Encrypted Channel: Симметричное шифрование
Other sub-techniques of Encrypted Channel (2)
ID | Название |
---|---|
.001 | Симметричное шифрование |
.002 | Асимметричное шифрование |
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
Примеры процедур |
|
Название | Описание |
---|---|
Dridex |
Dridex has encrypted traffic with RC4.(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017) |
SMOKEDHAM |
SMOKEDHAM has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) |
InvisiMole |
InvisiMole uses variations of a simple XOR encryption routine for C&C communications.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2018) |
SysUpdate |
SysUpdate has used DES to encrypt all C2 communications.(Citation: Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux) |
Emotet |
Emotet is known to use RSA keys for encrypting C2 traffic. (Citation: Trend Micro Emotet Jan 2019) |
Prikormka |
Prikormka encrypts some C2 traffic with the Blowfish cipher.(Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait) |
3PARA RAT |
3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode with a key derived from the MD5 hash of the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS. 3PARA RAT will use an 8-byte XOR key derived from the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS if the DES decoding fails(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) |
NETEAGLE |
NETEAGLE will decrypt resources it downloads with HTTP requests by using RC4 with the key "ScoutEagle."(Citation: FireEye APT30) |
Machete |
Machete has used AES to exfiltrate documents.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) |
Azorult |
Azorult can encrypt C2 traffic using XOR.(Citation: Unit42 Azorult Nov 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint Azorult July 2018) |
Bisonal |
Bisonal variants reported on in 2014 and 2015 used a simple XOR cipher for C2. Some Bisonal samples encrypt C2 communications with RC4.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
Sys10 |
Sys10 uses an XOR 0x1 loop to encrypt its C2 domain.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) |
Elise |
Elise encrypts exfiltrated data with RC4.(Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015) |
Winnti for Windows |
Winnti for Windows can XOR encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) |
Pandora |
Pandora has the ability to encrypt communications with D3DES.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
BADNEWS |
BADNEWS encrypts C2 data with a ROR by 3 and an XOR by 0x23.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) |
NDiskMonitor |
NDiskMonitor uses AES to encrypt certain information sent over its C2 channel.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) |
Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4.(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020) |
QUIETCANARY |
QUIETCANARY can RC4 encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023) |
Sardonic |
Sardonic has the ability to use an RC4 key to encrypt communications to and from actor-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Bitdefender Sardonic Aug 2021) |
Darkhotel |
Darkhotel has used AES-256 and 3DES for C2 communications.(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016) |
Attor |
Attor has encrypted data symmetrically using a randomly generated Blowfish (OFB) key which is encrypted with a public RSA key.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019) |
Lurid |
Lurid performs XOR encryption.(Citation: Villeneuve 2011) |
StrifeWater |
StrifeWater can encrypt C2 traffic using XOR with a hard coded key.(Citation: Cybereason StrifeWater Feb 2022) |
Chaos |
Chaos provides a reverse shell connection on 8338/TCP, encrypted via AES.(Citation: Chaos Stolen Backdoor) |
POWERTON |
POWERTON has used AES for encrypting C2 traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail) |
SUNBURST |
SUNBURST encrypted C2 traffic using a single-byte-XOR cipher.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) |
More_eggs |
More_eggs has used an RC4-based encryption method for its C2 communications.(Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019) |
Hikit |
Hikit performs XOR encryption.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
NETWIRE |
NETWIRE can use AES encryption for C2 data transferred.(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020) |
Helminth |
Helminth encrypts data sent to its C2 server over HTTP with RC4.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) |
QuasarRAT |
QuasarRAT uses AES with a hardcoded pre-shared key to encrypt network communication.(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)(Citation: CISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018) |
HotCroissant |
HotCroissant has compressed network communications and encrypted them with a custom stream cipher.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020)(Citation: US-CERT HOTCROISSANT February 2020) |
Bonadan |
Bonadan can XOR-encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018) |
Lucifer |
Lucifer can perform a decremental-xor encryption on the initial C2 request before sending it over the wire.(Citation: Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020) |
Taidoor |
Taidoor uses RC4 to encrypt the message body of HTTP content.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) |
Hi-Zor |
Hi-Zor encrypts C2 traffic with a double XOR using two distinct single-byte keys.(Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor) |
FALLCHILL |
FALLCHILL encrypts C2 data with RC4 encryption.(Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021) |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used an AES key to communicate with their C2 server.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020) |
|
Mosquito |
Mosquito uses a custom encryption algorithm, which consists of XOR and a stream that is similar to the Blum Blum Shub algorithm.(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018) |
Dipsind |
