Proxy: Домен-прикрытие
Other sub-techniques of Proxy (4)
Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored). For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020) |
| APT29 |
APT29 has used the meek domain fronting plugin for Tor to hide the destination of C2 traffic.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) |
| meek |
meek uses Domain Fronting to disguise the destination of network traffic as another server that is hosted in the same Content Delivery Network (CDN) as the intended destination. |
| Mythic |
Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers.(Citation: Mythc Documentation) |
| SMOKEDHAM |
SMOKEDHAM has used a fronted domain to obfuscate its hard-coded C2 server domain.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| SSL/TLS Inspection |
Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity. |
Обнаружение
If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)
Ссылки
- David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.
- FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
- Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016.
- Thomas, C. (n.d.). Mythc Documentation. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
- Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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