Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

User Execution:  Вредоносный файл

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, and .reg. Adversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) While Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

ID: T1204.002
Относится к технике:  T1204
Тактика(-и): Execution
Платформы: Linux, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
Версия: 1.5
Дата создания: 11 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
TrickBot

TrickBot has attempted to get users to launch malicious documents to deliver its payload. (Citation: TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019)(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)

BLINDINGCAN

BLINDINGCAN has lured victims into executing malicious macros embedded within Microsoft Office documents.(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)

Ninja

Ninja has gained execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022)

Bumblebee

Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs.(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022)(Citation: Symantec Bumblebee June 2022)(Citation: Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022)(Citation: Medium Ali Salem Bumblebee April 2022)

KOPILUWAK

KOPILUWAK has gained execution through malicious attachments.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

ThreatNeedle

ThreatNeedle relies on a victim to click on a malicious document for initial execution.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

StrongPity

StrongPity has been executed via compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)

Pony

Pony has attempted to lure targets into downloading an attached executable (ZIP, RAR, or CAB archives) or document (PDF or other MS Office format).(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

AppleSeed

AppleSeed can achieve execution through users running malicious file attachments distributed via email.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)

NETWIRE

NETWIRE has been executed through luring victims into opening malicious documents.(Citation: FireEye NETWIRE March 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint NETWIRE December 2020)

Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)

EnvyScout

EnvyScout has been executed through malicious files attached to e-mails.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)

Emotet

Emotet has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)(Citation: Carbon Black Emotet Apr 2019)(Citation: IBM IcedID November 2017)

Woody RAT

Woody RAT has relied on users opening a malicious email attachment for execution.(Citation: MalwareBytes WoodyRAT Aug 2022)

Squirrelwaffle

Squirrelwaffle has relied on users enabling malicious macros within Microsoft Excel and Word attachments.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

Snip3

Snip3 can gain execution through the download of visual basic files.(Citation: Morphisec Snip3 May 2021)(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021)

Rifdoor

Rifdoor has been executed from malicious Excel or Word documents containing macros.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020)

GuLoader

The GuLoader executable has been retrieved via embedded macros in malicious Word documents.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)

InvisiMole

InvisiMole can deliver trojanized versions of software and documents, relying on user execution.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)

Mispadu

Mispadu has relied on users to execute malicious files in order to gain execution on victim machines.(Citation: ESET Security Mispadu Facebook Ads 2019)(Citation: Metabase Q Mispadu Trojan 2023)(Citation: SCILabs Malteiro 2021)

IcedID

IcedID has been executed through Word and Excel files with malicious embedded macros and through ISO and LNK files that execute the malicious DLL.(Citation: Juniper IcedID June 2020)(Citation: DFIR_Quantum_Ransomware)(Citation: DFIR_Sodinokibi_Ransomware)

CSPY Downloader

CSPY Downloader has been delivered via malicious documents with embedded macros.(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)

BADFLICK

BADFLICK has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)

Flagpro

Flagpro has relied on users clicking a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

DarkTortilla

DarkTortilla has relied on a user to open a malicious document or archived file delivered via email for initial execution.(Citation: Secureworks DarkTortilla Aug 2022)

CARROTBALL

CARROTBALL has been executed through users being lured into opening malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Unit 42 CARROTBAT January 2020)

ROKRAT

ROKRAT has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes RokRAT VBA January 2021)

Javali

Javali has achieved execution through victims opening malicious attachments, including MSI files with embedded VBScript.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)

Bisonal

Bisonal has relied on users to execute malicious file attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)

Lumma Stealer

Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files.(Citation: Cybereason LumaStealer Undated)

Clambling

Clambling has gained execution through luring victims into opening malicious files.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)

Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla has been executed through malicious e-mail attachments (Citation: Bitdefender Agent Tesla April 2020)

DarkGate

DarkGate initial infection payloads can masquerade as pirated media content requiring user interaction for code execution.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018) DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.(Citation: Trellix Darkgate 2023)

Mongall

Mongall has relied on a user opening a malicious document for execution.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)

SVCReady

SVCReady has relied on users clicking a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: HP SVCReady Jun 2022)

Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 has gained execution through users opening malicious documents.(Citation: Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022)

Latrodectus

Latrodectus has lured users into opening malicious email attachments for execution.(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)

Saint Bot

Saint Bot has relied on users to execute a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

Chaes

Chaes requires the user to click on the malicious Word document to execute the next part of the attack.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

TYPEFRAME

A Word document delivering TYPEFRAME prompts the user to enable macro execution.(Citation: US-CERT TYPEFRAME June 2018)

Bundlore

Bundlore has attempted to get users to execute a malicious .app file that looks like a Flash Player update.(Citation: MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019)

