Каталоги
- Сертификаты СЗИ - Государственный реестр сертифицированных средств защиты информации опубликованный Федеральной службой по техническому и экспортному контролю, может быть использован для контроля актуальности используемых СЗИ в организации.
- CVE уязвимости - общедоступная публичная база уязвимостей Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). Миссия программы CVE заключается в выявлении, определении и каталогизации публично раскрываемых уязвимостей в сфере кибербезопасности. Для каждой уязвимости в каталоге существует одна запись CVE. Уязвимости обнаруживаются, затем присваиваются и публикуются организациями по всему миру, которые сотрудничают с программой CVE. Партнеры публикуют записи CVE для единообразного описания уязвимостей. Специалисты в области информационных технологий и кибербезопасности используют записи CVE, чтобы убедиться, что они обсуждают одну и ту же проблему, и координировать свои усилия по определению приоритетности и устранению уязвимостей.
- БДУ ФСТЭК уязвимости - раздел Уязвимости Банка данных уязвимостей опубликованная Федеральной службой по техническому и экспортному контролю совместно с Государственным научно-исследовательским испытательным институтом проблем технической защиты информации. Одной из целей создания банка данных угроз безопасности информации является объединение специалистов в области информационной безопасности для решения задач повышения защищенности информационных систем.
- НКЦКИ уязвимости - общедоступная публичная база уязвимостей Национального координационного центра по компьютерным инцидентам (НКЦКИ), обеспечивающего координацию деятельности субъектов КИИ по обнаружению, предупреждению, ликвидации последствий компьютерных атак и реагированию на компьютерные инциденты.
- MITRE ATT&CK – Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge – Тактики, техники и общеизвестные знания о злоумышленниках. Это основанная на реальных наблюдениях база знаний компании Mitre, содержащая описание тактик, приемов и методов, используемых киберпреступниками. База создана в 2013 году и регулярно обновляется, цель – составление структурированной матрицы используемых киберпреступниками приемов, чтобы упростить задачу реагирования на киберинциденты.
- БДУ ФСТЭК и Новая БДУ ФСТЭК – раздел Угрозы Банка данных угроз, опубликованный в 2015 году Федеральной службой по техническому и экспортному контролю и Государственным научно-исследовательским испытательным институтом проблем технической защиты информации, обязателен при моделировании угроз при построении систем защиты персональных данных, критической информационной инфраструктуры, государственных информационных систем.
CVE, БДУ ФСТЭК и НКЦКИ
Интерфейс каталогов идентичен и содержит следующие блоки:
- Метрики:
- Найденные уязвимости – отображает количество найденных в отчетах от сканеров уязвимостей которые связаны с уязвимостями из каталога, при нажатии на виджет перенаправляет в модуль Технические уязвимости с установленным фильтром по названию каталога (тип фильтра Группа уязвимостей);
- Уязвимые хосты – отображает количество хостов на которых обнаружены уязвимости связанные с уязвимостями из каталога, при нажатии на виджет перенаправляет в модуль Технические уязвимости с установленным фильтром по названию каталога (тип фильтра Группа уязвимостей).
- Табличную часть Каталог уязвимостей:
- Фильтр по полю Идентификатор - особенностью данного фильтра является автоматический разбор текста с последующим извлечением из текста идентификаторов. Для этого необходимо вставить произвольный текст с идентификаторами в поле и добавить в фильтр через кнопку плюс;
- Табличную часть с полями для каталогов CVE и БДУ ФСТЭК:
- Идентификатор - id уязвимости в базе уязвимостей;
- Описание - текстовое описание уязвимости;
- Обнаружено - флаг, данный статус отображается если уязвимость обнаружена в отчетах о сканировании;
- CVSS - числовая оценка уязвимости согласно источнику, с указанием даты выявления уязвимости экспертами, оценка отображается цветом согласно оценке CVSS 0.1 – 3.9 Low Зеленый,
4.0 – 6.9 Medium Желтый, 7.0 – 8.9 High Оранжевый, 9.0 – 10.0 Critical Красный.
