PROMETHIUM
Associated Group Descriptions |
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Name | Description |
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StrongPity | The name StrongPity has also been used to describe the group and the malware used by the group.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) |
Techniques Used |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
PROMETHIUM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) |
Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
PROMETHIUM has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
Enterprise | T1587 | .002 | Develop Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates |
PROMETHIUM has created self-signed certificates to sign malicious installers.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
.003 | Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates |
PROMETHIUM has created self-signed digital certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service |
PROMETHIUM has named services to appear legitimate.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
PROMETHIUM has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
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Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing |
PROMETHIUM has signed code with self-signed certificates.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
Enterprise | T1205 | .001 | Traffic Signaling: Port Knocking |
PROMETHIUM has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
Enterprise | T1204 | .002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
PROMETHIUM has attempted to get users to execute compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
Enterprise | T1078 | .003 | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts |
PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
Software |
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ID | Name | References | Techniques |
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S0491 | StrongPity | (Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) (Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) | Encrypted/Encoded File, Archive via Custom Method, Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, Malicious File, Windows Service, Automated Collection, Code Signing, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Automated Exfiltration, File and Directory Discovery, Masquerade Task or Service, Process Discovery, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, PowerShell, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Multi-hop Proxy, Disable or Modify Tools, Non-Standard Port, Asymmetric Cryptography, Security Software Discovery, Hidden Window, File Deletion, Web Protocols, Ingress Tool Transfer, Service Execution |
S0178 | Truvasys | (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) | Masquerade Task or Service, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
References
- Microsoft. (2016, December 14). Twin zero-day attacks: PROMETHIUM and NEODYMIUM target individuals in Europe. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
- Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
- Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
- Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
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