TA2541
Associated Group Descriptions |
|
Name | Description |
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Techniques Used |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains |
TA2541 has registered domains often containing the keywords “kimjoy,” “h0pe,” and “grace,” using domain registrars including Netdorm and No-IP DDNS, and hosting providers including xTom GmbH and Danilenko, Artyom.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
.006 | Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services |
TA2541 has hosted malicious files on various platforms including Google Drive, OneDrive, Discord, PasteText, ShareText, and GitHub.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
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Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
TA2541 has placed VBS files in the Startup folder and used Registry run keys to establish persistence for malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
TA2541 has used PowerShell to download files and to inject into various Windows processes.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
TA2541 has used VBS files to execute or establish persistence for additional payloads, often using file names consistent with email themes or mimicking system functionality.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1573 | .002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
TA2541 has used TLS encrypted C2 communications including for campaigns using AsyncRAT.(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
TA2541 has attempted to disable built-in security protections such as Windows AMSI. (Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
TA2541 has used file names to mimic legitimate Windows files or system functionality.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
Enterprise | T1027 | .002 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing |
TA2541 has used a .NET packer to obfuscate malicious files.(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
.013 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File |
TA2541 has used compressed and char-encoded scripts in operations.(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1588 | .001 | Obtain Capabilities: Malware |
TA2541 has used multiple strains of malware available for purchase on criminal forums or in open-source repositories.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
.002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
TA2541 has used commodity remote access tools.(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
TA2541 has sent phishing emails with malicious attachments for initial access including MS Word documents.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
.002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link |
TA2541 has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious links to deliver malware. (Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021) |
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Enterprise | T1055 | .012 | Process Injection: Process Hollowing |
TA2541 has used process hollowing to execute CyberGate malware.(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
TA2541 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for installed tools.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery |
TA2541 has used tools to search victim systems for security products such as antivirus and firewall software.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022) |
Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
TA2541 has uploaded malware to various platforms including Google Drive, Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
Enterprise | T1218 | .005 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta |
TA2541 has used `mshta` to execute scripts including VBS.(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
Enterprise | T1016 | .001 | System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery |
TA2541 has run scripts to check internet connectivity from compromised hosts. (Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link |
TA2541 has used malicious links to cloud and web services to gain execution on victim machines.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: FireEye NETWIRE March 2019) |
.002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
TA2541 has used macro-enabled MS Word documents to lure victims into executing malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021)(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021) |
References
- Larson, S. and Wise, J. (2022, February 15). Charting TA2541's Flight. Retrieved September 12, 2023.
- Ventura, V. (2021, September 16). Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise. Retrieved September 15, 2023.
- Lorber, N. (2021, May 7). Revealing the Snip3 Crypter, a Highly Evasive RAT Loader. Retrieved September 13, 2023.
- Maniath, S. and Kadam P. (2019, March 19). Dissecting a NETWIRE Phishing Campaign's Usage of Process Hollowing. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
- Jornet, A. (2021, December 23). Snip3, an investigation into malware. Retrieved September 19, 2023.
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