominers.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has disabled |
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware |
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware modifies the Windows firewall during execution.(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023) |
ShrinkLocker |
ShrinkLocker turns on the system firewall and deletes all of its rules during execution.(Citation: Kaspersky ShrinkLocker 2024)(Citation: Splunk ShrinkLocker 2024) |
Operation Wocao |
Operation Wocao has used PowerShell to add and delete rules in the Windows firewall.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019) |
H1N1 |
H1N1 kills and disables services for Windows Firewall.(Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 2) |
TYPEFRAME |
TYPEFRAME can open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.(Citation: US-CERT TYPEFRAME June 2018) |
Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has disabled host-based firewalls. The group has also globally opened port 3389.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 added rules to a victim's Windows firewall to set up a series of port-forwards allowing traffic to target systems.(Citation: Nearest Neighbor Volexity) |
|
netsh |
netsh can be used to disable local firewall settings.(Citation: TechNet Netsh)(Citation: TechNet Netsh Firewall) |
PyDCrypt |
PyDCrypt has modified firewall rules to allow incoming SMB, NetBIOS, and RPC connections using `netsh.exe` on remote machines.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021) |
Cyclops Blink |
Cyclops Blink can modify the Linux iptables firewall to enable C2 communication on network devices via a stored list of port numbers.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022) |
Moses Staff |
Moses Staff has used batch scripts that can disable the Windows firewall on specific remote machines.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021) |
njRAT |
njRAT has modified the Windows firewall to allow itself to communicate through the firewall.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) |
Grandoreiro |
Grandoreiro can block the Deibold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia security tool at the firewall level.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020) |
UNC2452 |
UNC2452 used |
Remsec |
Remsec can add or remove applications or ports on the Windows firewall or disable it entirely.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Technical Analysis) |
PlugX |
PlugX has modified local firewall rules on victim machines to enable a random, high-number listening port for subsequent access and C2 activity.(Citation: Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024A) |
ToddyCat |
Prior to executing a backdoor ToddyCat has run `cmd /c start /b netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="SGAccessInboundRule" dir=in protocol=udp action=allow localport=49683` to allow the targeted system to receive UDP packets on port 49683.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023) |
ZxShell |
ZxShell can disable the firewall by modifying the registry key |
BPFDoor |
BPFDoor starts a shell on a high TCP port starting at 42391 up to 43391, then changes the local `iptables` rules to redirect all packets from the attacker to the shell port.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022) |
OilRig |
OilRig has modified Windows firewall rules to enable remote access.(Citation: Symantec Crambus OCT 2023) |
DarkComet |
DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like the Windows Firewall.(Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)(Citation: Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018) |
CookieMiner |
CookieMiner has checked for the presence of "Little Snitch", macOS network monitoring and application firewall software, stopping and exiting if it is found.(Citation: Unit42 CookieMiner Jan 2019) |
Magic Hound |
Magic Hound has added the following rule to a victim's Windows firewall to allow RDP traffic - `"netsh" advfirewall firewall add rule name="Terminal Server" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=3389`.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021) |
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used PowerShell to add and delete rules in the Windows firewall.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019) |
|
APT29 |
APT29 used |
Lazarus Group |
Various Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using netsh. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools) |
APT38 |
APT38 have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) |
Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has been observed disabling the system firewall.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013) |
Leviathan modified system firewalls to add two open listening ports on 9998 and 9999 during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.(Citation: CISA Leviathan 2024) |
|
HOPLIGHT |
HOPLIGHT has modified the firewall using netsh.(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) |
Velvet Ant |
Velvet Ant modified system firewall settings during PlugX installation using `netsh.exe` to open a listening, random high number port on victim devices.(Citation: Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024A) |
HARDRAIN |
HARDRAIN opens the Windows Firewall to modify incoming connections.(Citation: US-CERT HARDRAIN March 2018) |
Dragonfly 2.0 |
Dragonfly 2.0 has disabled host-based firewalls. The group has also globally opened port 3389.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) |
BACKSPACE |
The "ZR" variant of BACKSPACE will check to see if known host-based firewalls are installed on the infected systems. BACKSPACE will attempt to establish a C2 channel, then will examine open windows to identify a pop-up from the firewall software and will simulate a mouse-click to allow the connection to proceed.(Citation: FireEye APT30) |
Kasidet |
Kasidet has the ability to change firewall settings to allow a plug-in to be downloaded.(Citation: Zscaler Kasidet) |
BlackByte |
BlackByte modified firewall rules on victim machines to enable remote system discovery.(Citation: Picus BlackByte 2022)(Citation: Symantec BlackByte 2022) |
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `netsh` to configure firewall rules that limited certain UDP outbound packets.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021) |
Контрмеры |
|
Контрмера | Описание |
---|---|
Audit |
Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks. Permission Audits: - Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions. Software Audits: - Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives. Configuration Audits: - Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems. Network Audits: - Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior. |
User Account Management |
User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access. |
Restrict Registry Permissions |
