Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

System Binary Proxy Execution:  Утилита Regsvr32

Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)

ID: T1218.010
Относится к технике:  T1218
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Версия: 2.2
Дата создания: 23 Jan 2020
Последнее изменение: 16 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Covenant

Covenant can create SCT files for installation via `Regsvr32` to deploy new Grunt listeners.(Citation: Github Covenant)

Orz

Some Orz versions have an embedded DLL known as MockDll that uses Process Hollowing and regsvr32 to execute another payload.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)

AppleSeed

AppleSeed can call regsvr32.exe for execution.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)

Emotet

Emotet uses RegSvr32 to execute the DLL payload.(Citation: emotet_trendmicro_mar2023)

Squirrelwaffle

Squirrelwaffle has been executed using `regsvr32.exe`.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin uses regsvr32.exe execution without any command line parameters for command and control requests to IP addresses associated with Tor nodes.(Citation: RedCanary RaspberryRobin 2022)

Ragnar Locker

Ragnar Locker has used regsvr32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

Hi-Zor

Hi-Zor executes using regsvr32.exe called from the Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder persistence mechanism.(Citation: Fidelis INOCNATION)

Xbash

Xbash can use regsvr32 for executing scripts.(Citation: Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018)

Saint Bot

Saint Bot has used `regsvr32` to execute scripts.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

EVILNUM

EVILNUM can run a remote scriptlet that drops a file and executes it via regsvr32.exe.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)

Mori

Mori can use `regsvr32.exe` for DLL execution.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

RogueRobin

RogueRobin uses regsvr32.exe to run a .sct file for execution.(Citation: Unit42 DarkHydrus Jan 2019)

Derusbi

Derusbi variants have been seen that use Registry persistence to proxy execution through regsvr32.exe.(Citation: ThreatGeek Derusbi Converge)

Valak

Valak has used regsvr32.exe to launch malicious DLLs.(Citation: Cybereason Valak May 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)

More_eggs

More_eggs has used regsvr32.exe to execute the malicious DLL.(Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019)

Koadic

Koadic can use Regsvr32 to execute additional payloads.(Citation: Github Koadic)

Egregor

Egregor has used regsvr32.exe to execute malicious DLLs.(Citation: JoeSecurity Egregor 2020)

Astaroth

Astaroth can be loaded through regsvr32.exe.(Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019)

QakBot

QakBot can use Regsvr32 to execute malicious DLLs.(Citation: Red Canary Qbot)(Citation: Cyberint Qakbot May 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022)(Citation: NCC Group Black Basta June 2022)(Citation: Deep Instinct Black Basta August 2022)

Dridex

Dridex can use `regsvr32.exe` to initiate malicious code.(Citation: Red Canary Dridex Threat Report 2021)

HermeticWizard

HermeticWizard has used `regsvr32.exe /s /i` to execute malicious payloads.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used rgsvr32 to execute custom malware.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)

WIRTE

WIRTE has used `regsvr32.exe` to trigger the execution of a malicious script.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)

Leviathan

Leviathan has used regsvr32 for execution.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)

APT32

APT32 created a Scheduled Task/Job that used regsvr32.exe to execute a COM scriptlet that dynamically downloaded a backdoor and injected it into memory. The group has also used regsvr32 to run their backdoor.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Deep Panda

Deep Panda has used regsvr32.exe to execute a server variant of Derusbi in victim networks.(Citation: RSA Shell Crew)

APT19

APT19 used Regsvr32 to bypass application control techniques.(Citation: FireEye APT19)

Inception

Inception has ensured persistence at system boot by setting the value regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)

Kimsuky

Kimsuky has executed malware with regsvr32s.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)

TA551

TA551 has used regsvr32.exe to load malicious DLLs.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)

Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs using regsvr32.exe.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used regsvr32.exe to execute scripts.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Exploit Protection

Deploy capabilities that detect, block, and mitigate conditions indicative of software exploits. These capabilities aim to prevent exploitation by addressing vulnerabilities, monitoring anomalous behaviors, and applying exploit-mitigation techniques to harden systems and software. Operating System Exploit Protections: - Use Case: Enable built-in exploit protection features provided by modern operating systems, such as Microsoft's Exploit Protection, which includes techniques like Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG). - Implementation: Enforce DEP for all programs and enable ASLR to randomize memory addresses used by system and application processes. Windows: Configure Exploit Protection through the Windows Security app or deploy settings via Group Policy. `ExploitProtectionExportSettings.exe -path "exploit_settings.xml"` Linux: Use Kernel-level hardening features like SELinux, AppArmor, or GRSEC to enforce memory protections and prevent exploits. Third-Party Endpoint Security: - Use Case: Use endpoint protection tools with built-in exploit protection, such as enhanced memory protection, behavior monitoring, and real-time exploit detection. - Implementation: Deploy tools to detect and block exploitation attempts targeting unpatched software. Virtual Patching: - Use Case: Use tools to implement virtual patches that mitigate vulnerabilities in applications or operating systems until official patches are applied. - Implementation: Use Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to block exploitation attempts on known vulnerabilities in outdated applications. Hardening Application Configurations: - Use Case: Disable risky application features that can be exploited, such as macros in Microsoft Office or JScript in Internet Explorer. - Implementation: Configure Microsoft Office Group Policies to disable execution of macros in downloaded files.

Обнаружение

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)

Ссылки

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Связанные риски

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Каталоги

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