Каталоги
- Сертификаты СЗИ - Государственный реестр сертифицированных средств защиты информации опубликованный Федеральной службой по техническому и экспортному контролю, может быть использован для контроля актуальности используемых СЗИ в организации.
- CVE уязвимости - общедоступная публичная база уязвимостей Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). Миссия программы CVE заключается в выявлении, определении и каталогизации публично раскрываемых уязвимостей в сфере кибербезопасности. Для каждой уязвимости в каталоге существует одна запись CVE. Уязвимости обнаруживаются, затем присваиваются и публикуются организациями по всему миру, которые сотрудничают с программой CVE. Партнеры публикуют записи CVE для единообразного описания уязвимостей. Специалисты в области информационных технологий и кибербезопасности используют записи CVE, чтобы убедиться, что они обсуждают одну и ту же проблему, и координировать свои усилия по определению приоритетности и устранению уязвимостей.
- БДУ ФСТЭК уязвимости - раздел Уязвимости Банка данных уязвимостей опубликованная Федеральной службой по техническому и экспортному контролю совместно с Государственным научно-исследовательским испытательным институтом проблем технической защиты информации. Одной из целей создания банка данных угроз безопасности информации является объединение специалистов в области информационной безопасности для решения задач повышения защищенности информационных систем.
- НКЦКИ уязвимости - общедоступная публичная база уязвимостей Национального координационного центра по компьютерным инцидентам (НКЦКИ), обеспечивающего координацию деятельности субъектов КИИ по обнаружению, предупреждению, ликвидации последствий компьютерных атак и реагированию на компьютерные инциденты.
- MITRE ATT&CK – Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge – Тактики, техники и общеизвестные знания о злоумышленниках. Это основанная на реальных наблюдениях база знаний компании Mitre, содержащая описание тактик, приемов и методов, используемых киберпреступниками. База создана в 2013 году и регулярно обновляется, цель – составление структурированной матрицы используемых киберпреступниками приемов, чтобы упростить задачу реагирования на киберинциденты.
- БДУ ФСТЭК и Новая БДУ ФСТЭК – раздел Угрозы Банка данных угроз, опубликованный в 2015 году Федеральной службой по техническому и экспортному контролю и Государственным научно-исследовательским испытательным институтом проблем технической защиты информации, обязателен при моделировании угроз при построении систем защиты персональных данных, критической информационной инфраструктуры, государственных информационных систем.
CVE, БДУ ФСТЭК и НКЦКИ
Интерфейс каталогов идентичен и содержит следующие блоки:
- Метрики:
- Найденные уязвимости – отображает количество найденных в отчетах от сканеров уязвимостей которые связаны с уязвимостями из каталога, при нажатии на виджет перенаправляет в модуль Технические уязвимости с установленным фильтром по названию каталога (тип фильтра Группа уязвимостей);
- Уязвимые хосты – отображает количество хостов на которых обнаружены уязвимости связанные с уязвимостями из каталога, при нажатии на виджет перенаправляет в модуль Технические уязвимости с установленным фильтром по названию каталога (тип фильтра Группа уязвимостей).
- Табличную часть Каталог уязвимостей:
- Фильтр по полю Идентификатор - особенностью данного фильтра является автоматический разбор текста с последующим извлечением из текста идентификаторов. Для этого необходимо вставить произвольный текст с идентификаторами в поле и добавить в фильтр через кнопку плюс;
- Табличную часть с полями для каталогов CVE и БДУ ФСТЭК:
- Идентификатор - id уязвимости в базе уязвимостей;
- Описание - текстовое описание уязвимости;
- Обнаружено - флаг, данный статус отображается если уязвимость обнаружена в отчетах о сканировании;
- CVSS - числовая оценка уязвимости согласно источнику, с указанием даты выявления уязвимости экспертами, оценка отображается цветом согласно оценке CVSS 0.1 – 3.9 Low Зеленый,
4.0 – 6.9 Medium Желтый, 7.0 – 8.9 High Оранжевый, 9.0 – 10.0 Critical Красный.
- Табличную часть с полями для каталогов CVE :
- Дата бюллетеня - информация о дате публикации бюллетеня содержащего уязвимости;
- Идентификатор - id уязвимости в базе уязвимостей;
- Информация - текстовое описание уязвимости;
- Вектор атаки - локальный или сетевой вектор атаки;
- Обнаружено - флаг, данный статус отображается если уязвимость обнаружена в отчетах о сканировании;
- Наличие обновления - - флаг, данный статус отображается если база уязвимостей содержит информацию о наличии обновлений от производителя уязвимого ПО;
- Дата выявления - даты выявления уязвимости экспертами.
- Чекбокс «Только обнаруженные уязвимости» - устанавливает фильтр на табличную часть для отображения только обнаруженные уязвимости.
- Функционал для экспорта всех уязвимостей каталога.
- Для каталога добавляется функционал Варианты отображения:
- Бюллетени - изменяет отображение табличной части на реестр бюллетеней, отображает общее количество уязвимостей в бюллетени в поле Уязвимостей в бюллетени и статус по обнаружению в поле Обнаружено - данный статус отображается если хотя бы одна уязвимость из бюллетеня обнаружена в инфраструктуре.
- Уязвимости.
MITRE ATT&CK, БДУ ФСТЭК, Новая БДУ ФСТЭК
Каждый из указанных каталогов сформирован по собственной схеме данных, которая не соответствует подходу оценки риска, используемому в сервисе. Но в основе своей указанные базы описывают все те же риски информационной безопасности, каждый под своим углом. Поэтому они добавлены в сервис и как отдельные компоненты и как основа для создания рисков, угроз или уязвимостей.
