Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Учетные записи эл. почты
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MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Учетные записи эл. почты
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Establish Accounts:  Учетные записи эл. почты

ID Название
.001 Учетные записи соцсетей
.002 Учетные записи эл. почты
.003 Облачные учетные записи

Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services – such as trial periods – to Acquire Infrastructure for follow-on purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)

ID: T1585.002
Относится к технике:  T1585
Тактика(-и): Resource Development
Платформы: PRE
Версия: 1.1
Дата создания: 01 Oct 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has created email accounts to communicate with their ransomware victims, to include providing payment and decryption details.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
APT1

APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Leviathan

Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has leveraged ProtonMail email addresses in ransom notes when delivering Ryuk ransomware.(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021)
EXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY has created e-mail accounts to spoof targeted organizations.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)
HEXANE

HEXANE has established email accounts for use in domain registration including for ProtonMail addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
Kimsuky

Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)
Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has established email accounts using fake personas for spearphishing operations.(Citation: IBM ITG18 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)
Star Blizzard

Star Blizzard has registered impersonation email accounts to spoof experts in a particular field or individuals and organizations affiliated with the intended target.(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)
Moonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet has created email accounts to interact with victims, including for phishing purposes.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)
Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)
APT42

APT42 has created email accounts to use in spearphishing operations.(Citation: TAG APT42)
Silent Librarian

Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)
CURIUM

CURIUM has created dedicated email accounts for use with tools such as IMAPLoader.(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Pre-compromise

Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct successful operations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Limit Information Exposure: - Regularly audit and sanitize publicly available data, including job posts, websites, and social media. - Use tools like OSINT monitoring platforms (e.g., SpiderFoot, Recon-ng) to identify leaked information. Protect Domain and DNS Infrastructure: - Enable DNSSEC and use WHOIS privacy protection. - Monitor for domain hijacking or lookalike domains using services like RiskIQ or DomainTools. External Monitoring: - Use tools like Shodan, Censys to monitor your external attack surface. - Deploy external vulnerability scanners to proactively address weaknesses. Threat Intelligence: - Leverage platforms like MISP, Recorded Future, or Anomali to track adversarial infrastructure, tools, and activity. Content and Email Protections: - Use email security solutions like Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, or Mimecast. - Enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC policies to protect against email spoofing. Training and Awareness: - Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, securing their social media, and avoiding information leaks.

Обнаружение

Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).

Ссылки

  1. Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
  2. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.
  3. PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.
  4. Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
  5. Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.
  6. Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict in Ukraine Escalates. Retrieved March 16, 2022.
  7. Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.
  8. Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  9. Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 02). McAfee Uncovers Operation Honeybee, a Malicious Document Campaign Targeting Humanitarian Aid Groups. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
  10. Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.
  11. Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
  12. Google Threat Analysis Group. (2024, August 14). Iranian backed group steps up phishing campaigns against Israel, U.S.. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
  13. Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  14. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.
  15. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  16. KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.
  17. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  18. CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.
  19. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, August 15). Disrupting SEABORGIUM’s ongoing phishing operations. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  20. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  21. Lesnewich, G. et al. (2024, April 16). From Social Engineering to DMARC Abuse: TA427’s Art of Information Gathering. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
  22. Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  23. Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.
  24. CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  25. Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  26. Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021.
  27. Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
  28. DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021.
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