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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Remote Services:  Протокол удаленного рабочего стола

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features or Terminal Services DLL for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)

ID: T1021.001
Относится к технике:  T1021
Тактика(-и): Lateral Movement
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation
Версия: 1.2
Дата создания: 11 Feb 2020
Последнее изменение: 07 Aug 2023

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)

INC Ransom

INC Ransom has used RDP to move laterally.(Citation: Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023)(Citation: SOCRadar INC Ransom January 2024)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransomware May 2024)

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022)

QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)

Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via RDP using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)

APT5

APT5 has moved laterally throughout victim environments using RDP.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Update May 2021)

zwShell

zwShell has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)

OilRig

OilRig has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the environment.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)

Patchwork

Patchwork attempted to use RDP to move laterally.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)

FIN8

FIN8 has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)

Imminent Monitor

Imminent Monitor has a module for performing remote desktop access.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)

WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT has the ability to control an infected PC using RDP.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)

APT39

APT39 has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and persistence, in some cases employing the rdpwinst tool for mangement of multiple sessions.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: BitDefender Chafer May 2020)

Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)

Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)

Aquatic Panda

Aquatic Panda leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.(Citation: Crowdstrike HuntReport 2022)

Carbanak

Carbanak enables concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions.(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.(Citation: Costa AvosLocker May 2022)

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 moved laterally via RDP.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used RDP with compromised credentials for lateral movement.(Citation: Volexity Ivanti Zero-Day Exploitation January 2024)

FIN7

FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)

Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)

Silence

Silence has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)

Revenge RAT

Revenge RAT has a plugin to perform RDP access.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)

ServHelper

ServHelper has commands for adding a remote desktop user and sending RDP traffic to the attacker through a reverse SSH tunnel.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)

APT29

APT29 has used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

HEXANE

HEXANE has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)

Axiom

Axiom has used RDP during operations.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)

TEMP.Veles

TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used Remote Desktop Protocol to conduct lateral movement.(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)

SDBbot

SDBbot has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim's machines.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)

Koadic

Koadic can enable remote desktop on the victim's machine.(Citation: Github Koadic)

jRAT

jRAT can support RDP control.(Citation: Kaspersky Adwind Feb 2016)

Agrius

Agrius tunnels RDP traffic through deployed web shells to access victim environments via compromised accounts.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021) Agrius used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)

njRAT

njRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)

Pysa

Pysa has laterally moved using RDP connections.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

Stolen Pencil

Stolen Pencil utilized RDP for direct remote point-and-click access. (Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)

Pupy

Pupy can enable/disable RDP connection and can start a remote desktop session using a browser web socket client.(Citation: GitHub Pupy)

DarkComet

DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.(Citation: Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018)

FIN6

FIN6 used RDP to move laterally in victim networks.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)

FIN10

FIN10 has used RDP to move laterally to systems in the victim environment.(Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)

ZxShell

ZxShell has remote desktop functionality.(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014)

FIN13

FIN13 has remotely accessed compromised environments via Remote Desktop Services (RDS) for lateral movement.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)

Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used Remote Desktop to log on to servers interactively and manually copy files to remote hosts.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)

menuPass

menuPass has used RDP connections to move across the victim network.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)

During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

APT3

APT3 enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence.(Citation: aptsim) APT3 has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.(Citation: Twitter Cglyer Status Update APT3 eml)

Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)

Leviathan

Leviathan has targeted RDP credentials and used it to move through the victim environment.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)

Dragonfly

Dragonfly has moved laterally via RDP.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)

APT41

APT41 used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) APT41 used NATBypass to expose local RDP ports on compromised systems to the Internet.(Citation: apt41_dcsocytec_dec2022)

Chimera

Chimera has used RDP to access targeted systems.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)

APT1

The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.(Citation: FireEye PLA)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Audit

Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.

Limit Access to Resource Over Network

Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.

Network Segmentation

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.

Operating System Configuration

Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.

Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.

User Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.

Multi-factor Authentication

Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.

Privileged Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.

Обнаружение

Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.

Ссылки

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Связанные риски

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Каталоги

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