Автоматизированный сбор данных
Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.
Примеры процедур |
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Название | Описание |
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T9000 |
T9000 searches removable storage devices for files with a pre-defined list of file extensions (e.g. * .doc, *.ppt, *.xls, *.docx, *.pptx, *.xlsx). Any matching files are encrypted and written to a local user directory.(Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016) |
Rover |
Rover automatically collects files from the local system and removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions on a regular timeframe.(Citation: Palo Alto Rover) |
Micropsia |
Micropsia executes an RAR tool to recursively archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions (*.xls, *.xlsx, *.csv, *.odt, *.doc, *.docx, *.ppt, *.pptx, *.pdf, *.mdb, *.accdb, *.accde, *.txt).(Citation: Radware Micropsia July 2018) |
ccf32 |
ccf32 can be used to automatically collect files from a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) |
Gamaredon Group |
Gamaredon Group has deployed scripts on compromised systems that automatically scan for interesting documents.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) |
Comnie |
Comnie executes a batch script to store discovery information in %TEMP%\info.dat and then uploads the temporarily file to the remote C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Comnie) |
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a script to collect information about the infected system.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019) |
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ROADTools |
ROADTools automatically gathers data from Azure AD environments using the Azure Graph API.(Citation: Roadtools) |
NETWIRE |
NETWIRE can automatically archive collected data.(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020) |
PoshC2 |
PoshC2 contains a module for recursively parsing through files and directories to gather valid credit card numbers.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) |
PoetRAT |
PoetRAT used file system monitoring to track modification and enable automatic exfiltration.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020) |
Empire |
Empire can automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other information from a compromised system.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019) |
APT1 |
APT1 used a batch script to perform a series of discovery techniques and saves it to a text file.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
Proxysvc |
Proxysvc automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret) |
BADNEWS |
BADNEWS monitors USB devices and copies files with certain extensions to a predefined directory.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) |
TajMahal |
TajMahal has the ability to index and compress files into a send queue for exfiltration.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019) |
Ke3chang |
Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data collection from victim networks.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021) |
FIN5 |
FIN5 scans processes on all victim systems in the environment and uses automated scripts to pull back the results.(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) |
VERMIN |
VERMIN saves each collected file with the automatically generated format {0:dd-MM-yyyy}.txt .(Citation: Unit 42 VERMIN Jan 2018) |
Metamorfo |
Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine, and set timers to collect the contents of the clipboard and website browsing.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018) |
APT28 |
APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) |
WindTail |
WindTail can identify and add files that possess specific file extensions to an array for archiving.(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019) |
USBStealer |
For all non-removable drives on a victim, USBStealer executes automated collection of certain files for later exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) |
AppleSeed |
AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi) |
Valak |
Valak can download a module to search for and build a report of harvested credential data.(Citation: SentinelOne Valak June 2020) |
OutSteel |
OutSteel can automatically scan for and collect files with specific extensions.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) |
LightNeuron |
LightNeuron can be configured to automatically collect files under a specified directory.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) |
Bankshot |
Bankshot recursively generates a list of files within a directory and sends them back to the control server.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot) |
Frankenstein |
Frankenstein has enumerated hosts via Empire, gathering the username, domain name, machine name, and other system information.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019) |
StrongPity |
StrongPity has a file searcher component that can automatically collect and archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
FunnyDream |
FunnyDream can monitor files for changes and automatically collect them.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) |
Attor |
Attor has automatically collected data about the compromised system.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019) |
Confucius |
Confucius has used a file stealer to steal documents and images with the following extensions: txt, pdf, png, jpg, doc, xls, xlm, odp, ods, odt, rtf, ppt, xlsx, xlsm, docx, pptx, and jpeg.(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Aug 2021) |
OilRig |
OilRig has used automated collection.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) |
Ramsay |
Ramsay can conduct an initial scan for Microsoft Word documents on the local system, removable media, and connected network drives, before tagging and collecting them. It can continue tagging documents to collect with follow up scans.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
RTM |
RTM monitors browsing activity and automatically captures screenshots if a victim browses to a URL matching one of a list of strings.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019) |
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other system information.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019) |
|
FIN6 |
FIN6 has used a script to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy and remove data to a log file, and to bind to events from the submit payment button.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro FIN6 October 2019) |
Patchwork |
Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions. Patchwork also executed a script to enumerate all drives, store them as a list, and upload generated files to the C2 server.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) |
Tropic Trooper |
Tropic Trooper has collected information automatically using the adversary's USBferry attack.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
Sidewinder |
Sidewinder has used tools to automatically collect system and network configuration information.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021) |
Chimera |
Chimera has used custom DLLs for continuous retrieval of data from memory.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) |
GoldFinder |
GoldFinder logged and stored information related to the route or hops a packet took from a compromised machine to a hardcoded C2 server, including the target C2 URL, HTTP response/status code, HTTP response headers and values, and data received from the C2 node.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021) |
Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) |
Mythic |
Mythic supports scripting of file downloads from agents.(Citation: Mythc Documentation) |
Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda used custom batch scripts to collect files automatically from a targeted system.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) |
Operation Wocao |
Operation Wocao has used a script to collect information about the infected system.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019) |
InvisiMole |
InvisiMole can sort and collect specific documents as well as generate a list of all files on a newly inserted drive and store them in an encrypted file.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2018)(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) |
Crutch |
Crutch can automatically monitor removable drives in a loop and copy interesting files.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020) |
Helminth |
A Helminth VBScript receives a batch script to execute a set of commands in a command prompt.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) |
Zebrocy |
Zebrocy scans the system and automatically collects files with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, ,.xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .jpeg, .bmp, .tiff, .kum, .tlg, .sbx, .cr, .hse, .hsf, and .lhz.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) |
menuPass |
menuPass has used the Csvde tool to collect Active Directory files and data.(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020) |
ShimRatReporter |
ShimRatReporter gathered information automatically, without instruction from a C2, related to the user and host machine that is compiled into a report and sent to the operators.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang) |
MESSAGETAP |
MESSAGETAP checks two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, for instructions on how to target and save data parsed and extracted from SMS message data from the network traffic. If an SMS message contained either a phone number, IMSI number, or keyword that matched the predefined list, it is saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019) |
Контрмеры |
|
Контрмера | Описание |
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Remote Data Storage |
Use remote security log and sensitive file storage where access can be controlled better to prevent exposure of intrusion detection log data or sensitive information. |
Encrypt Sensitive Information |
Protect sensitive information with strong encryption. |
Automated Collection Mitigation |
Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through Input Capture and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through Brute Force techniques. Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP) |
Обнаружение
Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces.
Ссылки
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