Restricting registry permissions involves configuring access control settings for sensitive registry keys and hives to ensure that only authorized users or processes can make modifications. By limiting access, organizations can prevent unauthorized changes that adversaries might use for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Review and Adjust Permissions on Critical Keys - Regularly review permissions on keys such as `Run`, `RunOnce`, and `Services` to ensure only authorized users have write access. - Use tools like `icacls` or `PowerShell` to automate permission adjustments. Enable Registry Auditing - Enable auditing on sensitive keys to log access attempts. - Use Event Viewer or SIEM solutions to analyze logs and detect suspicious activity. - Example Audit Policy: `auditpol /set /subcategory:"Registry" /success:enable /failure:enable` Protect Credential-Related Hives - Limit access to hives like `SAM`,`SECURITY`, and `SYSTEM` to prevent credential dumping or other unauthorized access. - Use LSA Protection to add an additional security layer for credential storage. Restrict Registry Editor Usage - Use Group Policy to restrict access to regedit.exe for non-administrative users. - Block execution of registry editing tools on endpoints where they are unnecessary. Deploy Baseline Configuration Tools - Use tools like Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit or CIS Benchmarks to apply and maintain secure registry configurations. *Tools for Implementation* Registry Permission Tools: - Registry Editor (regedit): Built-in tool to manage registry permissions. - PowerShell: Automate permissions and manage keys. `Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "KeyName" -Value "Value"` - icacls: Command-line tool to modify ACLs. Monitoring Tools: - Sysmon: Monitor and log registry events. - Event Viewer: View registry access logs. Policy Management Tools: - Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce registry permissions via GPOs. - Microsoft Endpoint Manager: Deploy configuration baselines for registry permissions. |
Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files. Enforce Least Privilege Permissions: - Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs. Harden File Shares: - Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): - Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions. Audit File System Access: - Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities. Restrict Startup Directories: - Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`. - On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`. |
Обнаружение
Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.
Ссылки
- Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
- MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
- US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.
- US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
- The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
- Pham Duy Phuc, Max Kersten, Noël Keijzer, and Michaël Schrijver. (2024, February 14). RansomHouse am See. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
- Carvey, H. (2024, February 28). BlackCat Ransomware Affiliate TTPs. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
- Broadcom. (2025, March 24). Add Allowed IP Addresses for an ESXi Host by Using the VMware Host Client. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
- Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
- Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
- Group-IB and Fox-IT. (2014, December). Anunak: APT against financial institutions. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- Cisco Talos. (2025, February 20). Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon. Retrieved February 24, 2025.
- Kasza, A., Halfpop, T. (2016, February 09). NanoCoreRAT Behind an Increase in Tax-Themed Phishing E-mails. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
- The DigiTrust Group. (2017, January 01). NanoCore Is Not Your Average RAT. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
- US-CERT. (2018, February 06). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536-G. Retrieved June 7, 2018.
- Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- Kol, Roi. Morag, A. (2020, August 25). Deep Analysis of TeamTNT Techniques Using Container Images to Attack. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
- Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
- Splunk Threat Research Team , Teoderick Contreras. (2024, September 5). ShrinkLocker Malware: Abusing BitLocker to Lock Your Data. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
- Cristian Souza, Eduardo Ovalle, Ashley Muñoz, & Christopher Zachor. (2024, May 23). ShrinkLocker: Turning BitLocker into ransomware. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
- Reynolds, J.. (2016, September 14). H1N1: Technical analysis reveals new capabilities – part 2. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- US-CERT. (2018, June 14). MAR-10135536-12 – North Korean Trojan: TYPEFRAME. Retrieved July 13, 2018.
- Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.
- Microsoft. (2009, June 3). Netsh Commands for Windows Firewall. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.
- Checkpoint Research. (2021, November 15). Uncovering MosesStaff techniques: Ideology over Money. Retrieved August 11, 2022.
- NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022.
- Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
- Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
- Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2013, June 28). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1009: "njRAT" Uncovered. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
- ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Sygnia Team. (2024, June 3). China-Nexus Threat Group ‘Velvet Ant’ Abuses F5 Load Balancers for Persistence. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
- Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024.
- Allievi, A., et al. (2014, October 28). Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell. Retrieved September 24, 2019.
- The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.
- Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2023, October 19). Crambus: New Campaign Targets Middle Eastern Government. Retrieved November 27, 2024.
- Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
- TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
- Chen, y., et al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved July 22, 2020.
- DFIR Report. (2022, March 21). APT35 Automates Initial Access Using ProxyShell. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
- DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023.
- Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Tools Report. Retrieved March 10, 2016.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
- Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.
- CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.
- US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
- US-CERT. (2018, February 05). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536-F. Retrieved June 11, 2018.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Yadav, A., et al. (2016, January 29). Malicious Office files dropping Kasidet and Dridex. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
- Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, October 21). Exbyte: BlackByte Ransomware Attackers Deploy New Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
- Huseyin Can Yuceel. (2022, February 21). TTPs used by BlackByte Ransomware Targeting Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.