Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Поставщик поддержки безопасности (SSP)
Other sub-techniques of Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (15)
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.
The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| PowerSploit |
PowerSploit's |
| Empire |
Empire can enumerate Security Support Providers (SSPs) as well as utilize PowerSploit's |
| Mimikatz |
The Mimikatz credential dumper contains an implementation of an SSP.(Citation: Deply Mimikatz) |
| Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has rebooted victim machines to establish persistence by installing a SSP DLL.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Privileged Process Integrity |
Privileged Process Integrity focuses on defending highly privileged processes (e.g., system services, antivirus, or authentication processes) from tampering, injection, or compromise by adversaries. These processes often interact with critical components, making them prime targets for techniques like code injection, privilege escalation, and process manipulation. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Protected Process Mechanisms: - Enable RunAsPPL on Windows systems to protect LSASS and other critical processes. - Use registry modifications to enforce protected process settings: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL` Anti-Injection and Memory Protection: - Enable Control Flow Guard (CFG), DEP, and ASLR to protect against process memory tampering. - Deploy endpoint protection tools that actively block process injection attempts. Code Signing Validation: - Implement policies for Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to enforce execution of signed binaries. - Ensure critical processes are signed with valid certificates. Access Controls: - Use DACLs and MIC to limit which users and processes can interact with privileged processes. - Disable unnecessary debugging capabilities for high-privileged processes. Kernel-Level Protections: - Ensure Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) is enabled on Windows systems. - Leverage SELinux or AppArmor on Linux to enforce kernel-level security policies. *Tools for Implementation* Protected Process Light (PPL): - RunAsPPL (Windows) - Windows Defender Credential Guard Code Integrity and Signing: - Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) - AppLocker - SELinux/AppArmor (Linux) Memory Protection: - Control Flow Guard (CFG), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), ASLR Process Isolation/Sandboxing: - Firejail (Linux Sandbox) - Windows Sandbox - QEMU/KVM-based isolation Kernel Protection: - PatchGuard (Windows Kernel Patch Protection) - SELinux (Mandatory Access Control for Linux) - AppArmor |
Обнаружение
Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)
Ссылки
- Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
- Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
- Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.
- PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
- F-Secure Labs. (2020, August 18). Lazarus Group Campaign Targeting the Cryptocurrency Vertical. Retrieved September 1, 2020.
- Deply, B. (n.d.). Mimikatz. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
| Риск | Связи | |
|---|---|---|
|
Закрепление злоумышленника в ОС
из-за
добавления библиотек через Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)
в ОС Windows
Повышение привилегий
НСД
|
|
|
|
Повышение привилегий в ОС
из-за
добавления библиотек через Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)
в ОС Windows
Повышение привилегий
Целостность
|
|
Каталоги
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