Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Remote Services:  Протокол удаленного рабочего стола

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features or Terminal Services DLL for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)

ID: T1021.001
Относится к технике:  T1021
Тактика(-и): Lateral Movement
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation
Версия: 1.3
Дата создания: 11 Feb 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)

INC Ransom

INC Ransom has used RDP to move laterally.(Citation: Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023)(Citation: SOCRadar INC Ransom January 2024)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransomware May 2024)

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022)

QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)

Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via RDP using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)

APT5

APT5 has moved laterally throughout victim environments using RDP.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Update May 2021)

zwShell

zwShell has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)

OilRig

OilRig has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the environment.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)(Citation: Symantec Crambus OCT 2023)(Citation: Symantec Crambus OCT 2023)

Patchwork

Patchwork attempted to use RDP to move laterally.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)

FIN8

FIN8 has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)

BlackByte

BlackByte has used RDP to access other hosts within victim networks.(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023)(Citation: Cisco BlackByte 2024)

Imminent Monitor

Imminent Monitor has a module for performing remote desktop access.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)

WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT has the ability to control an infected PC using RDP.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)

APT39

APT39 has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and persistence, in some cases employing the rdpwinst tool for mangement of multiple sessions.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: BitDefender Chafer May 2020)

Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)

Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)

Aquatic Panda

Aquatic Panda leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.(Citation: Crowdstrike HuntReport 2022)

Carbanak

Carbanak enables concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions.(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.(Citation: Costa AvosLocker May 2022)

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 moved laterally via RDP.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used RDP with compromised credentials for lateral movement.(Citation: Volexity Ivanti Zero-Day Exploitation January 2024)

FIN7

FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)

Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)

Silence

Silence has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)

reGeorg

reGeorg can be used to tunnel RDP connections.(Citation: Fortinet reGeorg MAR 2019)

Revenge RAT

Revenge RAT has a plugin to perform RDP access.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)

ServHelper

ServHelper has commands for adding a remote desktop user and sending RDP traffic to the attacker through a reverse SSH tunnel.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)

APT29

APT29 has used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

HEXANE

HEXANE has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)

Axiom

Axiom has used RDP during operations.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)

TEMP.Veles

TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used Remote Desktop Protocol to conduct lateral movement.(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)

Akira

Akira has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)

SDBbot

SDBbot has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim's machines.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)

Koadic

Koadic can enable remote desktop on the victim's machine.(Citation: Github Koadic)

jRAT

jRAT can support RDP control.(Citation: Kaspersky Adwind Feb 2016)

Agrius

Agrius tunnels RDP traffic through deployed web shells to access victim environments via compromised accounts.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021) Agrius used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)

njRAT

njRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)

Pysa

Pysa has laterally moved using RDP connections.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)

During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: Nearest Neighbor Volexity)

Stolen Pencil

Stolen Pencil utilized RDP for direct remote point-and-click access. (Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)

Pupy

Pupy can enable/disable RDP connection and can start a remote desktop session using a browser web socket client.(Citation: GitHub Pupy)

DarkComet

DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.(Citation: Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018)

FIN6

FIN6 used RDP to move laterally in victim networks.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)

FIN10

FIN10 has used RDP to move laterally to systems in the victim environment.(Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)

ZxShell

ZxShell has remote desktop functionality.(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014)

FIN13

FIN13 has remotely accessed compromised environments via Remote Desktop Services (RDS) for lateral movement.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)

Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used Remote Desktop to log on to servers interactively and manually copy files to remote hosts.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)

menuPass

menuPass has used RDP connections to move across the victim network.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)

During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

APT3

APT3 enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence.(Citation: aptsim) APT3 has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.(Citation: Twitter Cglyer Status Update APT3 eml)

Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)

Leviathan

Leviathan has targeted RDP credentials and used it to move through the victim environment.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)

Dragonfly

Dragonfly has moved laterally via RDP.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)

APT41

APT41 used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) APT41 used NATBypass to expose local RDP ports on compromised systems to the Internet.(Citation: apt41_dcsocytec_dec2022)

Chimera

Chimera has used RDP to access targeted systems.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)

APT1

The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.(Citation: FireEye PLA)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks. Permission Audits: - Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions. Software Audits: - Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives. Configuration Audits: - Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems. Network Audits: - Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

