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MITRE ATT&CK - Инструмент CHOPSTICK
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CHOPSTICK

CHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) It is tracked separately from the X-Agent for Android.
ID: S0023
Associated Software: SPLM Xagent X-Agent webhp Backdoor.SofacyX
Type: MALWARE
Platforms: Windows
Version: 2.3
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 26 Mar 2023

Associated Software Descriptions
Name Description
SPLM (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
Xagent (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
X-Agent (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
webhp (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
Backdoor.SofacyX (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)

Techniques Used
Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over HTTP.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
.003 Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols

Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over SMTP and POP3.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

Enterprise T1568 .002 Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms

CHOPSTICK can use a DGA for Fallback Channels, domains are generated by concatenating words from lists.(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
Enterprise T1573 .001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

CHOPSTICK encrypts C2 communications with RC4.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography

CHOPSTICK encrypts C2 communications with TLS.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

Enterprise T1056 .001 Input Capture: Keylogging

CHOPSTICK is capable of performing keylogging.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)
Enterprise T1027 .011 Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage

CHOPSTICK may store RC4 encrypted configuration information in the Windows Registry.(Citation: FireEye APT28)
Enterprise T1090 .001 Proxy: Internal Proxy

CHOPSTICK used a proxy server between victims and the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
Enterprise T1518 .001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery

CHOPSTICK checks for antivirus and forensics software.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

Groups That Use This Software
ID Name References
G0007 APT28

(Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)

References

  1. ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
  2. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  3. FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
  4. Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.
  5. Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.
  6. Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
  7. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
  8. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  9. Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022.
  10. Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
  11. FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
  12. ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
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