Каталоги могут использоваться в сервисе с целью:
- Облегчения процесса формирования рисков, угроз и уязвимостей;
- Обогащения информации по рискам (угрозам, уязвимостям) созданным в сервисе.
- Взгляда на компанию и оценку рисков через публичные каталоги угроз.
- Уязвимости могут быть связаны с угрозами БДУ ФСТЭК, техниками ATT&CK и способами реализации Новой БДУ ФСТЭК.
- Угрозы могут быть связаны с угрозами БДУ ФСТЭК, техниками ATT&CK, угрозами и последствиями Новой БДУ ФСТЭК.
- Риски могут быть связаны с угрозами БДУ ФСТЭК, техниками ATT&CK, угрозами, способами реализации и последствиями Новой БДУ ФСТЭК.
Для рисков, угроз и уязвимостей из базы Community связи с каталогами угроз уже установлены.
Связь с каталогом угроз может быть прямой или косвенной. Например, если уязвимость связана с угрозой из БДУ ФСТЭК то и все риски, в составе которых есть данная уязвимость будут автоматически связаны с угрозой из БДУ ФСТЭК.
Каталог БДУ ФСТЭК - это реестр рисков от банка данных угроз безопасности информации ФСТЭК России.
Каждая угроза содержит описание, рекомендации к каким типам активов может быть применена эта угроза, классификация по свойствам информации и вероятные источники угрозы. Дополнительно в блоке Связанные риски указаны связанные риски, а в блоке Каталоги указываются связи с записями из других каталогов.
Каталог Новая БДУ ФСТЭК от банка данных угроз безопасности информации ФСТЭК России содержит:
- матрицу Способы реализации (возникновения угроз) - каждая ячейка которых содержит описание поверхности атаки: группу способов, уровень возможностей нарушителя, возможные реализуемые угрозы, компоненты объектов воздействия, возможные меры защиты;
- Негативные последствия - перечень негативных последствий в классификации ФСТЭК в виде кода и описания;
- Угрозы - реестр угроз с описанием, каждая угроза содержит возможные объекты воздействия и возможные способы реализации угроз;
- Объекты - перечень объектов последствий с описанием и компонентами которые могут входить в состав объекта;
- Компоненты - перечень компонентов объектов воздействия с указанием объектов воздействия на которых они могут располагаться;
- Нарушители - уровни возможностей нарушителей классифицированные по возможностям и компетенции;
- Меры защиты - в терминологии SECURITM это список требований выполнение которых сокращает возможности нарушителя.
- Матрица - содержит тактики и техники злоумышленника, позволяет на основании тактики или техники создать риск или уязвимость, в матрице указаны связи с рисками в базе Community и с рисками в базе команды;
- Тактики - направления действия нарушителя на том или ином этапе cyberkillchane;
- Техники - конкретные действия нарушителя для достижения цели на конкретном шаге cyberkillchane;
- Контрмеры - в терминологии SECURITM это список требований выполнение которых сокращает возможности нарушителя;
- Преступные группы - описание APT группировок и их особенности и модель поведения;
- Инструменты - ПО используемое нарушителями для вредоносного воздействия.
Сертификаты СЗИ
- Имеющиеся СЗИ - отображает количество активов у которых заполнено поле Номер сертификата СЗИ;
- Скоро будут просрочены - отображает количество активов у которых срок действия сертификата меньше 90 календарных дней;
- Просроченные сертификаты - отображает количество активов у которых срок действия сертификата уже истек;
- Истекшая поддержка - отображает количество активов у которых срок действия сертификата уже истек.
- Номер сертификата;
- Дата внесения в реестр;
- Срок действия сертификата;
- Срок окончания тех. поддержки;
- Наименование средства (шифр);
- Схема сертификации;
- Испытательная лаборатория;
- Орган по сертификации;
- Заявитель;
- Наименования документов соответствия;
- Реквизиты заявителя.