- Табличную часть с полями для каталогов CVE :
- Дата бюллетеня - информация о дате публикации бюллетеня содержащего уязвимости;
- Идентификатор - id уязвимости в базе уязвимостей;
- Информация - текстовое описание уязвимости;
- Вектор атаки - локальный или сетевой вектор атаки;
- Обнаружено - флаг, данный статус отображается если уязвимость обнаружена в отчетах о сканировании;
- Наличие обновления - - флаг, данный статус отображается если база уязвимостей содержит информацию о наличии обновлений от производителя уязвимого ПО;
- Дата выявления - даты выявления уязвимости экспертами.
- Чекбокс «Только обнаруженные уязвимости» - устанавливает фильтр на табличную часть для отображения только обнаруженные уязвимости.
- Функционал для экспорта всех уязвимостей каталога.
- Для каталога добавляется функционал Варианты отображения:
- Бюллетени - изменяет отображение табличной части на реестр бюллетеней, отображает общее количество уязвимостей в бюллетени в поле Уязвимостей в бюллетени и статус по обнаружению в поле Обнаружено - данный статус отображается если хотя бы одна уязвимость из бюллетеня обнаружена в инфраструктуре.
- Уязвимости.
MITRE ATT&CK, БДУ ФСТЭК, Новая БДУ ФСТЭК
Каждый из указанных каталогов сформирован по собственной схеме данных, которая не соответствует подходу оценки риска, используемому в сервисе. Но в основе своей указанные базы описывают все те же риски информационной безопасности, каждый под своим углом. Поэтому они добавлены в сервис и как отдельные компоненты и как основа для создания рисков, угроз или уязвимостей.
Каталоги могут использоваться в сервисе с целью:
- Облегчения процесса формирования рисков, угроз и уязвимостей;
- Обогащения информации по рискам (угрозам, уязвимостям) созданным в сервисе.
- Взгляда на компанию и оценку рисков через публичные каталоги угроз.
- Уязвимости могут быть связаны с угрозами БДУ ФСТЭК, техниками ATT&CK и способами реализации Новой БДУ ФСТЭК.
- Угрозы могут быть связаны с угрозами БДУ ФСТЭК, техниками ATT&CK, угрозами и последствиями Новой БДУ ФСТЭК.
- Риски могут быть связаны с угрозами БДУ ФСТЭК, техниками ATT&CK, угрозами, способами реализации и последствиями Новой БДУ ФСТЭК.
Для рисков, угроз и уязвимостей из базы Community связи с каталогами угроз уже установлены.
Связь с каталогом угроз может быть прямой или косвенной. Например, если уязвимость связана с угрозой из БДУ ФСТЭК то и все риски, в составе которых есть данная уязвимость будут автоматически связаны с угрозой из БДУ ФСТЭК.
Каталог БДУ ФСТЭК - это реестр рисков от банка данных угроз безопасности информации ФСТЭК России.
Каждая угроза содержит описание, рекомендации к каким типам активов может быть применена эта угроза, классификация по свойствам информации и вероятные источники угрозы. Дополнительно в блоке Связанные риски указаны связанные риски, а в блоке Каталоги указываются связи с записями из других каталогов.
Каталог Новая БДУ ФСТЭК от банка данных угроз безопасности информации ФСТЭК России содержит:
- матрицу Способы реализации (возникновения угроз) - каждая ячейка которых содержит описание поверхности атаки: группу способов, уровень возможностей нарушителя, возможные реализуемые угрозы, компоненты объектов воздействия, возможные меры защиты;
- Негативные последствия - перечень негативных последствий в классификации ФСТЭК в виде кода и описания;
- Угрозы - реестр угроз с описанием, каждая угроза содержит возможные объекты воздействия и возможные способы реализации угроз;
- Объекты - перечень объектов последствий с описанием и компонентами которые могут входить в состав объекта;
- Компоненты - перечень компонентов объектов воздействия с указанием объектов воздействия на которых они могут располагаться;
- Нарушители - уровни возможностей нарушителей классифицированные по возможностям и компетенции;
- Меры защиты - в терминологии SECURITM это список требований выполнение которых сокращает возможности нарушителя.
