Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Учетные записи эл. почты
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MITRE ATT&CK
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Учетные записи эл. почты
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Establish Accounts:  Учетные записи эл. почты

ID Название
.001 Учетные записи соцсетей
.002 Учетные записи эл. почты
.003 Облачные учетные записи

Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)

ID: T1585.002
Относится к технике:  T1585
Тактика(-и): Resource Development
Платформы: PRE
Версия: 1.0
Дата создания: 01 Oct 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2021

Примеры процедур
Название Описание

During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.(Citation: McAfee Honeybee)

Kimsuky

Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has established email accounts using fake personas for spearphishing operations.(Citation: IBM ITG18 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)

For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)
Leviathan

Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)
Silent Librarian

Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)
EXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY has created e-mail accounts to spoof targeted organizations.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)
APT1

APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
HEXANE

HEXANE has established email accounts for use in domain registration including for ProtonMail addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)

For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Pre-compromise

This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques.

Обнаружение

Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).

Ссылки

  1. Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.
  2. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  3. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.
  4. Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.
  5. Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021.
  6. Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  7. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  8. Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.
  9. Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
  10. Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  11. Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.
  12. Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 02). McAfee Uncovers Operation Honeybee, a Malicious Document Campaign Targeting Humanitarian Aid Groups. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
  13. Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict in Ukraine Escalates. Retrieved March 16, 2022.
  14. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  15. KISA. (n.d.). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 7, 2022.
  16. CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.
  17. DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021.
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