Эксфильтрация через канал управления
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| TrickBot |
TrickBot can send information about the compromised host and upload data to a hardcoded C2 server.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)(Citation: Bitdefender Trickbot VNC module Whitepaper 2021) |
| BLINDINGCAN |
BLINDINGCAN has sent user and system information to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests.(Citation: NHS UK BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020) |
| Pikabot |
During the initial Pikabot command and control check-in, Pikabot will transmit collected system information encrypted using RC4.(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024) |
| Spark |
Spark has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020) |
| Bumblebee |
Bumblebee can send collected data in JSON format to C2.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022) |
| Amadey |
Amadey has sent victim data to its C2 servers.(Citation: BlackBerry Amadey 2020) |
| Proxysvc |
Proxysvc performs data exfiltration over the control server channel using a custom protocol.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret) |
| Torisma |
Torisma can send victim data to an actor-controlled C2 server.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020) |
| Stuxnet |
Stuxnet sends compromised victim information via HTTP.(Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011) |
| RotaJakiro |
RotaJakiro sends device and other collected data back to the C2 using the established C2 channels over TCP. (Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis) |
| KOPILUWAK |
KOPILUWAK has exfiltrated collected data to its C2 via POST requests.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023) |
| Misdat |
Misdat has uploaded files and data to its C2 servers.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) |
| ShimRatReporter |
ShimRatReporter sent generated reports to the C2 via HTTP POST requests.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang) |
| Sliver |
Sliver can exfiltrate files from the victim using the |
| SILENTTRINITY |
SILENTTRINITY can transfer files from an infected host to the C2 server.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019) |
| HAWKBALL |
HAWKBALL has sent system information and files over the C2 channel.(Citation: FireEye HAWKBALL Jun 2019) |
| Ursnif |
Ursnif has used HTTP POSTs to exfil gathered information.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye Ursnif Nov 2017)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) |
| ZLib |
ZLib has sent data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) |
| Bankshot |
Bankshot exfiltrates data over its C2 channel.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot) |
| SharpDisco |
SharpDisco can load a plugin to exfiltrate stolen files to SMB shares also used in C2.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023) |
| StrongPity |
StrongPity can exfiltrate collected documents through C2 channels.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020) |
| AppleSeed |
AppleSeed can exfiltrate files via the C2 channel.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| PowerExchange |
PowerExchange can exfiltrate files via its email C2 channel.(Citation: Symantec Crambus OCT 2023) |
| Emotet |
Emotet has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader) |
| Crimson |
Crimson can exfiltrate stolen information over its C2.(Citation: Cisco Talos Transparent Tribe Education Campaign July 2022) |
| Tomiris |
Tomiris can upload files matching a hardcoded set of extensions, such as .doc, .docx, .pdf, and .rar, to its C2 server.(Citation: Kaspersky Tomiris Sep 2021) |
| DUSTTRAP |
DUSTTRAP can exfiltrate collected data over C2 channels.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024) |
| Empire |
Empire can send data gathered from a target through the command and control channel.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019) |
| BADHATCH |
BADHATCH can exfiltrate data over the C2 channel.(Citation: Gigamon BADHATCH Jul 2019)(Citation: BitDefender BADHATCH Mar 2021) |
| Machete |
Machete's collected data is exfiltrated over the same channel used for C2.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) |
| PingPull |
PingPull has the ability to exfiltrate stolen victim data through its C2 channel.(Citation: Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022) |
| PcShare |
PcShare can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 servers.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) |
| Woody RAT |
Woody RAT can exfiltrate files from an infected machine to its C2 server.(Citation: MalwareBytes WoodyRAT Aug 2022) |
| Mafalda |
Mafalda can send network system data and files to its C2 server.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022) |
| Squirrelwaffle |
Squirrelwaffle has exfiltrated victim data using HTTP POST requests to its C2 servers.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021) |
| AuTo Stealer |
AuTo Stealer can exfiltrate data over actor-controlled C2 servers via HTTP or TCP.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021) |
| ShrinkLocker |
ShrinkLocker will exfiltrate victim system information along with the encryption key via an HTTP POST.(Citation: Kaspersky ShrinkLocker 2024)(Citation: Splunk ShrinkLocker 2024) |
| SombRAT |
SombRAT has uploaded collected data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020) |
| ODAgent |
ODAgent can use an attacker-controlled OneDrive account to receive C2 commands and to exfiltrate files.(Citation: ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023) |
| FlawedAmmyy |
FlawedAmmyy has sent data collected from a compromised host to its C2 servers.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020) |
| HOPLIGHT |
HOPLIGHT has used its C2 channel to exfiltrate data.(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) |
| Cuckoo Stealer |
Cuckoo Stealer can send information about the targeted system to C2 including captured passwords, OS build, hostname, and username.(Citation: Kandji Cuckoo April 2024) |
| MobileOrder |
MobileOrder exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016) |
| RDAT |
RDAT can exfiltrate data gathered from the infected system via the established Exchange Web Services API C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 RDAT July 2020) |
| Okrum |
Data exfiltration is done by Okrum using the already opened channel with the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019) |
| TRANSLATEXT |
TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated collected credentials to the C2 server.(Citation: Zscaler Kimsuky TRANSLATEXT) |
| Line Dancer |
Line Dancer exfiltrates collected data via command and control channels.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024) |
| Mispadu |
Mispadu can sends the collected financial data to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Security Mispadu Facebook Ads 2019)(Citation: SCILabs Malteiro 2021) |
| Doki |
Doki has used Ngrok to establish C2 and exfiltrate data.(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) |
| MarkiRAT |
MarkiRAT can exfiltrate locally stored data via its C2.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021) |
| PowerShower |
PowerShower has used a PowerShell document stealer module to pack and exfiltrate .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files smaller than 5MB that were modified during the past two days.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019) |
| NETEAGLE |
NETEAGLE is capable of reading files over the C2 channel.(Citation: FireEye APT30) |
| CHIMNEYSWEEP |
CHIMNEYSWEEP can upload collected files to the command-and-control server.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022) |
| Rising Sun |
Rising Sun can send data gathered from the infected machine via HTTP POST request to the C2.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018) |
| Chrommme |
Chrommme can exfiltrate collected data via C2.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021) |
