Stage Capabilities: Загрузка вредоносного ПО
Other sub-techniques of Stage Capabilities (6)
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022) Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
Примеры процедур |
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Название | Описание |
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Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers in forums to enable initial access to executing user.(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) |
TA2541 |
TA2541 has uploaded malware to various platforms including Google Drive, Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used compromised servers to host malware.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020) |
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During Night Dragon, threat actors uploaded commonly available hacker tools to compromised web servers.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) |
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Earth Lusca |
Earth Lusca has staged malware and malicious files on compromised web servers, GitHub, and Google Drive.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022) |
Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has hosted malicious payloads on DropBox including PlugX.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022) |
LuminousMoth |
LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021) |
For C0011, Transparent Tribe hosted malicious documents on domains registered by the group.(Citation: Cisco Talos Transparent Tribe Education Campaign July 2022) |
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Mustang Panda staged malware on adversary-controlled domains and cloud storage instances during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.(Citation: Recorded Future RedDelta 2025) |
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Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has used compromised and acquired infrastructure to host and deliver malware including Blogspot to host beacons, file exfiltrators, and implants.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 Full PDF Report) |
Mustard Tempest |
Mustard Tempest has hosted payloads on acquired second-stage servers for periods of either days, weeks, or months.(Citation: SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022) |
OilRig |
OilRig has hosted malware on fake websites designed to target specific audiences.(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) |
TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021) |
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors staged malware and malicious files in legitimate hosting services such as OneDrive or MediaFire.(Citation: ESET Operation Spalax Jan 2021) |
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LazyScripter |
LazyScripter has hosted open-source remote access Trojans used in its operations in GitHub.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
Gamaredon Group |
Gamaredon Group has registered domains to stage payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022) |
Star Blizzard |
Star Blizzard has uploaded malicious payloads to cloud storage sites.(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024) |
Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020) |
SideCopy |
SideCopy has used compromised domains to host its malicious payloads.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021) |
For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022) |
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For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors staged malicious files on Dropbox and other websites.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018) |
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TA505 |
TA505 has staged malware on actor-controlled domains.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020) |
BlackByte |
BlackByte has staged tools such as Cobalt Strike at public file sharing and hosting sites.(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023) |
BITTER |
BITTER has registered domains to stage payloads.(Citation: Forcepoint BITTER Pakistan Oct 2016) |
For C0021, the threat actors uploaded malware to websites under their control.(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018) |
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APT32 |
APT32 has hosted malicious payloads in Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive for use during targeting.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) |
HEXANE |
HEXANE has staged malware on fraudulent websites set up to impersonate targeted organizations.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021) |
Saint Bear |
Saint Bear has used the Discord content delivery network for hosting malicious content referenced in links and emails.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) |
Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet staged malicious capabilities online for follow-on download by victims or malware.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024) |
FIN7 |
FIN7 has staged legitimate software, that was trojanized to contain an Atera agent installer, on Amazon S3.(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) |
EXOTIC LILY |
EXOTIC LILY has uploaded malicious payloads to file-sharing services including TransferNow, TransferXL, WeTransfer, and OneDrive.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022) |
APT42 |
APT42 has used its infrastructure for C2 and for staging the VINETHORN payload, which masqueraded as a VPN application.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has hosted malicious files on compromised as well as Lazarus Group-controlled servers.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020) |
Контрмеры |
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Контрмера | Описание |
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Pre-compromise |
Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct successful operations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Limit Information Exposure: - Regularly audit and sanitize publicly available data, including job posts, websites, and social media. - Use tools like OSINT monitoring platforms (e.g., SpiderFoot, Recon-ng) to identify leaked information. Protect Domain and DNS Infrastructure: - Enable DNSSEC and use WHOIS privacy protection. - Monitor for domain hijacking or lookalike domains using services like RiskIQ or DomainTools. External Monitoring: - Use tools like Shodan, Censys to monitor your external attack surface. - Deploy external vulnerability scanners to proactively address weaknesses. Threat Intelligence: - Leverage platforms like MISP, Recorded Future, or Anomali to track adversarial infrastructure, tools, and activity. Content and Email Protections: - Use email security solutions like Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, or Mimecast. - Enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC policies to protect against email spoofing. Training and Awareness: - Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, securing their social media, and avoiding information leaks. |
Обнаружение
If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as User Execution or Ingress Tool Transfer.
Ссылки
- Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.
- Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
- Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
- Ventura, V. (2021, September 16). Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise. Retrieved September 15, 2023.
- Larson, S. and Wise, J. (2022, February 15). Charting TA2541's Flight. Retrieved September 12, 2023.
- Cashman, M. (2020, July 29). Operation North Star Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
- Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
- Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict in Ukraine Escalates. Retrieved March 16, 2022.
- Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
- N. Baisini. (2022, July 13). Transparent Tribe begins targeting education sector in latest campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2022.
- Insikt Group. (2025, January 9). Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain. Retrieved January 14, 2025.
- Mandiant. (n.d.). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved October 14, 2024.
- Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
- An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.
- Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.
- ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
- Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
- M. Porolli. (2021, January 21). Operation Spalax: Targeted malware attacks in Colombia. Retrieved September 16, 2022.
- Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Unit 42. (2022, February 3). Russia’s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine. Retrieved February 21, 2022.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2022, February 4). ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved February 18, 2022.
- Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
- Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
- Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
- Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020.
- Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
- Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
- Dela Paz, R. (2016, October 21). BITTER: a targeted attack against Pakistan. Retrieved June 1, 2022.
- Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.
- Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
- ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.
- Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.
- Abdo, B., et al. (2022, April 4). FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7. Retrieved April 5, 2022.
- Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
- Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromises. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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