Limit Access to Resource Over Network

Restrict access to network resources, such as file shares, remote systems, and services, to only those users, accounts, or systems with a legitimate business requirement. This can include employing technologies like network concentrators, RDP gateways, and zero-trust network access (ZTNA) models, alongside hardening services and protocols. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Audit and Restrict Access: - Regularly audit permissions for file shares, network services, and remote access tools. - Remove unnecessary access and enforce least privilege principles for users and services. - Use Active Directory and IAM tools to restrict access based on roles and attributes. Deploy Secure Remote Access Solutions: - Use RDP gateways, VPN concentrators, and ZTNA solutions to aggregate and secure remote access connections. - Configure access controls to restrict connections based on time, device, and user identity. - Enforce MFA for all remote access mechanisms. Disable Unnecessary Services: - Identify running services using tools like netstat (Windows/Linux) or Nmap. - Disable unused services, such as Telnet, FTP, and legacy SMB, to reduce the attack surface. - Use firewall rules to block traffic on unused ports and protocols. Network Segmentation and Isolation: - Use VLANs, firewalls, or micro-segmentation to isolate critical network resources from general access. - Restrict communication between subnets to prevent lateral movement. Monitor and Log Access: - Monitor access attempts to file shares, RDP, and remote network resources using SIEM tools. - Enable auditing and logging for successful and failed attempts to access restricted resources. *Tools for Implementation* File Share Management: - Microsoft Active Directory Group Policies - Samba (Linux/Unix file share management) - AccessEnum (Windows access auditing tool) Secure Remote Access: - Microsoft Remote Desktop Gateway - Apache Guacamole (open-source RDP/VNC gateway) - Zero Trust solutions: Tailscale, Cloudflare Zero Trust Service and Protocol Hardening: - Nmap or Nessus for network service discovery - Windows Group Policy Editor for disabling SMBv1, Telnet, and legacy protocols - iptables or firewalld (Linux) for blocking unnecessary traffic Network Segmentation: - pfSense for open-source network isolation

Network Segmentation

Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications. By segmenting networks, organizations can reduce the attack surface, restrict lateral movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets from compromise. Effective network segmentation leverages a combination of physical boundaries, logical separation through VLANs, and access control policies enforced by network appliances like firewalls, routers, and cloud-based configurations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Segment Critical Systems: - Identify and group systems based on their function, sensitivity, and risk. Examples include payment systems, HR databases, production systems, and internet-facing servers. - Use VLANs, firewalls, or routers to enforce logical separation. Implement DMZ for Public-Facing Services: - Host web servers, DNS servers, and email servers in a DMZ to limit their access to internal systems. - Apply strict firewall rules to filter traffic between the DMZ and internal networks. Use Cloud-Based Segmentation: - In cloud environments, use VPCs, subnets, and security groups to isolate applications and enforce traffic rules. - Apply AWS Transit Gateway or Azure VNet peering for controlled connectivity between cloud segments. Apply Microsegmentation for Workloads: - Use software-defined networking (SDN) tools to implement workload-level segmentation and prevent lateral movement. Restrict Traffic with ACLs and Firewalls: - Apply Access Control Lists (ACLs) to network devices to enforce "deny by default" policies. - Use firewalls to restrict both north-south (external-internal) and east-west (internal-internal) traffic. Monitor and Audit Segmented Networks: - Regularly review firewall rules, ACLs, and segmentation policies. - Monitor network flows for anomalies to ensure segmentation is effective. Test Segmentation Effectiveness: - Perform periodic penetration tests to verify that unauthorized access is blocked between network segments.

Operating System Configuration

Operating System Configuration involves adjusting system settings and hardening the default configurations of an operating system (OS) to mitigate adversary exploitation and prevent abuse of system functionality. Proper OS configurations address security vulnerabilities, limit attack surfaces, and ensure robust defense against a wide range of techniques. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Disable Unused Features: - Turn off SMBv1, LLMNR, and NetBIOS where not needed. - Disable remote registry and unnecessary services. Enforce OS-level Protections: - Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG) on Windows. - Use AppArmor or SELinux on Linux for mandatory access controls. Secure Access Settings: - Enable User Account Control (UAC) for Windows. - Restrict root/sudo access on Linux/macOS and enforce strong permissions using sudoers files. File System Hardening: - Implement least-privilege access for critical files and system directories. - Audit permissions regularly using tools like icacls (Windows) or getfacl/chmod (Linux/macOS). Secure Remote Access: - Restrict RDP, SSH, and VNC to authorized IPs using firewall rules. - Enable NLA for RDP and enforce strong password/lockout policies. Harden Boot Configurations: - Enable Secure Boot and enforce UEFI/BIOS password protection. - Use BitLocker or LUKS to encrypt boot drives. Regular Audits: - Periodically audit OS configurations using tools like CIS Benchmarks or SCAP tools. *Tools for Implementation* Windows: - Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO): Centrally enforce OS security settings. - Windows Defender Exploit Guard: Built-in OS protection against exploits. - CIS-CAT Pro: Audit Windows security configurations based on CIS Benchmarks. Linux/macOS: - AppArmor/SELinux: Enforce mandatory access controls. - Lynis: Perform comprehensive security audits. - SCAP Security Guide: Automate configuration hardening using Security Content Automation Protocol. Cross-Platform: - Ansible or Chef/Puppet: Automate configuration hardening at scale. - OpenSCAP: Perform compliance and configuration checks.

Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Remove Legacy Software: - Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash). - Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date. Disable Unused Features: - Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue. Control Applications Installed by Users: - Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools. - Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment. Remove Unnecessary Services: - Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices. - Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations. Restrict Add-ons and Plugins: - Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes. - Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.

User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Multi-factor Authentication

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). Authentication Tools and Methods: - Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications. Secure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. Monitoring and Alerting: - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations. Training and Policy Enforcement: - Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications.

Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Обнаружение

Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.

Ссылки

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