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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Протоколы (кроме прикладного уровня)
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Протоколы (кроме прикладного уровня)

Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.

ID: T1095
Тактика(-и): Command and Control
Платформы: Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Источники данных: Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 2.1
Дата создания: 31 May 2017
Последнее изменение: 17 Feb 2022

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Anchor

Anchor has used ICMP in C2 communications.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
FakeM

Some variants of FakeM use SSL to communicate with C2 servers.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Aria-body

Aria-body has used TCP in C2 communications.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)
Clambling

Clambling has the ability to use TCP and UDP for communication.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
MacMa

MacMa has used a custom JSON-based protocol for its C&C communications.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)
WINDSHIELD

WINDSHIELD C2 traffic can communicate via TCP raw sockets.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)
Gelsemium

Gelsemium has the ability to use TCP and UDP in C2 communications.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
TSCookie

TSCookie can use ICMP to receive information on the destination server.(Citation: JPCert BlackTech Malware September 2019)
PlugX

PlugX can be configured to use raw TCP or UDP for command and control.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)
AuTo Stealer

AuTo Stealer can use TCP to communicate with command and control servers.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)
RARSTONE

RARSTONE uses SSL to encrypt its communication with its C2 server.(Citation: Aquino RARSTONE)
Drovorub

Drovorub can use TCP to communicate between its agent and client modules.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)
InvisiMole

InvisiMole has used TCP to download additional modules.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Winnti for Linux

Winnti for Linux has used ICMP, custom TCP, and UDP in outbound communications.(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019)
Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used a custom protocol for command and control.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Nebulae

Nebulae can use TCP in C2 communications.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Metamorfo

Metamorfo has used raw TCP for C2.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

Remsec

Remsec is capable of using ICMP, TCP, and UDP for C2.(Citation: Symantec Remsec IOCs)(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Full Report)
Winnti for Windows

Winnti for Windows can communicate using custom TCP.(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)
MoonWind

MoonWind completes network communication via raw sockets.(Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)
HiddenWasp

HiddenWasp communicates with a simple network protocol over TCP.(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019)
WellMail

WellMail can use TCP for C2 communications.(Citation: CISA WellMail July 2020)
Mythic

Mythic supports WebSocket and TCP-based C2 profiles.(Citation: Mythc Documentation)

Misdat

Misdat network traffic communicates over a raw socket.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Pay2Key

Pay2Key has sent its public key to the C2 server over TCP.(Citation: Check Point Pay2Key November 2020)
Reaver

Some Reaver variants use raw TCP for C2.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)
SombRAT

SombRAT has the ability to use TCP sockets to send data and ICMP to ping the C2 server.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
PipeMon

The PipeMon communication module can use a custom protocol based on TLS over TCP.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)
Bandook

Bandook has a command built in to use a raw TCP socket.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT can use TCP for C2 communication.(Citation: CISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018)
APT29

APT29 has used TCP for C2 communications.(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)
gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT has used an encrypted protocol within TCP segments to communicate with the C2.(Citation: Gh0stRAT ATT March 2019)
ShadowPad

ShadowPad has used UDP for C2 communications.(Citation: Kaspersky ShadowPad Aug 2017)
SDBbot

SDBbot has the ability to communicate with C2 with TCP over port 443.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)
PingPull

PingPull variants have the ability to communicate with C2 servers using ICMP or TCP.(Citation: Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022)
Carbon

Carbon uses TCP and UDP for C2.(Citation: ESET Carbon Mar 2017)
RainyDay

RainyDay can use TCP in C2 communications.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
NETEAGLE

If NETEAGLE does not detect a proxy configured on the infected machine, it will send beacons via UDP/6000. Also, after retrieving a C2 IP address and Port Number, NETEAGLE will initiate a TCP connection to this socket. The ensuing connection is a plaintext C2 channel in which commands are specified by DWORDs.(Citation: FireEye APT30)
LookBack

LookBack uses a custom binary protocol over sockets for C2 communications.(Citation: Proofpoint LookBack Malware Aug 2019)
Bisonal

Bisonal has used raw sockets for network communication.(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)
QakBot

QakBot has the ability use TCP to send or receive C2 packets.(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)
BUBBLEWRAP

BUBBLEWRAP can communicate using SOCKS.(Citation: FireEye admin@338)
Umbreon

Umbreon provides access to the system via SSH or any other protocol that uses PAM to authenticate.(Citation: Umbreon Trend Micro)
Derusbi

Derusbi binds to a raw socket on a random source port between 31800 and 31900 for C2.(Citation: Fidelis Turbo)
PLATINUM

PLATINUM has used the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for command and control.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM June 2017)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can be configured to use TCP, ICMP, and UDP for C2 communications.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Strike September 2020)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
RCSession

RCSession has the ability to use TCP and UDP in C2 communications.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)(Citation: Profero APT27 December 2020)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom protocol for command and control.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Penquin

The Penquin C2 mechanism is based on TCP and UDP packets.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)
Mis-Type

Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over a raw socket.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT can communicate with its C2 server via TCP over port 5200.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)
Crimson

Crimson uses a custom TCP protocol for C2.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)

FIN6

FIN6 has used Metasploit Bind and Reverse TCP stagers.(Citation: Trend Micro FIN6 October 2019)
BackdoorDiplomacy

BackdoorDiplomacy has used EarthWorm for network tunneling with a SOCKS5 server and port transfer functionalities.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Cryptoistic

Cryptoistic can use TCP in communications with C2.(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)
APT3

An APT3 downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections for its initial C2.(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap)
Regin

The Regin malware platform can use ICMP to communicate between infected computers.(Citation: Kaspersky Regin)
BITTER

BITTER has used TCP for C2 communications.(Citation: Forcepoint BITTER Pakistan Oct 2016)
NETWIRE

NETWIRE can use TCP in C2 communications.(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)
HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has used TCP for C2.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)
FunnyDream

FunnyDream can communicate with C2 over TCP and UDP.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)
PHOREAL

PHOREAL communicates via ICMP for C2.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)
SUGARUSH

SUGARUSH has used TCP for C2.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022)
Taidoor

Taidoor can use TCP for C2 communications.(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
Filter Network Traffic

Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.
Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation

Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems. Also ensure hosts are only provisioned to communicate over authorized interfaces. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Network Segmentation

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.

Обнаружение

Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.

Ссылки

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