Metamorfo

Metamorfo requires the user to double-click the executable to run the malicious HTA file or to download a malicious installer.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

Bandook

Bandook has used lure documents to convince the user to enable macros.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

KONNI

KONNI has relied on a victim to enable malicious macros within an attachment delivered via email.(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021)

DnsSystem

DnsSystem has lured victims into opening macro-enabled Word documents for execution.(Citation: Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022)

KGH_SPY

KGH_SPY has been spread through Word documents containing malicious macros.(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)

Kerrdown

Kerrdown has gained execution through victims opening malicious files.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019)

Black Basta

Black Basta has been downloaded and executed from malicious Excel files.(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta May 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta Spotlight September 2022)

SQLRat

SQLRat relies on users clicking on an embedded image to execute the scripts.(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)

RTM

RTM has relied on users opening malicious email attachments, decompressing the attached archive, and double-clicking the executable within.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

StrelaStealer

StrelaStealer relies on user execution of a malicious file for installation.(Citation: DCSO StrelaStealer 2022)

Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro has infected victims via malicious attachments.(Citation: IBM Grandoreiro April 2020)

ZxxZ

ZxxZ has relied on victims to open a malicious attachment delivered via email.(Citation: Cisco Talos Bitter Bangladesh May 2022)

SUGARDUMP

Some SUGARDUMP variants required a user to enable a macro within a malicious .xls file for execution.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022)

LunarMail

LunarMail has been installed through a malicious macro in a Microsoft Word document.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)

JCry

JCry has achieved execution by luring users to click on a file that appeared to be an Adobe Flash Player update installer. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

REvil

REvil has been executed via malicious MS Word e-mail attachments.(Citation: G Data Sodinokibi June 2019)(Citation: McAfee REvil October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)

Valak

Valak has been executed via Microsoft Word documents containing malicious macros.(Citation: Cybereason Valak May 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne Valak June 2020)

Taidoor

Taidoor has relied upon a victim to click on a malicious email attachment.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)

NativeZone

NativeZone can display an RTF document to the user to enable execution of Cobalt Strike stage shellcode.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)

PLEAD

PLEAD has been executed via malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

Cardinal RAT

Cardinal RAT lures victims into executing malicious macros embedded within Microsoft Excel documents.(Citation: PaloAlto CardinalRat Apr 2017)

DanBot

DanBot has relied on victims' opening a malicious file for initial execution.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)

Ramsay

Ramsay has been executed through malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020)

OutSteel

OutSteel has relied on a user to execute a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

BoomBox

BoomBox has gained execution through user interaction with a malicious file.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)

Mango

Mango has been executed through a Microsoft Word document with a malicious macro.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023)

Lokibot

Lokibot has tricked recipients into enabling malicious macros by getting victims to click "enable content" in email attachments.(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018)(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021)

PoetRAT

PoetRAT has used spearphishing attachments to infect victims.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)

KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS has relied on victims clicking a malicious document for execution.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)

Heyoka Backdoor

Heyoka Backdoor has been spread through malicious document lures.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)

Disco

Disco has been executed through inducing user interaction with malicious .zip and .msi files.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Octopus

Octopus has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)

AppleJeus

AppleJeus has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)

STARWHALE

STARWHALE has relied on victims opening a malicious Excel file for execution.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

Astaroth

Astaroth has used malicious files including VBS, LNK, and HTML for execution.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)

QakBot

QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious attachments.(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot May 2020)(Citation: Kroll Qakbot June 2020)(Citation: Crowdstrike Qakbot October 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Cyberint Qakbot May 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)(Citation: Deep Instinct Black Basta August 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)

SYSCON

SYSCON has been executed by luring victims to open malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Unit 42 CARROTBAT November 2018)

Hancitor

Hancitor has used malicious Microsoft Word documents, sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros.(Citation: FireEye Hancitor)

Dridex

Dridex has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)

OSX/Shlayer

OSX/Shlayer has relied on users mounting and executing a malicious DMG file.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018)

JSS Loader

JSS Loader has been executed through malicious attachments contained in spearphishing emails.(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)

WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT has relied on a victim to open a malicious attachment within an email for execution.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)

Frankenstein

Frankenstein has used trojanized Microsoft Word documents sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)

APT28

APT28 attempted to get users to click on Microsoft Office attachments containing malicious macro scripts.(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)

Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has lured victims into executing malware via malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)

The White Company

The White Company has used phishing lure documents that trick users into opening them and infecting their computers.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)

APT33

APT33 has used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malware.(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)

Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on Office attachments with malicious macros embedded.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)(Citation: unit42_gamaredon_dec2022)

APT29

APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments, including, but not limited to, malicious Microsoft Word documents, .pdf, and .lnk files. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET T3 Threat Report 2021)(Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile)