Dipsind encrypts C2 data with AES256 in ECB mode.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016) |
CharmPower |
CharmPower can send additional modules over C2 encrypted with a simple substitution cipher.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
BADCALL |
BADCALL encrypts C2 traffic using an XOR/ADD cipher.(Citation: US-CERT BADCALL) |
WarzoneRAT |
WarzoneRAT can encrypt its C2 with RC4 with the password `warzone160\x00`.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020) |
HAMMERTOSS |
Before being appended to image files, HAMMERTOSS commands are encrypted with a key composed of both a hard-coded value and a string contained on that day's tweet. To decrypt the commands, an investigator would need access to the intended malware sample, the day's tweet, and the image file containing the command.(Citation: FireEye APT29) |
LunarWeb |
LunarWeb can send AES encrypted C2 commands.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024) |
Uroburos |
Uroburos can encrypt the data beneath its http2 or tcp encryption at the session layer with CAST-128, using a different key for incoming and outgoing data.(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023) |
SideTwist |
SideTwist can encrypt C2 communications with a randomly generated key.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D |
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D encrypts data sent back to the C2 using AES in CBC mode with a null initialization vector (IV) and a key sent from the server that is padded to 32 bytes.(Citation: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017) |
Emissary |
The C2 server response to a beacon sent by a variant of Emissary contains a 36-character GUID value that is used as an encryption key for subsequent network communications. Some variants of Emissary use various XOR operations to encrypt C2 data.(Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015) |
FakeM |
The original variant of FakeM encrypts C2 traffic using a custom encryption cipher that uses an XOR key of “YHCRA” and bit rotation between each XOR operation. Some variants of FakeM use RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016) |
QakBot |
QakBot can RC4 encrypt strings in C2 communication.(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021) |
Lazarus Group |
Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret) |
Mongall |
Mongall has the ability to RC4 encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022) |
Cardinal RAT |
Cardinal RAT uses a secret key with a series of XOR and addition operations to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: PaloAlto CardinalRat Apr 2017) |
Sakula |
Sakula encodes C2 traffic with single-byte XOR keys.(Citation: Dell Sakula) |
ZIRCONIUM |
ZIRCONIUM has used AES encrypted communications in C2.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020) |
Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has used a version of the Awen web shell that employed AES encryption and decryption for C2 communications.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023) |
Volgmer |
Volgmer uses a simple XOR cipher to encrypt traffic and files.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017) |
httpclient |
httpclient encrypts C2 content with XOR using a single byte, 0x12.(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) |
LIGHTWIRE |
LIGHTWIRE can RC4 encrypt C2 commands.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024) |
HiddenWasp |
HiddenWasp uses an RC4-like algorithm with an already computed PRGA generated key-stream for network communication.(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) |
MoonWind |
MoonWind encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a static key.(Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017) |
Ninja |
Ninja can XOR and AES encrypt C2 messages.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022) |
Pikabot |
Earlier Pikabot variants use a custom encryption procedure leveraging multiple mechanisms including AES with multiple rounds of Base64 encoding for its command and control communication.(Citation: Zscaler Pikabot 2023) Later Pikabot variants eliminate the use of AES and instead use RC4 encryption for transmitted information.(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024) |
GrimAgent |
GrimAgent can use an AES key to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021) |
UPPERCUT |
Some versions of UPPERCUT have used the hard-coded string “this is the encrypt key” for Blowfish encryption when communicating with a C2. Later versions have hard-coded keys uniquely for each C2 address.(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) |
4H RAT |
4H RAT obfuscates C2 communication using a 1-byte XOR with the key 0xBE.(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) |
Winnti for Linux |
Winnti for Linux has used a custom TCP protocol with four-byte XOR for command and control (C2).(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019) |
RedCurl |
RedCurl has used AES-128 CBC to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl2) |
TrickBot |
TrickBot uses a custom crypter leveraging Microsoft’s CryptoAPI to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016)Newer versions of TrickBot have been known to use `bcrypt` to encrypt and digitally sign responses to their C2 server. (Citation: Bitdefender Trickbot C2 infra Nov 2020) |
Stealth Falcon |
Stealth Falcon malware encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a hard-coded key.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016) |
Stuxnet |
Stuxnet encodes the payload of system information sent to the command and control servers using a one byte 0xFF XOR key. Stuxnet also uses a 31-byte long static byte string to XOR data sent to command and control servers. The servers use a different static key to encrypt replies to the implant.(Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011) |
Torisma |
Torisma has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020) |
