Filter Network Traffic
Techniques Addressed by Mitigation |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1557 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Use network appliances and host-based security software to block network traffic that is not necessary within the environment, such as legacy protocols that may be leveraged for AiTM conditions. |
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T1557.001 | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay |
Use host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic. Enabling SMB Signing can stop NTLMv2 relay attacks.(Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)(Citation: Microsoft SMB Packet Signing) |
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T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Consider enabling DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection on switches to create mappings between IP addresses requested via DHCP and ARP tables and tie the values to a port on the switch that may block bogus traffic.(Citation: Cisco ARP Poisoning Mitigation 2016)(Citation: Juniper DAI 2020) |
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T1557.003 | DHCP Spoofing |
Consider filtering DHCP traffic on ports 67 and 68 to/from unknown or untrusted DHCP servers. Additionally, port security may also be enabled on layer switches. Furthermore, consider enabling DHCP snooping on layer 2 switches as it will prevent DHCP spoofing attacks and starvation attacks. Consider tracking available IP addresses through a script or a tool. Additionally, block DHCPv6 traffic and incoming router advertisements, especially if IPv6 is not commonly used in the network.(Citation: ntlm_relaying_kerberos_del) |
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Enterprise | T1071 | T1071.004 | Application Layer Protocol: DNS |
Consider filtering DNS requests to unknown, untrusted, or known bad domains and resources. Resolving DNS requests with on-premise/proxy servers may also disrupt adversary attempts to conceal data within DNS packets. |
Enterprise | T1197 | BITS Jobs |
Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic. |
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Enterprise | T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage |
Cloud service providers support IP-based restrictions when accessing cloud resources. Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitigate the use of stolen credentials to access data. |
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Enterprise | T1602 | Data from Configuration Repository |
Apply extended ACLs to block unauthorized protocols outside the trusted network.(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017) |
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T1602.001 | SNMP (MIB Dump) |
Apply extended ACLs to block unauthorized protocols outside the trusted network.(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017) |
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T1602.002 | Network Device Configuration Dump |
Apply extended ACLs to block unauthorized protocols outside the trusted network.(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017) |
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Enterprise | T1499 | Endpoint Denial of Service |
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. To defend against SYN floods, enable SYN Cookies. |
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T1499.001 | OS Exhaustion Flood |
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. To defend against SYN floods, enable SYN Cookies. |
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T1499.002 | Service Exhaustion Flood |
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. |
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T1499.003 | Application Exhaustion Flood |
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. |
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T1499.004 | Application or System Exploitation |
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. |
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Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. |
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T1048.001 | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. |
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T1048.002 | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. |
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T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. |
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Enterprise | T1187 | Forced Authentication |
Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with allowlisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) |
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Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Consider using the host firewall to restrict file sharing communications such as SMB. (Citation: Microsoft Preventing SMB) |
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Enterprise | T1599 | Network Boundary Bridging |
Upon identifying a compromised network device being used to bridge a network boundary, block the malicious packets using an unaffected network device in path, such as a firewall or a router that has not been compromised. Continue to monitor for additional activity and to ensure that the blocks are indeed effective. |
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T1599.001 | Network Address Translation Traversal |
Block Traffic Upon identifying a compromised network device being used to bridge a network boundary, block the malicious packets using an unaffected network device in path, such as a firewall or a router that has not been compromised. Continue to monitor for additional activity and to ensure that the blocks are indeed effective. |
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Enterprise | T1498 | Network Denial of Service |
When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting Internet Service Provider (ISP) or by a 3rd party such as a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Depending on flood volume, on-premises filtering may be possible by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) As immediate response may require rapid engagement of 3rd parties, analyze the risk associated to critical resources being affected by Network DoS attacks and create a disaster recovery plan/business continuity plan to respond to incidents.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) |
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T1498.001 | Direct Network Flood |
When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting Internet Service Provider (ISP) or by a 3rd party such as a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Depending on flood volume, on-premises filtering may be possible by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) As immediate response may require rapid engagement of 3rd parties, analyze the risk associated to critical resources being affected by Network DoS attacks and create a disaster recovery plan/business continuity plan to respond to incidents.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) |
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T1498.002 | Reflection Amplification |
When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting Internet Service Provider (ISP) or by a 3rd party such as a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Depending on flood volume, on-premises filtering may be possible by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) As immediate response may require rapid engagement of 3rd parties, analyze the risk associated to critical resources being affected by Network DoS attacks and create a disaster recovery plan/business continuity plan to respond to incidents.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) |
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Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Filter network traffic to prevent use of protocols across the network boundary that are unnecessary. |
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Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling |
Consider filtering network traffic to untrusted or known bad domains and resources. |
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Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting. |
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T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting. |
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Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Software |
Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools. |
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Enterprise | T1021 | T1021.002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Consider using the host firewall to restrict file sharing communications such as SMB. (Citation: Microsoft Preventing SMB) |
T1021.005 | VNC |
VNC defaults to TCP ports 5900 for the server, 5800 for browser access, and 5500 for a viewer in listening mode. Filtering or blocking these ports will inhibit VNC traffic utilizing default ports. |
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Enterprise | T1218 | T1218.012 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Verclsid |
Consider modifying host firewall rules to prevent egress traffic from verclsid.exe. |
Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling |
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. |
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T1205.001 | Port Knocking |
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. |
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T1205.002 | Socket Filters |
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. |
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Enterprise | T1537 | Transfer Data to Cloud Account |
Implement network-based filtering restrictions to prohibit data transfers to untrusted VPCs. |
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Enterprise | T1552 | Unsecured Credentials |
Limit access to the Instance Metadata API using a host-based firewall such as iptables. A properly configured Web Application Firewall (WAF) may help prevent external adversaries from exploiting Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks that allow access to the Cloud Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018) |
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T1552.005 | Cloud Instance Metadata API |
Limit access to the Instance Metadata API using a host-based firewall such as iptables. A properly configured Web Application Firewall (WAF) may help prevent external adversaries from exploiting Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks that allow access to the Cloud Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018) |
References
- Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.
- US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
- Meintanis, S., Revuelto, V., Socha, K.. (2017, March 10). DDoS Overview and Response Guide. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
- Microsoft. (2020, March 10). Preventing SMB traffic from lateral connections and entering or leaving the network. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
- King, J., Lauerman, K. (2016, January 22). ARP Poisoning (Man-in-the-Middle) Attack and Mitigation Technique. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
- Juniper. (2020, September 23). Understanding and Using Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI). Retrieved October 15, 2020.
- Mollema, D. (2019, March 4). The worst of both worlds: Combining NTLM Relaying and Kerberos delegation . Retrieved August 15, 2022.
- US-CERT. (2017, March 16). SMB Security Best Practices. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
- US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.
- Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.
- Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
- Microsoft. (2008, September 10). Using SMB Packet Signing. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
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