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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Поддельный контроллер домена
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MITRE ATT&CK
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Поддельный контроллер домена
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Поддельный контроллер домена

Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)

ID: T1207
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion
Платформы: Windows
Требуемые разрешения: Administrator
Источники данных: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, User Account: User Account Authentication
Версия: 2.1
Дата создания: 18 Apr 2018
Последнее изменение: 08 Mar 2022

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Mimikatz

Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCShadow module can be used to make AD updates by temporarily setting a computer to be a DC.(Citation: Deply Mimikatz)(Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
DCShadow Mitigation

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.

Обнаружение

Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.

Ссылки

  1. Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
  2. Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
  3. Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
  4. Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
  5. Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, 2018.
  6. Deply, B. (n.d.). Mimikatz. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
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