- Матрица - содержит тактики и техники злоумышленника, позволяет на основании тактики или техники создать риск или уязвимость, в матрице указаны связи с рисками в базе Community и с рисками в базе команды;
- Тактики - направления действия нарушителя на том или ином этапе cyberkillchane;
- Техники - конкретные действия нарушителя для достижения цели на конкретном шаге cyberkillchane;
- Контрмеры - в терминологии SECURITM это список требований выполнение которых сокращает возможности нарушителя;
- Преступные группы - описание APT группировок и их особенности и модель поведения;
- Инструменты - ПО используемое нарушителями для вредоносного воздействия.
Сертификаты СЗИ
- Имеющиеся СЗИ - отображает количество активов у которых заполнено поле Номер сертификата СЗИ;
- Скоро будут просрочены - отображает количество активов у которых срок действия сертификата меньше 90 календарных дней;
- Просроченные сертификаты - отображает количество активов у которых срок действия сертификата уже истек;
- Истекшая поддержка - отображает количество активов у которых срок действия сертификата уже истек.
- Номер сертификата;
- Дата внесения в реестр;
- Срок действия сертификата;
- Срок окончания тех. поддержки;
- Наименование средства (шифр);
- Схема сертификации;
- Испытательная лаборатория;
- Орган по сертификации;
- Заявитель;
- Наименования документов соответствия;
- Реквизиты заявителя.
Obfuscated Files or Information: Упаковка ПО
Other sub-techniques of Obfuscated Files or Information (17)
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing)
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| TrickBot |
TrickBot leverages a custom packer to obfuscate its functionality.(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) |
| BLINDINGCAN |
BLINDINGCAN has been packed with the UPX packer.(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020) |
| Spark |
Spark has been packed with Enigma Protector to obfuscate its contents.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020) |
| Torisma |
Torisma has been packed with Iz4 compression.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020) |
| yty |
yty packs a plugin with UPX.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018) |
| COATHANGER |
The first stage of COATHANGER is delivered as a packed file.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024) |
| Misdat |
Misdat was typically packed using UPX.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) |
| AppleSeed |
AppleSeed has used UPX packers for its payload DLL.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| NETWIRE |
NETWIRE has used .NET packer tools to evade detection.(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020) |
| GreyEnergy |
GreyEnergy is packed for obfuscation.(Citation: ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018) |
| Emotet |
Emotet has used custom packers to protect its payloads.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet Jan 2019) |
| Tomiris |
Tomiris has been packed with UPX.(Citation: Kaspersky Tomiris Sep 2021) |
| Machete |
Machete has been packed with NSIS.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) |
| Squirrelwaffle |
Squirrelwaffle has been packed with a custom packer to hide payloads.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021) |
| Hildegard |
Hildegard has packed ELF files into other binaries.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) |
| FYAnti |
FYAnti has used ConfuserEx to pack its .NET module.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021) |
| ZeroT |
Some ZeroT DLL files have been packed with UPX.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017) |
| Raspberry Robin |
Raspberry Robin contains multiple payloads that are packed for defense evasion purposes and unpacked on runtime.(Citation: TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022) |
| Raindrop |
Raindrop used a custom packer for its Cobalt Strike payload, which was compressed using the LZMA algorithm.(Citation: Symantec RAINDROP January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021) |
| IcedID |
IcedID has packed and encrypted its loader module.(Citation: Juniper IcedID June 2020) |
| VERMIN |
VERMIN is initially packed.(Citation: Unit 42 VERMIN Jan 2018) |
| CSPY Downloader |
CSPY Downloader has been packed with UPX.(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020) |
| DarkComet |
DarkComet has the option to compress its payload using UPX or MPRESS.(Citation: Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018) |
| FatDuke |
FatDuke has been regularly repacked by its operators to create large binaries and evade detection.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019) |
| Lucifer |
Lucifer has used UPX packed binaries.(Citation: Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020) |
| DRATzarus |
DRATzarus's dropper can be packed with UPX.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020) |
| ShimRat |
ShimRat's loader has been packed with the compressed ShimRat core DLL and the legitimate DLL for it to hijack.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang) |
| China Chopper |
China Chopper's client component is packed with UPX.(Citation: Lee 2013) |
| GoldMax |
GoldMax has been packed for obfuscation.(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021) |
| CostaBricks |
