Использование интерпретаторов командной строки и сценариев
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic. Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in Initial Access payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various Remote Services in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)
Примеры процедур |
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Название | Описание |
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Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has used a Perl reverse shell to communicate with C2.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020) |
Stealth Falcon |
Stealth Falcon malware uses WMI to script data collection and command execution on the victim.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016) |
Winter Vivern |
Winter Vivern used XLM 4.0 macros for initial code execution for malicious document files.(Citation: DomainTools WinterVivern 2021) |
FIN7 |
FIN7 used SQL scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018) |
DarkComet |
DarkComet can execute various types of scripts on the victim’s machine.(Citation: Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018) |
FIN6 |
FIN6 has used scripting to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy data to a log file, and remove the original data files.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019) |
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) scripts to install malware.(Citation: ESET Operation Spalax Jan 2021) |
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CHOPSTICK |
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote command execution.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) |
Donut |
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via Ruby.(Citation: Donut Github) |
FIVEHANDS |
FIVEHANDS can receive a command line argument to limit file encryption to specified directories.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: NCC Group Fivehands June 2021) |
FIN5 |
FIN5 scans processes on all victim systems in the environment and uses automated scripts to pull back the results.(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) |
Matryoshka |
Matryoshka is capable of providing Meterpreter shell access.(Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) |
Imminent Monitor |
Imminent Monitor has a CommandPromptPacket and ScriptPacket module(s) for creating a remote shell and executing scripts.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019) |
Kessel |
Kessel can create a reverse shell between the infected host and a specified system.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018) |
During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Perl scripts to enable the deployment of the THINSPOOL shell script dropper and for enumerating host data.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024) |
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APT19 |
APT19 downloaded and launched code within a SCT file.(Citation: FireEye APT19) |
ZeroCleare |
ZeroCleare can receive command line arguments from an operator to corrupt the file system using the RawDisk driver.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022) |
gh0st RAT |
gh0st RAT is able to open a remote shell to execute commands.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018) |
Molerats |
Molerats used various implants, including those built on .NET, on target machines.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) |
APT32 |
APT32 has used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) |
Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has used the command line for execution.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) |
P.A.S. Webshell |
P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to create reverse shells with Perl scripts.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021) |
WINERACK |
WINERACK can create a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe code to emulate Windows command prompt commands.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) |
SLIGHTPULSE |
SLIGHTPULSE contains functionality to execute arbitrary commands passed to it.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021) |
FLORAHOX Activity has executed PHP and Shell scripts to identify and infect subsequent routers for the ORB network.(Citation: ORB Mandiant) |
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Bandook |
Bandook can support commands to execute Java-based payloads.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020) |
Saint Bear |
Saint Bear has used the Windows Script Host (wscript) to execute intermediate files written to victim machines.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) |
VersaMem |
VersaMem was delivered as a Java Archive (JAR) that runs by attaching itself to the Apache Tomcat Java servlet and web server.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024) |
Whitefly |
Whitefly has used a simple remote shell tool that will call back to the C2 server and wait for commands.(Citation: Symantec Whitefly March 2019) |
Zeus Panda |
Zeus Panda can launch remote scripts on the victim’s machine.(Citation: GDATA Zeus Panda June 2017) |
NICECURL |
NICECURL has provided an arbitrary command execution interface.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
SpeakUp |
SpeakUp uses Perl scripts.(Citation: CheckPoint SpeakUp Feb 2019) |
APT39 |
APT39 has utilized custom scripts to perform internal reconnaissance.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020) |
Ke3chang |
Malware used by Ke3chang can run commands on the command-line interface.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) |
ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024) |
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APT37 |
APT37 has used Ruby scripts to execute payloads.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021) |
Windigo |
Windigo has used a Perl script for information gathering.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018) |
Get2 |
Get2 has the ability to run executables with command-line arguments.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019) |
Dragonfly 2.0 |
Dragonfly 2.0 used command line for execution.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) |
OilRig |
OilRig has used various types of scripting for execution.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: OilRig ISMAgent July 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Nov 2018) |
