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MITRE ATT&CK - Преступная группа APT1
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APT1

APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
ID: G0006
Associated Groups: Comment Crew, Comment Group, Comment Panda
Version: 1.4
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 26 May 2021

Associated Group Descriptions
Name Description
Comment Crew (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Comment Group (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Comment Panda (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)

Techniques Used
Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1087 .001 Account Discovery: Local Account

APT1 used the commands net localgroup,net user, and net group to find accounts on the system.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Enterprise T1583 .001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

APT1 has registered hundreds of domains for use in operations.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Enterprise T1560 .001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

APT1 has used RAR to compress files before moving them outside of the victim network.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Enterprise T1059 .003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Enterprise T1584 .001 Compromise Infrastructure: Domains

APT1 hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Enterprise T1114 .001 Email Collection: Local Email Collection

APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. GETMAIL extracts emails from archived Outlook .pst files.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection

APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. MAPIGET steals email still on Exchange servers that has not yet been archived.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)

Enterprise T1585 .002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts

APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Enterprise T1036 .005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

The file name AcroRD32.exe, a legitimate process name for Adobe's Acrobat Reader, was used by APT1 as a name for malware.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)
Enterprise T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

APT1 has been known to use credential dumping using Mimikatz.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Enterprise T1588 .001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware

APT1 used publicly available malware for privilege escalation.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool

APT1 has used various open-source tools for privilege escalation purposes.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)

Enterprise T1566 .001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing hyperlinks to malicious files.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)

Enterprise T1021 .001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.(Citation: FireEye PLA)
Enterprise T1550 .002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

The APT1 group is known to have used pass the hash.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)

Software
ID Name References Techniques
S0039 Net (Citation: Mandiant APT1) (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility) (Citation: Savill 1999) Password Policy Discovery, Domain Groups, System Time Discovery, Domain Account, Local Account, System Service Discovery, Remote System Discovery, Network Share Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, Network Share Connection Removal, Service Execution, Local Account, Additional Local or Domain Groups, Local Groups, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Domain Account
S0109 WEBC2 (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix) (Citation: Mandiant APT1) DLL Search Order Hijacking, Ingress Tool Transfer, Windows Command Shell
S0100 ipconfig (Citation: Mandiant APT1) (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig) System Network Configuration Discovery
S0057 Tasklist (Citation: Mandiant APT1) (Citation: Microsoft Tasklist) Process Discovery, System Service Discovery, Security Software Discovery
S0121 Lslsass (Citation: Mandiant APT1) LSASS Memory
S0123 xCmd (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix) (Citation: xCmd) Service Execution
S0025 CALENDAR (Citation: Mandiant APT1) Windows Command Shell, Bidirectional Communication
S0006 pwdump (Citation: Mandiant APT1) (Citation: Wikipedia pwdump) Security Account Manager
S0122 Pass-The-Hash Toolkit (Citation: Mandiant APT1) Pass the Hash
S0002 Mimikatz (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Mandiant APT1) DCSync, Credentials from Password Stores, Rogue Domain Controller, Private Keys, SID-History Injection, Security Support Provider, Pass the Hash, Account Manipulation, Pass the Ticket, Credentials from Web Browsers, Golden Ticket, Security Account Manager, LSASS Memory, Silver Ticket, Windows Credential Manager, Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, LSA Secrets
S0008 gsecdump (Citation: Mandiant APT1) (Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump) Security Account Manager, LSA Secrets
S0012 PoisonIvy (Citation: Breut) (Citation: Darkmoon) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Mandiant APT1) (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) Windows Service, Modify Registry, Uncommonly Used Port, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Obfuscated Files or Information, Keylogging, Active Setup, Mutual Exclusion, Dynamic-link Library Injection, Local Data Staging, Windows Command Shell, Ingress Tool Transfer, Symmetric Cryptography, Data from Local System, Application Window Discovery, Rootkit
S0345 Seasalt (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix) (Citation: McAfee Oceansalt Oct 2018) Windows Command Shell, File and Directory Discovery, Web Protocols, Process Discovery, Masquerade Task or Service, Custom Command and Control Protocol, Ingress Tool Transfer, Encrypted/Encoded File, Windows Service, File Deletion, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
S0017 BISCUIT (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix) (Citation: Mandiant APT1) Screen Capture, Fallback Channels, System Information Discovery, System Time Discovery, Process Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Custom Command and Control Protocol, Keylogging, Asymmetric Cryptography, System Owner/User Discovery, Windows Command Shell
S0119 Cachedump (Citation: Mandiant APT1) Cached Domain Credentials
S0026 GLOOXMAIL (Citation: Mandiant APT1) Publish/Subscribe Protocols, Bidirectional Communication
S0029 PsExec (Citation: Mandiant APT1) (Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) (Citation: SANS PsExec) SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Windows Service, Lateral Tool Transfer, Service Execution, Domain Account

References

  1. Mandiant. (n.d.). Appendix C (Digital) - The Malware Arsenal. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  2. Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, October 18). ‘Operation Oceansalt’ Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group. Retrieved November 30, 2018.
  3. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  4. FireEye Labs. (2014, May 20). The PLA and the 8:00am-5:00pm Work Day: FireEye Confirms DOJ’s Findings on APT1 Intrusion Activity. Retrieved November 4, 2014.
  5. Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
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