TA2541

TA2541 has used macro-enabled MS Word documents to lure victims into executing malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021)(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021)

WIRTE

WIRTE has attempted to lure users into opening malicious MS Word and Excel files to execute malicious payloads.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)

Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has attempted to get users to click on a malicious zipped file.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)

Whitefly

Whitefly has used malicious .exe or .dll files disguised as documents or images.(Citation: Symantec Whitefly March 2019)

Darkhotel

Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users into clicking on a malicious attachments.(Citation: Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016)

APT39

APT39 has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious attachment.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: BitDefender Chafer May 2020)(Citation: Symantec Chafer February 2018)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)

APT38

APT38 has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Additionally, APT38 has used malicious Word documents and shortcut files.(Citation: 1 - appv)

APT12

APT12 has attempted to get victims to open malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachment sent via spearphishing.(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Trend Micro IXESHE 2012)

Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has used weaponized documents in e-mail to compromise targeted systems.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)

MuddyWater

MuddyWater has attempted to get users to open malicious PDF attachment and to enable macros and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)(Citation: Proofpoint TA450 Phishing March 2024)

Leviathan

Leviathan has sent spearphishing attachments attempting to get a user to click.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 has used various forms of spearphishing in attempts to get users to open attachments.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)

Ferocious Kitten

Ferocious Kitten has attempted to convince victims to enable malicious content within a spearphishing email by including an odd decoy message.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)

DarkHydrus

DarkHydrus has sent malware that required users to hit the enable button in Microsoft Excel to allow an .iqy file to be downloaded.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has attempted to get users to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Symantec Tick Apr 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)

Machete

Machete has relied on users opening malicious attachments delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)

FIN4

FIN4 has lured victims to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts).(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Video Dec 2014)

Molerats

Molerats has sent malicious files via email that tricked users into clicking Enable Content to run an embedded macro and to download malicious archives.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

SideCopy

SideCopy has attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious embedded archive files sent via spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)

Silence

Silence attempts to get users to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)

Nomadic Octopus

Nomadic Octopus as attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)

Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has lured victims to execute malware with spearphishing attachments containing macros to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)

Confucius

Confucius has lured victims to execute malicious attachments included in crafted spearphishing emails related to current topics.(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has lured victims into opening malicious files containing malware.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)

APT32

APT32 has attempted to lure users to execute a malicious dropper delivered via a spearphishing attachment.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT32 April 2020)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)

EXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY has gained execution through victims clicking on malicious LNK files contained within ISO files, which can execute hidden DLLs within the ISO.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022)

Saint Bear

Saint Bear relies on user interaction and execution of malicious attachments and similar for initial execution on victim systems.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

Higaisa

Higaisa used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing LNK files.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)

Dragonfly

Dragonfly has used various forms of spearphishing in attempts to get users to open malicious attachments.(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)

Sidewinder

Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious files to gain execution in the target environment.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)

Naikon

Naikon has convinced victims to open malicious attachments to execute malware.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)

OilRig

OilRig has delivered macro-enabled documents that required targets to click the "enable content" button to execute the payload on the system.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)

APT19

APT19 attempted to get users to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: FireEye APT19)

APT37

APT37 has sent spearphishing attachments attempting to get a user to open them.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

Inception

Inception lured victims into clicking malicious files for machine reconnaissance and to execute malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)

Andariel

Andariel has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments.(Citation: AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018)

HEXANE

HEXANE has relied on victim's executing malicious file attachments delivered via email or embedded within actor-controlled websites to deliver malware.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: Dragos Hexane)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)(Citation: Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022)

FIN7

FIN7 lured victims to double-click on images in the attachments they sent which would then execute the hidden LNK file.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)

APT-C-36

APT-C-36 has prompted victims to accept macros in order to execute the subsequent payload.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)

Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used attempted to lure victims into opening malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)

BITTER

BITTER has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing.(Citation: Cisco Talos Bitter Bangladesh May 2022)(Citation: Forcepoint BITTER Pakistan Oct 2016)

IndigoZebra

IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments that urged recipients to review modifications in the file which would trigger the attack.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on spearphishing attachments and enabling malicious macros embedded within files.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)

Sharpshooter

Sharpshooter has sent malicious DOC and PDF files to targets so that they can be opened by a user.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018)

Magic Hound

Magic Hound has lured victims into executing malicious files.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)

Magic Hound

Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious email attachments.(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)

menuPass

menuPass has attempted to get victims to open malicious files such as Windows Shortcuts (.lnk) and/or Microsoft Office documents, sent via email as part of spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)

Tonto Team

Tonto Team has relied on user interaction to open their malicious RTF documents.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)

PROMETHIUM

PROMETHIUM has attempted to get users to execute compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)