| Flagpro |
Flagpro has exfiltrated data to the C2 server.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021) |
| LightSpy |
To exfiltrate data, LightSpy configures each module to send an obfuscated JSON blob to hardcoded URL endpoints or paths aligned to the module name.(Citation: Huntress LightSpy macOS 2024) |
| GoldMax |
GoldMax can exfiltrate files over the existing C2 channel.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021) |
| Line Runner |
Line Runner utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using Line Dancer.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024) |
| Pteranodon |
Pteranodon exfiltrates screenshot files to its C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017) |
| ROKRAT |
ROKRAT can send collected files back over same C2 channel.(Citation: Talos ROKRAT) |
| Dyre |
Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2.(Citation: Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015) |
| Bisonal |
Bisonal has added the exfiltrated data to the URL over the C2 channel.(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
| S-Type |
S-Type has uploaded data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) |
| Lumma Stealer |
Lumma Stealer has exfiltrated collected data over existing HTTP and HTTPS C2 channels.(Citation: Qualys LummaStealer 2024)(Citation: Fortinet LummaStealer 2024) |
| DustySky |
DustySky has exfiltrated data to the C2 server.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) |
| LightNeuron |
LightNeuron exfiltrates data over its email C2 channel.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) |
| DarkGate |
DarkGate uses existing command and control channels to retrieve captured cryptocurrency wallet credentials.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018) |
| Mongall |
Mongall can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 server.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022) |
| SVCReady |
SVCReady can send collected data in JSON format to its C2 server.(Citation: HP SVCReady Jun 2022) |
| ThiefQuest |
ThiefQuest exfiltrates targeted file extensions in the |
| FoggyWeb |
FoggyWeb can remotely exfiltrate sensitive information from a compromised AD FS server.(Citation: MSTIC FoggyWeb September 2021) |
| Caterpillar WebShell |
Caterpillar WebShell can upload files over the C2 channel.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) |
| Latrodectus |
Latrodectus can exfiltrate encrypted system information to the C2 server.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)(Citation: Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024) |
| CharmPower |
CharmPower can exfiltrate gathered data to a hardcoded C2 URL via HTTP POST.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| EVILNUM |
EVILNUM can upload files over the C2 channel from the infected host.(Citation: Prevailion EvilNum May 2020) |
| SMOKEDHAM |
SMOKEDHAM has exfiltrated data to its C2 server.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) |
| Sagerunex |
Sagerunex encrypts collected system data then exfiltrates via existing command and control channels.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025) |
| Metamorfo |
Metamorfo can send the data it collects to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| Bandook |
Bandook can upload files from a victim's machine over the C2 channel.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020) |
| MagicRAT |
MagicRAT exfiltrates data via HTTP over existing command and control channels.(Citation: Cisco MagicRAT 2022) |
| KONNI |
KONNI has sent data and files to its C2 server.(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021)(Citation: Malwarebytes KONNI Evolves Jan 2022) |
| DnsSystem |
DnsSystem can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 server.(Citation: Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022) |
| BLUELIGHT |
BLUELIGHT has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021) |
| KGH_SPY |
KGH_SPY can exfiltrate collected information from the host to the C2 server.(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020) |
| OopsIE |
OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018) |
| Attor |
Attor has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019) |
| Imminent Monitor |
Imminent Monitor has uploaded a file containing debugger logs, network information and system information to the C2.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019) |
| LitePower |
LitePower can send collected data, including screenshots, over its C2 channel.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021) |
| BoxCaon |
BoxCaon uploads files and data from a compromised host over the existing C2 channel.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021) |
| NightClub |
NightClub can use SMTP and DNS for file exfiltration and C2.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023) |
| Crutch |
Crutch can exfiltrate data over the primary C2 channel (Dropbox HTTP API).(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020) |
| SDBbot |
SDBbot has sent collected data from a compromised host to its C2 servers.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020) |
| StrelaStealer |
StrelaStealer exfiltrates collected email credentials via HTTP POST to command and control servers.(Citation: DCSO StrelaStealer 2022)(Citation: PaloAlto StrelaStealer 2024)(Citation: Fortgale StrelaStealer 2023)(Citation: IBM StrelaStealer 2024) |
| Grandoreiro |
Grandoreiro can send data it retrieves to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020) |
| Drovorub |
Drovorub can exfiltrate files over C2 infrastructure.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020) |
| Shark |
Shark has the ability to upload files from the compromised host over a DNS or HTTP C2 channel.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021) |
| SUGARDUMP |
SUGARDUMP has sent stolen credentials and other data to its C2 server.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022) |
| Zebrocy |
Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020) |
| LunarMail |
LunarMail can use email image attachments with embedded data for receiving C2 commands and data exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024) |
| HotCroissant |
HotCroissant has the ability to download files from the infected host to the command and control (C2) server.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020) |
| REvil |
REvil can exfiltrate host and malware information to C2 servers.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019) |
| Valak |
Valak has the ability to exfiltrate data over the C2 channel.(Citation: Cybereason Valak May 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne Valak June 2020) |
| OilBooster |
OilBooster can use an actor-controlled OneDrive account for C2 communication and exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023) |
| Cyclops Blink |
Cyclops Blink has the ability to upload exfiltrated files to a C2 server.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022) |
| TajMahal |
TajMahal has the ability to send collected files over its C2.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019) |
| Raccoon Stealer |
Raccoon Stealer uses existing HTTP-based command and control channels for exfiltration.(Citation: S2W Racoon 2022)(Citation: Sekoia Raccoon1 2022)(Citation: Sekoia Raccoon2 2022) |
| IPsec Helper |
IPsec Helper exfiltrates specific files through its command and control framework.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021) |
| Solar |
Solar can send staged files to C2 for exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023) |
| GoldenSpy |
GoldenSpy has exfiltrated host environment information to an external C2 domain via port 9006.(Citation: Trustwave GoldenSpy June 2020) |
| Carberp |
Carberp has exfiltrated data via HTTP to already established C2 servers.(Citation: Prevx Carberp March 2011)(Citation: Trusteer Carberp October 2010) |
| MacMa |
MacMa exfiltrates data from a supplied path over its C2 channel.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022) |