Ebury |
Ebury has encrypted C2 traffic using the client IP address, then encoded it as a hexadecimal string.(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014) |
RDAT |
RDAT has used AES ciphertext to encode C2 communications.(Citation: Unit42 RDAT July 2020) |
XCSSET |
XCSSET uses RC4 encryption over TCP to communicate with its C2 server.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020) |
Samurai |
Samurai can encrypt C2 communications with AES.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022) |
ZIPLINE |
ZIPLINE can use AES-128-CBC to encrypt data for both upload and download.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024) |
Bazar |
Bazar can send C2 communications with XOR encryption.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020) |
Frankenstein |
Frankenstein has communicated with a C2 via an encrypted RC4 byte stream and AES-CBC.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019) |
Duqu |
The Duqu command and control protocol's data stream can be encrypted with AES-CBC.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu) |
Rifdoor |
Rifdoor has encrypted command and control (C2) communications with a stream cipher.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020) |
Hydraq |
Hydraq C2 traffic is encrypted using bitwise NOT and XOR operations.(Citation: Symantec Hydraq Jan 2010) |
BBSRAT |
BBSRAT uses a custom encryption algorithm on data sent back to the C2 server over HTTP.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT) |
MuddyWater |
MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses.(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022) |
ADVSTORESHELL |
A variant of ADVSTORESHELL encrypts some C2 with 3DES.(Citation: Bitdefender APT28 Dec 2015) |
LightNeuron |
LightNeuron uses AES to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) |
Explosive |
Explosive has encrypted communications with the RC4 method.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) |
RTM |
RTM encrypts C2 traffic with a custom RC4 variant.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017) |
LookBack |
LookBack uses a modified version of RC4 for data transfer.(Citation: Proofpoint LookBack Malware Aug 2019) |
TAINTEDSCRIBE |
TAINTEDSCRIBE uses a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) algorithm for network encryption.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020) |
Kobalos |
Kobalos's post-authentication communication channel uses a 32-byte-long password with RC4 for inbound and outbound traffic.(Citation: ESET Kobalos Feb 2021)(Citation: ESET Kobalos Jan 2021) |
gh0st RAT |
gh0st RAT uses RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018) |
Mafalda |
Mafalda can encrypt its C2 traffic with RC4.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022) |
SombRAT |
SombRAT has encrypted its C2 communications with AES.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020) |
WellMess |
WellMess can encrypt HTTP POST data using RC6 and a dynamically generated AES key encrypted with a hard coded RSA public key.(Citation: PWC WellMess July 2020)(Citation: PWC WellMess C2 August 2020)(Citation: CISA WellMess July 2020) |
Downdelph |
Downdelph uses RC4 to encrypt C2 responses.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) |
Comnie |
Comnie encrypts command and control communications with RC4.(Citation: Palo Alto Comnie) |
BendyBear |
BendyBear communicates to a C2 server over port 443 using modified RC4 and XOR-encrypted chunks.(Citation: Unit42 BendyBear Feb 2021) |
PipeMon |
PipeMon communications are RC4 encrypted.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) |
HyperStack |
HyperStack has used RSA encryption for C2 communications.(Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020) |
Gazer |
Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses 3DES.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017) |
FRP |
FRP can use STCP (Secret TCP) with a preshared key to encrypt services exposed to public networks.(Citation: FRP GitHub) |
NGLite |
NGLite will use an AES encrypted channel for command and control purposes, in one case using the key |
NanoCore |
NanoCore uses DES to encrypt the C2 traffic.(Citation: PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016) |
Derusbi |
Derusbi obfuscates C2 traffic with variable 4-byte XOR keys.(Citation: Fidelis Turbo) |
SLIGHTPULSE |
SLIGHTPULSE can RC4 encrypt all incoming and outgoing C2 messages.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021) |
Carbanak |
Carbanak encrypts the message body of HTTP traffic with RC2 (in CBC mode). Carbanak also uses XOR with random keys for its communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) |
xCaon |
xCaon has encrypted data sent to the C2 server using a XOR key.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021) |
Okrum |
Okrum uses AES to encrypt network traffic. The key can be hardcoded or negotiated with the C2 server in the registration phase. (Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019) |
Higaisa |
Higaisa used AES-128 to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020) |
PoisonIvy |
PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) |
Bumblebee |
Bumblebee can encrypt C2 requests and responses with RC4(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022) |
GreyEnergy |
GreyEnergy encrypts communications using AES256.(Citation: ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018) |
Sliver |
Sliver can use AES-GCM-256 to encrypt a session key for C2 message exchange.(Citation: GitHub Sliver Encryption) |
SodaMaster |
SodaMaster can use RC4 to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021) |
RedLeaves |
RedLeaves has encrypted C2 traffic with RC4, previously using keys of 88888888 and babybear.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) |
FlawedAmmyy |
FlawedAmmyy has used SEAL encryption during the initial C2 handshake.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018) |
Epic |
