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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Эксфильтрация по альтернативному протоколу без шифрования (с возможной обфускацией)
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Эксфильтрация по альтернативно...
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Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol:  Эксфильтрация по альтернативному протоколу без шифрования (с возможной обфускацией)

ID Название
.001 Эксфильтрация по альтернативному протоколу с симметричным шифрованием
.002 Эксфильтрация по альтернативному протоколу с асимметричным шифрованием
.003 Эксфильтрация по альтернативному протоколу без шифрования (с возможной обфускацией)

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.(Citation: copy_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields.

ID: T1048.003
Относится к технике:  T1048
Тактика(-и): Exfiltration
Платформы: ESXi, Linux, Network Devices, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 2.2
Дата создания: 15 Mar 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
WindTail

WindTail has the ability to automatically exfiltrate files using the macOS built-in utility /usr/bin/curl.(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019)
Brave Prince

Some Brave Prince variants have used South Korea's Daum email service to exfiltrate information, and later variants have posted the data to a web server via an HTTP post command.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)
CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke exfiltrates collected files over FTP or WebDAV. Exfiltration servers can be separately configured from C2 servers.(Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)
Rclone

Rclone can exfiltrate data over FTP or HTTP, including HTTP via WebDAV.(Citation: Rclone)
SocGholish

SocGholish can exfiltrate data directly to its C2 domain via HTTP.(Citation: Red Canary SocGholish March 2024)
BITSAdmin

BITSAdmin can be used to create BITS Jobs to upload files from a compromised host.(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)
Remsec

Remsec can exfiltrate data via a DNS tunnel or email, separately from its C2 channel.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Full Report)
Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla has routines for exfiltration over SMTP, FTP, and HTTP.(Citation: Talos Agent Tesla Oct 2018)(Citation: Bitdefender Agent Tesla April 2020)(Citation: SentinelLabs Agent Tesla Aug 2020)
CharmPower

CharmPower can send victim data via FTP with credentials hardcoded in the script.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
KONNI

KONNI has used FTP to exfiltrate reconnaissance data out.(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)
CORALDECK

CORALDECK has exfiltrated data in HTTP POST headers.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
ccf32

ccf32 can upload collected data and files to an FTP server.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)
WARPWIRE

WARPWIRE can send captured credentials to C2 via HTTP `GET` or `POST` requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 2 January 2024)
Cherry Picker

Cherry Picker exfiltrates files over FTP.(Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker)
Carbon

Carbon uses HTTP to send data to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Carbon Mar 2017)
Kessel

Kessel can exfiltrate credentials and other information via HTTP POST request, TCP, and DNS.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018)
PoetRAT

PoetRAT has used ftp for exfiltration.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)
ftp

ftp may be used to exfiltrate data separate from the main command and control protocol.(Citation: Microsoft FTP)(Citation: Linux FTP)
CookieMiner

CookieMiner has used the curl --upload-file command to exfiltrate data over HTTP.(Citation: Unit42 CookieMiner Jan 2019)
Dok

Dok exfiltrates logs of its execution stored in the /tmp folder over FTP using the curl command.(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)

APT33

APT33 has used FTP to exfiltrate files (separately from the C2 channel).(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019)
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has exfiltrated victim information using FTP.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)
Thrip

Thrip has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data from a targeted organization over FTP.(Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)
APT32

APT32's backdoor can exfiltrate data by encoding it in the subdomain field of DNS packets.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)
OilRig

OilRig has exfiltrated data via Microsoft Exchange and over FTP separately from its primary C2 channel over DNS.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Simnavaz October 2024)
Salt Typhoon

Salt Typhoon has exfiltrated configuration files from exploited network devices over FTP and TFTP.(Citation: Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025)
FIN6

FIN6 has sent stolen payment card data to remote servers via HTTP POSTs.(Citation: Trend Micro FIN6 October 2019)
FIN8

FIN8 has used FTP to exfiltrate collected data.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
Data Loss Prevention

