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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Распространение через съемные носители
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Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself. Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).

ID: T1091
Тактика(-и): Initial Access, Lateral Movement
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
Версия: 1.2
Дата создания: 31 May 2017
Последнее изменение: 21 Oct 2022

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Flame

Flame contains modules to infect USB sticks and spread laterally to other Windows systems the stick is plugged into using Autorun functionality.(Citation: Kaspersky Flame)
SHIPSHAPE

APT30 may have used the SHIPSHAPE malware to move onto air-gapped networks. SHIPSHAPE targets removable drives to spread to other systems by modifying the drive to use Autorun to execute or by hiding legitimate document files and copying an executable to the folder with the same name as the legitimate document.(Citation: FireEye APT30)
Unknown Logger

Unknown Logger is capable of spreading to USB devices.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)
Aoqin Dragon

Aoqin Dragon has used a dropper that employs a worm infection strategy using a removable device to breach a secure network environment.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)
DustySky

DustySky searches for removable media and duplicates itself onto it.(Citation: DustySky)
H1N1

H1N1 has functionality to copy itself to removable media.(Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 2)
Darkhotel

Darkhotel's selective infector modifies executables stored on removable media as a method of spreading across computers.(Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)
Stuxnet

Stuxnet can propagate via removable media using an autorun.inf file or the CVE-2010-2568 LNK vulnerability.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has used a customized PlugX variant which could spread through USB connections.(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)
Agent.btz

Agent.btz drops itself onto removable media devices and creates an autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. When the device is inserted into another system, it opens autorun.inf and loads the malware.(Citation: ThreatExpert Agent.btz)
njRAT

njRAT can be configured to spread via removable drives.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018)
USBferry

USBferry can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)
CHOPSTICK

Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines and using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)
Crimson

Crimson can spread across systems by infecting removable media.(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)
FIN7

FIN7 actors have mailed USB drives to potential victims containing malware that downloads and installs various backdoors, including in some cases for ransomware operations.(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)
Ramsay

Ramsay can spread itself by infecting other portable executable files on removable drives.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)

QakBot

QakBot has the ability to use removable drives to spread through compromised networks.(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot May 2020)
USBStealer

USBStealer drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a user opens the removable media on another system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)
APT28

APT28 uses a tool to infect connected USB devices and transmit itself to air-gapped computers when the infected USB device is inserted.(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19)
Conficker

Conficker variants used the Windows AUTORUN feature to spread through USB propagation.(Citation: SANS Conficker)(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)
Ursnif

Ursnif has copied itself to and infected removable drives for propagation.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015)(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif File Dec 2014)
Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has attempted to transfer USBferry from an infected USB device by copying an Autorun function to the target machine.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation

Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control) Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
Limit Hardware Installation

Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Use capabilities to prevent suspicious behavior patterns from occurring on endpoint systems. This could include suspicious process, file, API call, etc. behavior.

Обнаружение

Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.

Ссылки

  1. Lucian Constantin. (2014, January 23). Windows malware tries to infect Android devices connected to PCs. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
  2. Zhaohui Wang & Angelos Stavrou. (n.d.). Exploiting Smart-Phone USB Connectivity For Fun And Profit. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
  3. Zack Whittaker. (2019, August 12). This hacker’s iPhone charging cable can hijack your computer. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
  4. Gostev, A. (2012, May 28). The Flame: Questions and Answers. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  5. Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
  6. Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2013, June 28). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1009: "njRAT" Uncovered. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
  7. Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
  8. ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
  9. Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.
  10. Mendoza, E. et al. (2020, May 25). Qakbot Resurges, Spreads through VBS Files. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  11. Trend Micro. (2014, March 18). Conficker. Retrieved February 18, 2021.
  12. Burton, K. (n.d.). The Conficker Worm. Retrieved February 18, 2021.
  13. Reynolds, J.. (2016, September 14). H1N1: Technical analysis reveals new capabilities – part 2. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  14. Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
  15. Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
  16. Caragay, R. (2014, December 11). Info-Stealing File Infector Hits US, UK. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
  17. Caragay, R. (2015, March 26). URSNIF: The Multifaceted Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
  18. Chen, J.. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air gapped Environments. Retrieved May 20, 2020.
  19. Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
  20. Hamzeloofard, S. (2020, January 31). New wave of PlugX targets Hong Kong | Avira Blog. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  21. Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022.
  22. FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
  23. Microsoft. (2007, August 31). https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771759(v=ws.10).aspx. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
  24. Microsoft. (n.d.). How to disable the Autorun functionality in Windows. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
  25. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  26. Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020.
  27. The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.
  28. FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
  29. Shevchenko, S.. (2008, November 30). Agent.btz - A Threat That Hit Pentagon. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
  30. Sanmillan, I.. (2020, May 13). Ramsay: A cyber‑espionage toolkit tailored for air‑gapped networks. Retrieved May 27, 2020.
  31. Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
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