Empire |
Empire uses a command-line interface to interact with systems.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) |
Raspberry Robin |
Raspberry Robin variants can be delivered via highly obfuscated Windows Script Files (WSF) for initial execution.(Citation: HP RaspberryRobin 2024) |
Bonadan |
Bonadan can create bind and reverse shells on the infected system.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018) |
Контрмеры |
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Контрмера | Описание |
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Limit Software Installation |
Prevent users or groups from installing unauthorized or unapproved software to reduce the risk of introducing malicious or vulnerable applications. This can be achieved through allowlists, software restriction policies, endpoint management tools, and least privilege access principles. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Application Whitelisting - Implement Microsoft AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create and enforce allowlists for approved software. - Whitelist applications based on file hash, path, or digital signatures. Restrict User Permissions - Remove local administrator rights for all non-IT users. - Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to restrict installation permissions to privileged accounts only. Software Restriction Policies (SRP) - Use GPO to configure SRP to deny execution of binaries from directories such as `%AppData%`, `%Temp%`, and external drives. - Restrict specific file types (`.exe`, `.bat`, `.msi`, `.js`, `.vbs`) to trusted directories only. Endpoint Management Solutions - Deploy tools like Microsoft Intune, SCCM, or Jamf for centralized software management. - Maintain a list of approved software, versions, and updates across the enterprise. Monitor Software Installation Events - Enable logging of software installation events and monitor Windows Event ID 4688 and Event ID 11707 for software installs. - Use SIEM or EDR tools to alert on attempts to install unapproved software. Implement Software Inventory Management - Use tools like OSQuery or Wazuh to scan for unauthorized software on endpoints and servers. - Conduct regular audits to detect and remove unapproved software. *Tools for Implementation* Application Whitelisting: - Microsoft AppLocker - Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) Endpoint Management: - Microsoft Intune - SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) - Jamf Pro (macOS) - Puppet or Ansible for automation Software Restriction Policies: - Group Policy Object (GPO) - Microsoft Software Restriction Policies (SRP) Monitoring and Logging: - Splunk - OSQuery - Wazuh (open-source SIEM and XDR) - EDRs Inventory Management and Auditing: - OSQuery - Wazuh |
Code Signing |
Code Signing is a security process that ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by digitally signing executables, scripts, and other code artifacts. It prevents untrusted or malicious code from executing by verifying the digital signatures against trusted sources. Code signing protects against tampering, impersonation, and distribution of unauthorized or malicious software, forming a critical defense against supply chain and software exploitation attacks. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforce Signed Code Execution: - Implementation: Configure operating systems (e.g., Windows with AppLocker or Linux with Secure Boot) to allow only signed code to execute. - Use Case: Prevent the execution of malicious PowerShell scripts by requiring all scripts to be signed with a trusted certificate. Vendor-Signed Driver Enforcement: - Implementation: Enable kernel-mode code signing to ensure that only drivers signed by trusted vendors can be loaded. - Use Case: A malicious driver attempting to modify system memory fails to load because it lacks a valid signature. Certificate Revocation Management: - Implementation: Use Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to block certificates associated with compromised or deprecated code. - Use Case: A compromised certificate used to sign a malicious update is revoked, preventing further execution of the software. Third-Party Software Verification: - Implementation: Require software from external vendors to be signed with valid certificates before deployment. - Use Case: An organization only deploys signed and verified third-party software to prevent supply chain attacks. Script Integrity in CI/CD Pipelines: - Implementation: Integrate code signing into CI/CD pipelines to sign and verify code artifacts before production release. - Use Case: A software company ensures that all production builds are signed, preventing tampered builds from reaching customers. **Key Components of Code Signing** - Digital Signature Verification: Verifies the authenticity of code by ensuring it was signed by a trusted entity. - Certificate Management: Uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to manage signing certificates and revocation lists. - Enforced Policy for Unsigned Code: Prevents the execution of unsigned or untrusted binaries and scripts. - Hash Integrity Check: Confirms that code has not been altered since signing by comparing cryptographic hashes. |
Disable or Remove Feature or Program |
Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Remove Legacy Software: - Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash). - Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date. Disable Unused Features: - Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue. Control Applications Installed by Users: - Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools. - Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment. Remove Unnecessary Services: - Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices. - Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations. Restrict Add-ons and Plugins: - Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes. - Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks. |
Execution Prevention |
Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Application Control: - Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution. - Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.xml"`) Script Blocking: - Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources. - Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g., `Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned`) Executable Blocking: - Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as `%TEMP%` or `%APPDATA%` directories. - Implementation: Block execution of `.exe`, `.bat`, or `.ps1` files from user-writable directories. Dynamic Analysis Prevention: - Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time. - Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution. |
Antivirus/Antimalware |
Antivirus/Antimalware solutions utilize signatures, heuristics, and behavioral analysis to detect, block, and remediate malicious software, including viruses, trojans, ransomware, and spyware. These solutions continuously monitor endpoints and systems for known malicious patterns and suspicious behaviors that indicate compromise. Antivirus/Antimalware software should be deployed across all devices, with automated updates to ensure protection against the latest threats. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Signature-Based Detection: - Implementation: Use predefined signatures to identify known malware based on unique patterns such as file hashes, byte sequences, or command-line arguments. This method is effective against known threats. - Use Case: When malware like "Emotet" is detected, its signature (such as a specific file hash) matches a known database of malicious software, triggering an alert and allowing immediate quarantine of the infected file. Heuristic-Based Detection: - Implementation: Deploy heuristic algorithms that analyze behavior and characteristics of files and processes to identify potential malware, even if it doesn’t match a known signature. - Use Case: If a program attempts to modify multiple critical system files or initiate suspicious network communications, heuristic analysis may flag it as potentially malicious, even if no specific malware signature is available. Behavioral Detection (Behavior Prevention): - Implementation: Use behavioral analysis to detect patterns of abnormal activities, such as unusual system calls, unauthorized file encryption, or attempts to escalate privileges. - Use Case: Behavioral analysis can detect ransomware attacks early by identifying behavior like mass file encryption, even before a specific ransomware signature has been identified. Real-Time Scanning: - Implementation: Enable real-time scanning to automatically inspect files and network traffic for signs of malware as they are accessed, downloaded, or executed. - Use Case: When a user downloads an email attachment, the antivirus solution scans the file in real-time, checking it against both signatures and heuristics to detect any malicious content before it can be opened. Cloud-Assisted Threat Intelligence: - Implementation: Use cloud-based threat intelligence to ensure the antivirus solution can access the latest malware definitions and real-time threat feeds from a global database of emerging threats. - Use Case: Cloud-assisted antivirus solutions quickly identify newly discovered malware by cross-referencing against global threat databases, providing real-time protection against zero-day attacks. **Tools for Implementation**: - Endpoint Security Platforms: Use solutions such as EDR for comprehensive antivirus/antimalware protection across all systems. - Centralized Management: Implement centralized antivirus management consoles that provide visibility into threat activity, enable policy enforcement, and automate updates. - Behavioral Analysis Tools: Leverage solutions with advanced behavioral analysis capabilities to detect malicious activity patterns that don’t rely on known signatures. |
Privileged Account Management |
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy. |
Audit |
Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks. Permission Audits: - Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions. Software Audits: - Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives. Configuration Audits: - Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems. Network Audits: - Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior. |
Restrict Web-Based Content |
Restricting web-based content involves enforcing policies and technologies that limit access to potentially malicious websites, unsafe downloads, and unauthorized browser behaviors. This can include URL filtering, download restrictions, script blocking, and extension control to protect against exploitation, phishing, and malware delivery. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Deploy Web Proxy Filtering: - Use solutions to filter web traffic based on categories, reputation, and content types. - Enforce policies that block unsafe websites or file types at the gateway level. Enable DNS-Based Filtering: - Implement tools to restrict access to domains associated with malware or phishing campaigns. - Use public DNS filtering services to enhance protection. Enforce Content Security Policies (CSP): - Configure CSP headers on internal and external web applications to restrict script execution, iframe embedding, and cross-origin requests. Control Browser Features: - Disable unapproved browser features like automatic downloads, developer tools, or unsafe scripting. - Enforce policies through tools like Group Policy Management to control browser settings. Monitor and Alert on Web-Based Threats: - Use SIEM tools to collect and analyze web proxy logs for signs of anomalous or malicious activity. - Configure alerts for access attempts to blocked domains or repeated file download failures. |
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint |
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Suspicious Process Behavior: - Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts. - Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action. Unauthorized File Access: - Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization. - Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it. Abnormal API Calls: - Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities. - Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like `OpenProcess` and `WriteProcessMemory` and terminates the offending process. Exploit Prevention: - Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access. - Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process. |
Обнаружение
Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
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