| FunnyDream |
FunnyDream can execute commands, including gathering user information, and send the results to C2.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) |
| SysUpdate |
SysUpdate has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux) |
| OutSteel |
OutSteel can upload files from a compromised host over its C2 channel.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) |
| Mango |
Mango can use its HTTP C2 channel for exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023) |
| Kessel |
Kessel has exfiltrated information gathered from the infected system to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018) |
| GrimAgent |
GrimAgent has sent data related to a compromise host over its C2 channel.(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021) |
| Pupy |
Pupy can send screenshots files, keylogger data, files, and recorded audio back to the C2 server.(Citation: GitHub Pupy) |
| Lokibot |
Lokibot has the ability to initiate contact with command and control (C2) to exfiltrate stolen data.(Citation: FSecure Lokibot November 2019) |
| CallMe |
CallMe exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016) |
| PoetRAT |
PoetRAT has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020) |
| Penquin |
Penquin can execute the command code |
| Cannon |
Cannon exfiltrates collected data over email via SMTP/S and POP3/S C2 channels.(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018) |
| CreepySnail |
CreepySnail can connect to C2 for data exfiltration.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022) |
| Troll Stealer |
Troll Stealer exfiltrates collected information to its command and control infrastructure.(Citation: S2W Troll Stealer 2024) |
| Ebury |
Ebury exfiltrates a list of outbound and inbound SSH sessions using OpenSSH's `known_host` files and `wtmp` records. Ebury can exfiltrate SSH credentials through custom DNS queries or use the command `Xcat` to send the process's ssh session's credentials to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Windigo Mar 2014)(Citation: ESET Ebury May 2024) |
| njRAT |
njRAT has used HTTP to receive stolen information from the infected machine.(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) |
| Manjusaka |
Manjusaka data exfiltration takes place over HTTP channels.(Citation: Talos Manjusaka 2022) |
| IceApple |
IceApple's Multi File Exfiltrator module can exfiltrate multiple files from a compromised host as an HTTP response over C2.(Citation: CrowdStrike IceApple May 2022) |
| metaMain |
metaMain can upload collected files and data to its C2 server.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022) |
| SideTwist |
SideTwist has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
| MechaFlounder |
MechaFlounder has the ability to send the compromised user's account name and hostname within a URL to C2.(Citation: Unit 42 MechaFlounder March 2019) |
| Psylo |
Psylo exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016) |
| Mis-Type |
Mis-Type has transmitted collected files and data to its C2 server.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) |
| XCSSET |
XCSSET retrieves files that match the pattern defined in the INAME_QUERY variable within the user's home directory, such as `*test.txt`, and are below a specific size limit. It then archives the files and exfiltrates the data over its C2 channel.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)(Citation: Microsoft March 2025 XCSSET) |
| Octopus |
Octopus has uploaded stolen files and data from a victim's machine over its C2 channel.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) |
| AppleJeus |
AppleJeus has exfiltrated collected host information to a C2 server.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021) |
| STARWHALE |
STARWHALE can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 servers.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022) |
| Industroyer |
Industroyer sends information about hardware profiles and previously-received commands back to the C2 server in a POST-request.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) |
| Kevin |
Kevin can send data from the victim host through a DNS C2 channel.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021) |
| Goopy |
Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate data over the Microsoft Outlook C2 channel.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017) |
| Remexi |
Remexi performs exfiltration over BITSAdmin, which is also used for the C2 channel.(Citation: Securelist Remexi Jan 2019) |
| Astaroth |
Astaroth exfiltrates collected information from its r1.log file to the external C2 server. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019) |
| QakBot |
QakBot can send stolen information to C2 nodes including passwords, accounts, and emails.(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021) |
| BACKSPACE |
Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to upload files to the C2 Server.(Citation: FireEye APT30) |
| ADVSTORESHELL |
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) |
| StrifeWater |
StrifeWater can send data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.(Citation: Cybereason StrifeWater Feb 2022) |
| WarzoneRAT |
WarzoneRAT can send collected victim data to its C2 server.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020) |
| SLOTHFULMEDIA |
SLOTHFULMEDIA has sent system information to a C2 server via HTTP and HTTPS POST requests.(Citation: CISA MAR SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020) |
| Frankenstein |
Frankenstein has collected information via Empire, which is automatically sent the data back to the adversary's C2.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019) |
| Operation Wocao |
Operation Wocao has used the Xserver backdoor to exfiltrate data.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019) |
| Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018) |
| Gamaredon Group |
A Gamaredon Group file stealer can transfer collected files to a hardcoded C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017) |
| APT39 |
APT39 has exfiltrated stolen victim data through C2 communications.(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020) |
| MuddyWater |
MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017) |
| Leviathan |
Leviathan has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) |
| ZIRCONIUM |
ZIRCONIUM has exfiltrated files via the Dropbox API C2.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020) |
| BlackByte |
BlackByte transmitted collected victim host information via HTTP POST to command and control infrastructure.(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023) |
| Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has exfiltrated domain credentials and network enumeration information over command and control (C2) channels.(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)(Citation: Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021) |
| Confucius |
Confucius has exfiltrated stolen files to its C2 server.(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Aug 2021) |
| APT32 |
APT32's backdoor has exfiltrated data using the already opened channel with its C&C server.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019) |
| Higaisa |
Higaisa exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020) |
| LuminousMoth |
LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021) |
| Chimera |
Chimera has used Cobalt Strike C2 beacons for data exfiltration.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) |
| Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021) |
| Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has sent system information to its C2 server using HTTP.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
| Ke3chang |
Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014) |
| Agrius |
Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) |
| APT3 |
APT3 has a tool that exfiltrates data over the C2 channel.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox) |