Epic encrypts commands from the C2 server using a hardcoded key.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla) |
Latrodectus |
Latrodectus can send RC4 encrypted data over C2 channels.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)(Citation: Elastic Latrodectus May 2024)(Citation: Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024) |
CallMe |
CallMe uses AES to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016) |
TSCookie |
TSCookie has encrypted network communications with RC4.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018) |
Komplex |
The Komplex C2 channel uses an 11-byte XOR algorithm to hide data.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) |
PlugX |
PlugX can use RC4 encryption in C2 communications.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022) |
WIREFIRE |
WIREFIRE can AES encrypt process output sent from compromised devices to C2.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024) |
Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike has the ability to use AES-256 symmetric encryption in CBC mode with HMAC-SHA-256 to encrypt task commands and XOR to encrypt shell code and configuration data.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Strike September 2020) |
SeaDuke |
SeaDuke C2 traffic has been encrypted with RC4 and AES.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)(Citation: Unit 42 SeaDuke 2015) |
RIPTIDE |
APT12 has used the RIPTIDE RAT, which communicates over HTTP with a payload encrypted with RC4.(Citation: Moran 2014) |
H1N1 |
H1N1 encrypts C2 traffic using an RC4 key.(Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 2) |
Inception |
Inception has encrypted network communications with AES.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014) |
KONNI |
KONNI has used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Malwarebytes KONNI Evolves Jan 2022) |
Daserf |
Daserf uses RC4 encryption to obfuscate HTTP traffic.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017) |
ZeroT |
ZeroT has used RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017) |
FatDuke |
FatDuke can AES encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019) |
KEYMARBLE |
KEYMARBLE uses a customized XOR algorithm to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: US-CERT KEYMARBLE Aug 2018) |
Bandook |
Bandook has used AES encryption for C2 communication.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020) |
IceApple |
The IceApple Result Retriever module can AES encrypt C2 responses.(Citation: CrowdStrike IceApple May 2022) |
APT33 |
APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail) |
RainyDay |
RainyDay can use RC4 to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021) |
PLAINTEE |
PLAINTEE encodes C2 beacons using XOR.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018) |
FoggyWeb |
FoggyWeb has used a dynamic XOR key and custom XOR methodology for C2 communications.(Citation: MSTIC FoggyWeb September 2021) |
BLINDINGCAN |
BLINDINGCAN has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020) |
ChChes |
ChChes can encrypt C2 traffic with AES or RC4.(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) |
metaMain |
metaMain can encrypt the data that it sends and receives from the C2 server using an RC4 encryption algorithm.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022) |
UBoatRAT |
UBoatRAT encrypts instructions in its C2 network payloads using a simple XOR cipher.(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) |
APT28 |
APT28 installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) |
BRONZE BUTLER |
BRONZE BUTLER has used RC4 encryption (for Datper malware) and AES (for xxmm malware) to obfuscate HTTP traffic. BRONZE BUTLER has also used a tool called RarStar that encodes data with a custom XOR algorithm when posting it to a C2 server.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017) |
Metamorfo |
Metamorfo has encrypted C2 commands with AES-256.(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
SNUGRIDE |
SNUGRIDE encrypts C2 traffic using AES with a static key.(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) |
PLEAD |
PLEAD has used RC4 encryption to download modules.(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) |
CHOPSTICK |
CHOPSTICK encrypts C2 communications with RC4.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) |
CORESHELL |
CORESHELL C2 messages are encrypted with custom stream ciphers using six-byte or eight-byte keys.(Citation: FireEye APT28) |
RotaJakiro |
RotaJakiro encrypts C2 communication using a combination of AES, XOR, ROTATE encryption, and ZLIB compression.(Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis) |
down_new |
down_new has the ability to AES encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019) |
Felismus |
Some Felismus samples use a custom encryption method for C2 traffic that utilizes AES and multiple keys.(Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017) |
During Frankenstein, the threat actors communicated with C2 via an encrypted RC4 byte stream and AES-CBC.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019) |
|
Nebulae |
Nebulae can use RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021) |
Woody RAT |
Woody RAT can use AES-CBC to encrypt data sent to its C2 server.(Citation: MalwareBytes WoodyRAT Aug 2022) |
CosmicDuke |
CosmicDuke contains a custom version of the RC4 algorithm that includes a programming error.(Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke) |
PingPull |
PingPull can use AES, in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode padded with PKCS5, to encrypt C2 server communications.(Citation: Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022) |
Контрмеры |
|
Контрмера | Описание |
---|---|
Network Intrusion Prevention |
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. |
Обнаружение
With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Ссылки
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