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) involves implementing strategies and technologies to identify, categorize, monitor, and control the movement of sensitive data within an organization. This includes protecting data formats indicative of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), intellectual property, or financial data from unauthorized access, transmission, or exfiltration. DLP solutions integrate with network, endpoint, and cloud platforms to enforce security policies and prevent accidental or malicious data leaks. (Citation: PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention) This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Sensitive Data Categorization: - Use Case: Identify and classify data based on sensitivity (e.g., PII, financial data, trade secrets). - Implementation: Use DLP solutions to scan and tag files containing sensitive information using predefined patterns, such as Social Security Numbers or credit card details. Exfiltration Restrictions: - Use Case: Prevent unauthorized transmission of sensitive data. - Implementation: Enforce policies to block unapproved email attachments, unauthorized USB usage, or unencrypted data uploads to cloud storage. Data-in-Transit Monitoring: - Use Case: Detect and prevent the transmission of sensitive data over unapproved channels. - Implementation: Deploy network-based DLP tools to inspect outbound traffic for sensitive content (e.g., financial records or PII) and block unapproved transmissions. Endpoint Data Protection: - Use Case: Monitor and control sensitive data usage on endpoints. - Implementation: Use endpoint-based DLP agents to block copy-paste actions of sensitive data and unauthorized printing or file sharing. Cloud Data Security: - Use Case: Protect data stored in cloud platforms. - Implementation: Integrate DLP with cloud storage platforms like Google Drive, OneDrive, or AWS to monitor and restrict sensitive data sharing or downloads.
Filter Network Traffic

Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Ingress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Configure network firewalls to allow traffic only from authorized IP addresses to public-facing servers. - Implementation: Limit SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) traffic to specific IP ranges. Egress Traffic Filtering: - Use Case: Use firewalls or endpoint security software to block unauthorized outbound traffic to prevent data exfiltration and command-and-control (C2) communications. - Implementation: Block outbound traffic to known malicious IPs or regions where communication is unexpected. Protocol-Based Filtering: - Use Case: Restrict the use of specific protocols that are commonly abused by adversaries, such as SMB, RPC, or Telnet, based on business needs. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 on endpoints to prevent exploits like EternalBlue. Network Segmentation: - Use Case: Create network segments for critical systems and restrict communication between segments unless explicitly authorized. - Implementation: Implement VLANs to isolate IoT devices or guest networks from core business systems. Application Layer Filtering: - Use Case: Use proxy servers or Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to inspect and block malicious HTTP/S traffic. - Implementation: Configure a WAF to block SQL injection attempts or other web application exploitation techniques.
Network Segmentation

Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications. By segmenting networks, organizations can reduce the attack surface, restrict lateral movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets from compromise. Effective network segmentation leverages a combination of physical boundaries, logical separation through VLANs, and access control policies enforced by network appliances like firewalls, routers, and cloud-based configurations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Segment Critical Systems: - Identify and group systems based on their function, sensitivity, and risk. Examples include payment systems, HR databases, production systems, and internet-facing servers. - Use VLANs, firewalls, or routers to enforce logical separation. Implement DMZ for Public-Facing Services: - Host web servers, DNS servers, and email servers in a DMZ to limit their access to internal systems. - Apply strict firewall rules to filter traffic between the DMZ and internal networks. Use Cloud-Based Segmentation: - In cloud environments, use VPCs, subnets, and security groups to isolate applications and enforce traffic rules. - Apply AWS Transit Gateway or Azure VNet peering for controlled connectivity between cloud segments. Apply Microsegmentation for Workloads: - Use software-defined networking (SDN) tools to implement workload-level segmentation and prevent lateral movement. Restrict Traffic with ACLs and Firewalls: - Apply Access Control Lists (ACLs) to network devices to enforce "deny by default" policies. - Use firewalls to restrict both north-south (external-internal) and east-west (internal-internal) traffic. Monitor and Audit Segmented Networks: - Regularly review firewall rules, ACLs, and segmentation policies. - Monitor network flows for anomalies to ensure segmentation is effective. Test Segmentation Effectiveness: - Perform periodic penetration tests to verify that unauthorized access is blocked between network segments.

Обнаружение

Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `copy` commands being run to exfiltrate configuration files to non-standard destinations over unencrypted protocols such as TFTP.

Ссылки

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