| Winter Vivern |
Winter Vivern delivered a PowerShell script capable of recursively scanning victim machines looking for various file types before exfiltrating identified files via HTTP.(Citation: CERT-UA WinterVivern 2023) |
| CURIUM |
CURIUM has used IMAP and SMTPS for exfiltration via tools such as IMAPLoader.(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023) |
| GALLIUM |
GALLIUM used Web shells and HTRAN for C2 and to exfiltrate data.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) |
| Stealth Falcon |
After data is collected by Stealth Falcon malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Network Intrusion Prevention |
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. |
| Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation |
Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
| Data Loss Prevention |
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) involves implementing strategies and technologies to identify, categorize, monitor, and control the movement of sensitive data within an organization. This includes protecting data formats indicative of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), intellectual property, or financial data from unauthorized access, transmission, or exfiltration. DLP solutions integrate with network, endpoint, and cloud platforms to enforce security policies and prevent accidental or malicious data leaks. (Citation: PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention) This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Sensitive Data Categorization: - Use Case: Identify and classify data based on sensitivity (e.g., PII, financial data, trade secrets). - Implementation: Use DLP solutions to scan and tag files containing sensitive information using predefined patterns, such as Social Security Numbers or credit card details. Exfiltration Restrictions: - Use Case: Prevent unauthorized transmission of sensitive data. - Implementation: Enforce policies to block unapproved email attachments, unauthorized USB usage, or unencrypted data uploads to cloud storage. Data-in-Transit Monitoring: - Use Case: Detect and prevent the transmission of sensitive data over unapproved channels. - Implementation: Deploy network-based DLP tools to inspect outbound traffic for sensitive content (e.g., financial records or PII) and block unapproved transmissions. Endpoint Data Protection: - Use Case: Monitor and control sensitive data usage on endpoints. - Implementation: Use endpoint-based DLP agents to block copy-paste actions of sensitive data and unauthorized printing or file sharing. Cloud Data Security: - Use Case: Protect data stored in cloud platforms. - Implementation: Integrate DLP with cloud storage platforms like Google Drive, OneDrive, or AWS to monitor and restrict sensitive data sharing or downloads. |
Обнаружение
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Ссылки
- Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
- Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
- Radu Tudorica. (2021, July 12). A Fresh Look at Trickbot’s Ever-Improving VNC Module. Retrieved September 28, 2021.
- Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
- Anton Cherepanov. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial controls systems. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
- Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
- ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.
- Santos, R. (2022, January 26). KONNI evolves into stealthier RAT. Retrieved April 13, 2022.
- Hawley, S. et al. (2023, February 2). Turla: A Galaxy of Opportunity. Retrieved May 15, 2023.
- Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.
- Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, May 1). Ebury is alive but unseen. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
- hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
- Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
- Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.
- FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
- M.Léveillé, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022.
- Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022.
- Yamout, M. (2021, November 29). WIRTE’s campaign in the Middle East ‘living off the land’ since at least 2019. Retrieved February 1, 2022.
- Kwiatkoswki, I. and Delcher, P. (2021, September 29). DarkHalo After SolarWinds: the Tomiris connection. Retrieved December 27, 2021.
- Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
- Patil, S. and Williams, M.. (2019, June 5). Government Sector in Central Asia Targeted With New HAWKBALL Backdoor Delivered via Microsoft Office Vulnerabilities. Retrieved June 20, 2019.
- Dupuy, T. and Faou, M. (2021, June). Gelsemium. Retrieved November 30, 2021.
- Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.
- Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Cara Lin, Fortinet. (2024, January 8). Deceptive Cracked Software Spreads Lumma Variant on YouTube. Retrieved March 22, 2025.
- ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
- Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 02). McAfee Uncovers Operation Honeybee, a Malicious Document Campaign Targeting Humanitarian Aid Groups. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
- Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, August 23). New variant of Konni malware used in campaign targetting Russia. Retrieved January 5, 2022.
- Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
- Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
- Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
- Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.
- Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 08). Hidden Cobra Targets Turkish Financial Sector With New Bankshot Implant. Retrieved May 18, 2018.
- CrowdStrike. (2022, May). ICEAPPLE: A NOVEL INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES (IIS) POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK. Retrieved June 27, 2022.
- Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.
- GReAT. (2019, August 12). Recent Cloud Atlas activity. Retrieved May 8, 2020.
- Kasuya, M. (2020, January 8). Threat Spotlight: Amadey Bot Targets Non-Russian Users. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
- Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
- Salem, E. et al. (2020, May 28). VALAK: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE . Retrieved June 19, 2020.
- Binary Defense. (n.d.). Emotet Evolves With new Wi-Fi Spreader. Retrieved September 8, 2023.
- Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021.
- ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.
- ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
- Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Check Point. (2020, November 26). Bandook: Signed & Delivered. Retrieved May 31, 2021.
- Cybereason Nocturnus. (2022, February 1). StrifeWater RAT: Iranian APT Moses Staff Adds New Trojan to Ransomware Operations. Retrieved August 15, 2022.
- Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
- Dumont, R., M.Léveillé, M., Porcher, H. (2018, December 1). THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORSSHE A landscape of OpenSSH backdoors. Retrieved July 16, 2020.
- Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.
- GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.
- ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.
- Kohler, A. and Lopez, C. (2024, April 30). Malware: Cuckoo Behaves Like Cross Between Infostealer and Spyware. Retrieved August 20, 2024.
- BishopFox. (n.d.). Sliver Download. Retrieved September 16, 2021.
- Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, September 21). OilRig’s Outer Space and Juicy Mix: Same ol’ rig, new drill pipes. Retrieved November 21, 2024.
- FBI. (2020, September 17). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07. Retrieved December 10, 2020.
- Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
- Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.
- Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
- MalwareBytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, August 3). Woody RAT: A new feature-rich malware spotted in the wild. Retrieved December 6, 2022.
- Bilodeau, O., Bureau, M., Calvet, J., Dorais-Joncas, A., Léveillé, M., Vanheuverzwijn, B. (2014, March 18). Operation Windigo – the vivisection of a large Linux server‑side credential‑stealing malware campaign. Retrieved February 10, 2021.
- CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.
- Fortgale. (2023, September 18). StrelaStealer Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
- ESET Security. (2019, November 19). Mispadu: Advertisement for a discounted Unhappy Meal. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
- Schlapfer, Patrick. (2022, June 6). A New Loader Gets Ready. Retrieved December 13, 2022.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, April 24). Analyzing Operation GhostSecret: Attack Seeks to Steal Data Worldwide. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
- Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
- Golo Mühr, Joe Fasulo & Charlotte Hammond, IBM X-Force. (2024, November 12). Strela Stealer: Today’s invoice is tomorrow’s phish. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
- Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.
- N. Baisini. (2022, July 13). Transparent Tribe begins targeting education sector in latest campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2022.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
- Legezo, D. (2019, January 30). Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
- Adamitis, D. (2020, May 6). Phantom in the Command Shell. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Caragay, R. (2015, March 26). URSNIF: The Multifaceted Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
- Pierre Le Bourhis, Quentin Bourgue, & Sekoia TDR. (2022, June 29). Raccoon Stealer v2 - Part 2: In-depth analysis. Retrieved August 1, 2024.
- Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.
- SCILabs. (2021, December 23). Cyber Threat Profile Malteiro. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
- Benjamin Chang, Goutam Tripathy, Pranay Kumar Chhaparwal, Anmol Maurya & Vishwa Thothathri, Palo Alto Networks. (2024, March 22). Large-Scale StrelaStealer Campaign in Early 2024. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
- Shivtarkar, N. and Kumar, A. (2022, June 9). Lyceum .NET DNS Backdoor. Retrieved June 23, 2022.
- Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
- S2W TALON. (2022, June 16). Raccoon Stealer is Back with a New Version. Retrieved August 1, 2024.
- Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.
- Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
- Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
- Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.
- Reaves, J. and Platt, J. (2020, June). Valak Malware and the Connection to Gozi Loader ConfCrew. Retrieved August 31, 2020.
- Giuliani, M., Allievi, A. (2011, February 28). Carberp - a modular information stealing trojan. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
- PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.
- Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
- Trusteer Fraud Prevention Center. (2010, October 7). Carberp Under the Hood of Carberp: Malware & Configuration Analysis. Retrieved July 15, 2020.
- Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
- Vishwajeet Kumar, Qualys. (2024, October 20). Unmasking Lumma Stealer: Analyzing Deceptive Tactics with Fake CAPTCHA. Retrieved March 22, 2025.
- Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
- Park, S. (2024, June 27). Kimsuky deploys TRANSLATEXT to target South Korean academia. Retrieved October 14, 2024.
- Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Lunghi, D. (2021, August 17). Confucius Uses Pegasus Spyware-related Lures to Target Pakistani Military. Retrieved December 26, 2021.
- Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
- Kumar, A., Stone-Gross, Brett. (2021, September 28). Squirrelwaffle: New Loader Delivering Cobalt Strike. Retrieved August 9, 2022.
- Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
- Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
- Falcone, R., Lee, B. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved November 26, 2018.
- Proofpoint Staff. (2016, August 25). Nightmare on Tor Street: Ursnif variant Dreambot adds Tor functionality. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
- Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2023, October 19). Crambus: New Campaign Targets Middle Eastern Government. Retrieved November 27, 2024.
- An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.
- Trend Micro. (2019, January 16). Exploring Emotet's Activities . Retrieved March 25, 2019.
- Unit 42. (2022, June 13). GALLIUM Expands Targeting Across Telecommunications, Government and Finance Sectors With New PingPull Tool. Retrieved August 7, 2022.
- Mercer, W. Rascagneres, P. Ventura, V. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves . Retrieved April 9, 2021.
- Singh, S. Singh, A. (2020, June 11). The Return on the Higaisa APT. Retrieved March 2, 2021.
- Duncan, B. (2020, July 24). Evolution of Valak, from Its Beginnings to Mass Distribution. Retrieved August 31, 2020.
- Falcone, R. (2019, March 4). New Python-Based Payload MechaFlounder Used by Chafer. Retrieved May 27, 2020.
- Thomas Reed. (2020, July 7). Mac ThiefQuest malware may not be ransomware after all. Retrieved March 22, 2021.
- US-CERT. (2020, August 19). MAR-10295134-1.v1 – North Korean Remote Access Trojan: BLINDINGCAN. Retrieved August 19, 2020.
- Mac Threat Response, Mobile Research Team. (2020, August 13). The XCSSET Malware: Inserts Malicious Code Into Xcode Projects, Performs UXSS Backdoor Planting in Safari, and Leverages Two Zero-day Exploits. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
- Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2017, April 03). Introducing ROKRAT. Retrieved May 21, 2018.
- Quentin Bourgue, Pierre le Bourhis, & Sekoia TDR. (2022, June 28). Raccoon Stealer v2 - Part 1: The return of the dead. Retrieved August 1, 2024.
- Jiho Kim & Sebin Lee, S2W. (2024, February 7). Kimsuky disguised as a Korean company signed with a valid certificate to distribute Troll Stealer (English ver.). Retrieved January 17, 2025.
- Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, June 4). It's alive: Threat actors cobble together open-source pieces into monstrous Frankenstein campaign. Retrieved May 11, 2020.