Aoqin Dragon

Aoqin Dragon has lured victims into opening weaponized documents, fake external drives, and fake antivirus to execute malicious payloads.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)

Mofang

Mofang's malicious spearphishing attachments required a user to open the file after receiving.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)

Windshift

Windshift has used e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malicious code.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)

Star Blizzard

Star Blizzard has lured targets into opening malicious .pdf files to deliver malware.(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)

BlackTech

BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious documents to lure victims into installing malware.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

Gallmaker

Gallmaker sent victims a lure document with a warning that asked victims to “enable content” for execution.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)

Storm-1811

Storm-1811 has prompted users to execute downloaded software and payloads as the result of social engineering activity.(Citation: Microsoft Storm-1811 2024)(Citation: rapid7-email-bombing)(Citation: RedCanary Storm-1811 2024)

Patchwork

Patchwork embedded a malicious macro in a Word document and lured the victim to click on an icon to execute the malware.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)

Moonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet relied on users interacting with malicious files, such as a trojanized PuTTY installer, for initial execution.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)

Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has sent malicious files requiring direct victim interaction to execute.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: Google TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)

Ember Bear

Ember Bear has attempted to lure victims into executing malicious files.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

RedCurl

RedCurl has used malicious files to infect the victim machines.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl1)(Citation: group-ib_redcurl2)(Citation: trendmicro_redcurl)

TA459

TA459 has attempted to get victims to open malicious Microsoft Word attachment sent via spearphishing.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)

Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group attempted to get users to launch malicious Microsoft Office attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)

Ajax Security Team

Ajax Security Team has lured victims into executing malicious files.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)

CURIUM

CURIUM has lured users into opening malicious files delivered via social media.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)

TA551

TA551 has prompted users to enable macros within spearphishing attachments to install malware.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)

Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca required users to click on a malicious file for the loader to activate.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)

RTM

RTM has attempted to lure victims into opening e-mail attachments to execute malicious code.(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)

FIN6

FIN6 has used malicious documents to lure victims into allowing execution of PowerShell scripts.(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019)

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has sent emails containing malicious attachments that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Cobalt Gang Oct 2018)

Elderwood

Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open attachments.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)

Malteiro

Malteiro has relied on users to execute .zip file attachments containing malicious URLs.(Citation: SCILabs Malteiro 2021)

Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal makes their malware look like Flash Player, Office, or PDF documents in order to entice a user to click on it.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)

FIN8

FIN8 has used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malware.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)

APT30

APT30 has relied on users to execute malicious file attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: FireEye APT30)

TA505

TA505 has used lures to get users to enable content in malicious attachments and execute malicious files contained in archives. For example, TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. (Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: ProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)

LazyScripter

LazyScripter has lured users to open malicious email attachments.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)

PLATINUM

PLATINUM has attempted to get users to open malicious files by sending spearphishing emails with attachments to victims.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)

admin@338

admin@338 has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: FireEye admin@338)

Rancor

Rancor attempted to get users to click on an embedded macro within a Microsoft Office Excel document to launch their malware.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Application Control: - Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution. - Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.xml"`) Script Blocking: - Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources. - Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g., `Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned`) Executable Blocking: - Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as `%TEMP%` or `%APPDATA%` directories. - Implementation: Block execution of `.exe`, `.bat`, or `.ps1` files from user-writable directories. Dynamic Analysis Prevention: - Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time. - Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Suspicious Process Behavior: - Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts. - Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action. Unauthorized File Access: - Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization. - Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it. Abnormal API Calls: - Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities. - Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like `OpenProcess` and `WriteProcessMemory` and terminates the offending process. Exploit Prevention: - Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access. - Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.

User Training

User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques. Comprehensive training programs create a human firewall by empowering users to be an active component of the organization's cybersecurity defenses. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Create Comprehensive Training Programs: - Design training modules tailored to the organization's risk profile, covering topics such as phishing, password management, and incident reporting. - Provide role-specific training for high-risk employees, such as helpdesk staff or executives. Use Simulated Exercises: - Conduct phishing simulations to measure user susceptibility and provide targeted follow-up training. - Run social engineering drills to evaluate employee responses and reinforce protocols. Leverage Gamification and Engagement: - Introduce interactive learning methods such as quizzes, gamified challenges, and rewards for successful detection and reporting of threats. Incorporate Security Policies into Onboarding: - Include cybersecurity training as part of the onboarding process for new employees. - Provide easy-to-understand materials outlining acceptable use policies and reporting procedures. Regular Refresher Courses: - Update training materials to include emerging threats and techniques used by adversaries. - Ensure all employees complete periodic refresher courses to stay informed. Emphasize Real-World Scenarios: - Use case studies of recent attacks to demonstrate the consequences of successful phishing or social engineering. - Discuss how specific employee actions can prevent or mitigate such attacks.

Обнаружение

Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).

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