Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Gather Victim Identity Information:  Адреса эл. почты

Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. Active Scanning), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.(Citation: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration)(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Email Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Brute Force via External Remote Services).

ID: T1589.002
Относится к технике:  T1589
Тактика(-и): Reconnaissance
Платформы: PRE
Источники данных: Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Версия: 1.2
Дата создания: 02 Oct 2020
Последнее изменение: 21 Oct 2022

Примеры процедур

Название Описание

TA551 has used spoofed company emails that were acquired from email clients on previously infected hosts to target other individuals.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)


MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing e-mails.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)


HAFNIUM has collected e-mail addresses for users they intended to target.(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)

Magic Hound

Magic Hound has acquired the personal email addresses of some individuals they intend to target.(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)

Silent Librarian

Silent Librarian has collected e-mail addresses from targeted organizations from open Internet searches.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)


Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)


AADInternals can check for the existence of user email addresses using public Microsoft APIs.(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)(Citation: Azure AD Recon)


HEXANE has targeted executives, human resources staff, and IT personnel for spearphishing.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)


LAPSUS$ has gathered employee email addresses, including personal accounts, for social engineering and initial access efforts.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)


EXOTIC LILY has gathered targeted individuals' e-mail addresses through open source research and website contact forms.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)


APT32 has collected e-mail addresses for activists and bloggers in order to target them with spyware.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has obtained valid emails addresses while conducting research against target organizations that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)


Контрмера Описание

This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques.


Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.


  1. Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
  2. Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
  3. GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021.
  4. gremwell. (2020, March 24). Office 365 User Enumeration. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
  5. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
  6. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved February 1, 2022.
  7. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022.
  8. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  9. DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021.
  10. Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.
  11. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
  12. Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
  13. SecureWorks 2019, August 27 LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign Retrieved. 2019/11/19
  14. ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.
  15. Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  16. Duncan, B. (2021, January 7). TA551: Email Attack Campaign Switches from Valak to IcedID. Retrieved March 17, 2021.
  17. Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
  18. Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021.
  19. Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.
  20. Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.

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