- Falcone, R. (2020, July 22). OilRig Targets Middle Eastern Telecommunications Organization and Adds Novel C2 Channel with Steganography to Its Inventory. Retrieved July 28, 2020.
- Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
- Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, January 24). Scarlet Mimic: Years-Long Espionage Campaign Targets Minority Activists. Retrieved February 10, 2016.
- Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 25). The Golden Tax Department and Emergence of GoldenSpy Malware. Retrieved July 23, 2020.
- SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.
- US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018.
- Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021.
- Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
- Ramin Nafisi. (2021, September 27). FoggyWeb: Targeted NOBELIUM malware leads to persistent backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
- DHS/CISA, Cyber National Mission Force. (2020, October 1). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) MAR-10303705-1.v1 – Remote Access Trojan: SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved October 2, 2020.
- Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK. (2022, February 24). Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks. Retrieved September 27, 2022.
- Savelesky, K., et al. (2019, July 23). ABADBABE 8BADFOOD: Discovering BADHATCH and a Detailed Look at FIN8's Tooling. Retrieved September 8, 2021.
- GReAT. (2021, June 16). Ferocious Kitten: 6 Years of Covert Surveillance in Iran. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
- CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
- CheckPoint Research. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT continues to attack Central Asia with evolving tools. Retrieved September 24, 2021.
- Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
- Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2025, March 11). New XCSSET malware adds new obfuscation, persistence techniques to infect Xcode projects. Retrieved April 2, 2025.
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2024, April 24). Cyber Activity Impacting CISCO ASA VPNs. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
- Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
- Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.
- Kazem, M. (2019, November 25). Trojan:W32/Lokibot. Retrieved May 15, 2020.
- Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
- Hada, H. (2021, December 28). Flagpro The new malware used by BlackTech. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
- Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
- Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020.
- CERT-UA. (2023, February 1). UAC-0114 aka Winter Vivern to target Ukrainian and Polish GOV entities (CERT-UA#5909). Retrieved July 29, 2024.
- Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
- Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
- Cristian Souza, Eduardo Ovalle, Ashley Muñoz, & Christopher Zachor. (2024, May 23). ShrinkLocker: Turning BitLocker into ransomware. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
- GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
- Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
- CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.
- ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
- Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.
- Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2016, December 13). The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
- Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
- John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- DCSO CyTec Blog. (2022, November 8). #ShortAndMalicious: StrelaStealer aims for mail credentials. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
- Asheer Malhotra, Vitor Ventura & Jungsoo An, Cisco Talos. (2022, September 7). MagicRAT: Lazarus’ latest gateway into victim networks. Retrieved December 30, 2024.
- Harakhavik, Y. (2020, February 3). Warzone: Behind the enemy lines. Retrieved December 17, 2021.
- Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
- Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
- Stuart Ashenbrenner, Alden Schmidt. (2024, April 25). LightSpy Malware Variant Targeting macOS. Retrieved January 3, 2025.
- Daniel Lunghi. (2023, March 1). Iron Tiger’s SysUpdate Reappears, Adds Linux Targeting. Retrieved March 20, 2023.
- ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). “Lebanese Cedar” APT Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February 10, 2021.
- CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303B). Retrieved December 9, 2020.
- Batista, J. (2024, June 17). Latrodectus, are you coming back?. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
- Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
- Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.
- Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.
- Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
- Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.
- Knight, S.. (2020, April 16). VMware Carbon Black TAU Threat Analysis: The Evolution of Lazarus. Retrieved May 1, 2020.
- Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
- NHS Digital . (2020, August 20). BLINDINGCAN Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved August 20, 2020.
- Smith, L., Leathery, J., Read, B. (2021, March 4). New SUNSHUTTLE Second-Stage Backdoor Uncovered Targeting U.S.-Based Entity; Possible Connection to UNC2452. Retrieved March 12, 2021.
- Chen, X., Scott, M., Caselden, D.. (2014, April 26). New Zero-Day Exploit targeting Internet Explorer Versions 9 through 11 Identified in Targeted Attacks. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
- NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020.
- NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022.
- Vrabie, V., et al. (2021, March 10). FIN8 Returns with Improved BADHATCH Toolkit. Retrieved September 8, 2021.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- The BlackBerry Research and Intelligence Team. (2020, November 12). The CostaRicto Campaign: Cyber-Espionage Outsourced. Retrieved May 24, 2021.
- Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
- Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.
- Mercer, W., et al. (2020, March 5). Bisonal: 10 years of play. Retrieved January 26, 2022.
- Splunk Threat Research Team , Teoderick Contreras. (2024, September 5). ShrinkLocker Malware: Abusing BitLocker to Lock Your Data. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
- Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
- QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center. (2019, February 18). APT-C-36: Continuous Attacks Targeting Colombian Government Institutions and Corporations. Retrieved May 5, 2020.
- Asheer Malhotra & Vitor Ventura. (2022, August 2). Manjusaka: A Chinese sibling of Sliver and Cobalt Strike. Retrieved September 4, 2024.
| Риск | Связи | |
|---|---|---|
|
Передача данных по скрытым каналам
из-за
возможности маскировки вредоносного трафика под легитимный
в сетевом трафике
Конфиденциальность
Раскрытие информации
|
|
|
|
Несанкционированное управление ИТ инфраструктурой
из-за
возможности маскировки вредоносного трафика под легитимный
в сетевом трафике
Повышение привилегий
Целостность
НСД
|
|
|
|
Утечка информации
из-за
возможности маскировки вредоносного трафика под легитимный
в сетевом трафике
Конфиденциальность
Раскрытие информации
|
|
Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.