Sandworm Team
Associated Group Descriptions |
|
Name | Description |
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Voodoo Bear | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
ELECTRUM | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
Quedagh | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
FROZENBARENTS | (Citation: Leonard TAG 2023) |
APT44 | (Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) |
IRIDIUM | (Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) |
Seashell Blizzard | (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023) |
BlackEnergy (Group) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
Telebots | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
IRON VIKING | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
Techniques Used |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about usernames listed in AD.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
.003 | Account Discovery: Email Account |
Sandworm Team used malware to enumerate email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application.(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017) |
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Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains |
Sandworm Team has registered domain names and created URLs that are often designed to mimic or spoof legitimate websites, such as email login pages, online file sharing and storage websites, and password reset pages, while also hosting these items on legitimate, compromised network infrastructure.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Slowik Sandworm 2021) |
.004 | Acquire Infrastructure: Server |
Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1595 | .002 | Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning |
Sandworm Team has scanned network infrastructure for vulnerabilities as part of its operational planning.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool connects to the designated C2 server via HTTP.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
Enterprise | T1110 | .003 | Brute Force: Password Spraying |
Sandworm Team has used a script to attempt RPC authentication against a number of hosts.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Sandworm Team has used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Sandworm Team has run the |
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.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
Sandworm Team has created VBScripts to run an SSH server.(Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
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Enterprise | T1586 | .001 | Compromise Accounts: Social Media Accounts |
Sandworm Team creates credential capture webpages to compromise existing, legitimate social media accounts.(Citation: Slowik Sandworm 2021) |
Enterprise | T1584 | .004 | Compromise Infrastructure: Server |
Sandworm Team compromised legitimate Linux servers running the EXIM mail transfer agent for use in subsequent campaigns.(Citation: NSA Sandworm 2020)(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023) |
.005 | Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet |
Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022) |
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Enterprise | T1136 | .002 | Create Account: Domain Account |
Sandworm Team has created new domain accounts on an ICS access server.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
Enterprise | T1555 | .003 | Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers |
Sandworm Team's CredRaptor tool can collect saved passwords from various internet browsers.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
Enterprise | T1132 | .001 | Data Encoding: Standard Encoding |
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool uses base64 encoding and HTML tags for the communication traffic between the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
Enterprise | T1491 | .002 | Defacement: External Defacement |
Sandworm Team defaced approximately 15,000 websites belonging to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector organizations in 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1587 | .001 | Develop Capabilities: Malware |
Sandworm Team has developed malware for its operations, including malicious mobile applications and destructive malware such as NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1561 | .002 | Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe |
Sandworm Team has used the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to corrupt the infected system's master boot record.(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) |
Enterprise | T1585 | .001 | Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts |
Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
.002 | Establish Accounts: Email Accounts |
Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1592 | .002 | Gather Victim Host Information: Software |
Sandworm Team has researched software code to enable supply-chain operations, most notably for the 2017 NotPetya attack. Sandworm Team also collected a list of computers using specific software as part of its targeting efforts.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1589 | .002 | Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses |
Sandworm Team has obtained valid emails addresses while conducting research against target organizations that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
.003 | Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names |
Sandworm Team's research of potential victim organizations included the identification and collection of employee information.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1590 | .001 | Gather Victim Network Information: Domain Properties |
Sandworm Team conducted technical reconnaissance of the Parliament of Georgia's official internet domain prior to its 2019 attack.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1591 | .002 | Gather Victim Org Information: Business Relationships |
In preparation for its attack against the 2018 Winter Olympics, Sandworm Team conducted online research of partner organizations listed on an official PyeongChang Olympics partnership site.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1562 | .002 | Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging |
Sandworm Team has disabled event logging on compromised systems.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
Sandworm Team has used backdoors that can delete files used in an attack from an infected system.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017)(Citation: Mandiant-Sandworm-Ukraine-2022) |
Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | Input Capture: Keylogging |
Sandworm Team has used a keylogger to capture keystrokes by using the SetWindowsHookEx function.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Sandworm Team has avoided detection by naming a malicious binary explorer.exe.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Sandworm Team has used its plainpwd tool, a modified version of Mimikatz, and comsvcs.dll to dump Windows credentials from system memory.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) |
.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
Sandworm Team has used `ntdsutil.exe` to back up the Active Directory database, likely for credential access.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) |
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Enterprise | T1027 | .002 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing |
Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
.010 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation |
Sandworm Team has used ROT13 encoding, AES encryption and compression with the zlib library for their Python-based backdoor.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
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Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
Sandworm Team has acquired open-source tools for their operations, including Invoke-PSImage, which was used to establish an encrypted channel from a compromised host to Sandworm Team's C2 server in preparation for the 2018 Winter Olympics attack, as well as Impacket and RemoteExec, which were used in their 2022 Prestige operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) Additionally, Sandworm Team has used Empire, Cobalt Strike and PoshC2.(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) |
.006 | Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities |
In 2017, Sandworm Team conducted technical research related to vulnerabilities associated with websites used by the Korean Sport and Olympic Committee, a Korean power company, and a Korean airport.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
Sandworm Team has delivered malicious Microsoft Office and ZIP file attachments via spearphishing emails.(Citation: iSight Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Google_WinRAR_vuln_2023)(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) |
.002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link |
Sandworm Team has crafted phishing emails containing malicious hyperlinks.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1598 | .003 | Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link |
Sandworm Team has crafted spearphishing emails with hyperlinks designed to trick unwitting recipients into revealing their account credentials.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1021 | .002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Sandworm Team has copied payloads to the `ADMIN$` share of remote systems and run |
Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Sandworm Team leveraged SHARPIVORY, a .NET dropper that writes embedded payload to disk and uses scheduled tasks to persist on victim machines.(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) |
Enterprise | T1505 | .001 | Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures |
Sandworm Team has used various MS-SQL stored procedures.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
.003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell |
Sandworm Team has used webshells including P.A.S. Webshell to maintain access to victim networks.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
Sandworm Team staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers in forums to enable initial access to executing user.(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) |
Enterprise | T1195 | .002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain |
Sandworm Team has distributed NotPetya by compromising the legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc and replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious one.(Citation: Secureworks NotPetya June 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Enterprise | T1218 | .011 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 |
Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using rundll32.exe.(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017) |
Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link |
Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
.002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on spearphishing attachments and enabling malicious macros embedded within files.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1078 | .002 | Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
Sandworm Team has used stolen credentials to access administrative accounts within the domain.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) |
Enterprise | T1102 | .002 | Web Service: Bidirectional Communication |
Sandworm Team has used the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive commands to its Python backdoor. Sandworm Team also used legitimate M.E.Doc software update check requests for sending and receiving commands and hosted malicious payloads on putdrive.com.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) |
References
- Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
- Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2016, December 13). The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
- Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
- Joseph Slowik, DomainTools. (2021, March 3). Centreon to Exim and Back: On the Trail of Sandworm. Retrieved April 6, 2024.
- Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia’s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
- Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
- Ward, S.. (2014, October 14). iSIGHT discovers zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 used in Russian cyber-espionage campaign. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
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- UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.
- NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
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- Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
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