CostaBricks can implement a custom-built virtual machine mechanism to obfuscate its code.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020) |
| HyperBro |
HyperBro has the ability to pack its payload.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| Anchor |
Anchor has come with a packed payload.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019) |
| Babuk |
Versions of Babuk have been packed.(Citation: Sogeti CERT ESEC Babuk March 2021)(Citation: McAfee Babuk February 2021)(Citation: Medium Babuk February 2021) |
| Dyre |
Dyre has been delivered with encrypted resources and must be unpacked for execution.(Citation: Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015) |
| Bisonal |
Bisonal has used the MPRESS packer and similar tools for obfuscation.(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
| S-Type |
Some S-Type samples have been packed with UPX.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) |
| SeaDuke |
SeaDuke has been packed with the UPX packer.(Citation: Unit 42 SeaDuke 2015) |
| Cuba |
Cuba has a packed payload when delivered.(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021) |
| Mongall |
Mongall has been packed with Themida.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022) |
| LockBit 3.0 |
LockBit 3.0 can use code packing to hinder analysis.(Citation: Sentinel Labs LockBit 3.0 JUL 2022)(Citation: INCIBE-CERT LockBit MAR 2024) |
| Latrodectus |
The Latrodectus payload has been packed for obfuscation.(Citation: Elastic Latrodectus May 2024) |
| Saint Bot |
Saint Bot has been packed using a dark market crypter.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021) |
| Sagerunex |
Sagerunex has used VMProtect to pack and obscure itself.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025) |
| Uroburos |
Uroburos uses a custom packer.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023) |
| Metamorfo |
Metamorfo has used VMProtect to pack and protect files.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020) |
| Trojan.Karagany |
Trojan.Karagany samples sometimes use common binary packers such as UPX and Aspack on top of a custom Delphi binary packer.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) |
| KONNI |
KONNI has been packed for obfuscation.(Citation: Malwarebytes KONNI Evolves Jan 2022) |
| OopsIE |
OopsIE uses the SmartAssembly obfuscator to pack an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018) |
| SDBbot |
SDBbot has used a packed installer file.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020) |
| StrelaStealer |
StrelaStealer variants have used packers to obfuscate payloads and make analysis more difficult.(Citation: PaloAlto StrelaStealer 2024) |
| LiteDuke |
LiteDuke has been packed with multiple layers of encryption.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019) |
| Bazar |
Bazar has a variant with a packed payload.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020) |
| XLoader |
XLoader uses various packers, including CyaX, to obfuscate malicious executables.(Citation: Netskope XLoader 2022) |
| Zebrocy |
Zebrocy's Delphi variant was packed with UPX.(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018) |
| FinFisher |
A FinFisher variant uses a custom packer.(Citation: FinFisher Citation)(Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) |
| Donut |
Donut can generate packed code modules.(Citation: Donut Github) |
| HotCroissant |
HotCroissant has used the open source UPX executable packer.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020) |
| Valak |
Valak has used packed DLL payloads.(Citation: SentinelOne Valak June 2020) |
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D |
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has a variant that is packed with UPX.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus macOS April 2019) |
| Daserf |
A version of Daserf uses the MPRESS packer.(Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) |
| SysUpdate |
SysUpdate has been packed with VMProtect.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)(Citation: Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux) |
| Clop |
Clop has been packed to help avoid detection.(Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020) |
| Lokibot |
Lokibot has used several packing methods for obfuscation.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019) |
| Egregor |
Egregor's payloads are custom-packed, archived and encrypted to prevent analysis.(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)(Citation: Cyble Egregor Oct 2020) |
| Melcoz |
Melcoz has been packed with VMProtect and Themida.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020) |
| Troll Stealer |
Troll Stealer has been delivered as a VMProtect-packed binary.(Citation: S2W Troll Stealer 2024)(Citation: ASEC Troll Stealer 2024) |
| Astaroth |
Astaroth uses a software packer called Pe123\RPolyCryptor.(Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019) |
| QakBot |
QakBot can encrypt and pack malicious payloads.(Citation: Cyberint Qakbot May 2021) |
| jRAT |
jRAT payloads have been packed.(Citation: Kaspersky Adwind Feb 2016) |
| Dok |
Dok is packed with an UPX executable packer.(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019) |
| H1N1 |
H1N1 uses a custom packing algorithm.(Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1) |
| The White Company |
The White Company has obfuscated their payloads through packing.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018) |
| Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has used Themida to pack at least two separate backdoor implants.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) |
| Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has used Themida to pack malicious DLLs and other files.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020) |
| APT29 |
APT29 used UPX to pack files.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) |
| TA2541 |
TA2541 has used a .NET packer to obfuscate malicious files.(Citation: Cisco Operation Layover September 2021) |
| APT39 |
APT39 has packed tools with UPX, and has repacked a modified version of Mimikatz to thwart anti-virus detection.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: BitDefender Chafer May 2020) |
| APT38 |
APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium, to pack their implants.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) |
| Night Dragon |
Night Dragon is known to use software packing in its tools.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) |
| Rocke |
Rocke's miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
| ZIRCONIUM |
ZIRCONIUM has used multi-stage packers for exploit code.(Citation: Check Point APT31 February 2021) |
| MoustachedBouncer |
MoustachedBouncer has used malware plugins packed with Themida.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023) |
| Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 has packed malware and tools, including using VMProtect.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| Saint Bear |
Saint Bear clones .NET assemblies from other .NET binaries as well as cloning code signing certificates from other software to obfuscate the initial loader payload.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) |
| Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has used the Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) to obfuscate the FRP client files BrightmetricAgent.exe and SMSvcService.ex) and the port scanning utility ScanLine.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024) |
| Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has packed malware with UPX.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
| Aoqin Dragon |
Aoqin Dragon has used the Themida packer to obfuscate malicious payloads.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022) |
| TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT) |
| Patchwork |
A Patchwork payload was packed with UPX.(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant) |
| Ember Bear |
Ember Bear has packed malware to help avoid detection.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) |
| APT3 |
APT3 has been known to pack their tools.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) |
| GALLIUM |
GALLIUM packed some payloads using different types of packers, both known and custom.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) |
| Elderwood |
Elderwood has packed malware payloads before delivery to victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) |
| APT41 |
APT41 uses packers such as Themida to obfuscate malicious files.(Citation: Rostovcev APT41 2021) |
| Dark Caracal |
Dark Caracal has used UPX to pack Bandook.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018) |
| TA505 |
TA505 has used UPX to obscure malicious code.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Antivirus/Antimalware |
Antivirus/Antimalware solutions utilize signatures, heuristics, and behavioral analysis to detect, block, and remediate malicious software, including viruses, trojans, ransomware, and spyware. These solutions continuously monitor endpoints and systems for known malicious patterns and suspicious behaviors that indicate compromise. Antivirus/Antimalware software should be deployed across all devices, with automated updates to ensure protection against the latest threats. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Signature-Based Detection: - Implementation: Use predefined signatures to identify known malware based on unique patterns such as file hashes, byte sequences, or command-line arguments. This method is effective against known threats. - Use Case: When malware like "Emotet" is detected, its signature (such as a specific file hash) matches a known database of malicious software, triggering an alert and allowing immediate quarantine of the infected file. Heuristic-Based Detection: - Implementation: Deploy heuristic algorithms that analyze behavior and characteristics of files and processes to identify potential malware, even if it doesn’t match a known signature. - Use Case: If a program attempts to modify multiple critical system files or initiate suspicious network communications, heuristic analysis may flag it as potentially malicious, even if no specific malware signature is available. Behavioral Detection (Behavior Prevention): - Implementation: Use behavioral analysis to detect patterns of abnormal activities, such as unusual system calls, unauthorized file encryption, or attempts to escalate privileges. - Use Case: Behavioral analysis can detect ransomware attacks early by identifying behavior like mass file encryption, even before a specific ransomware signature has been identified. Real-Time Scanning: - Implementation: Enable real-time scanning to automatically inspect files and network traffic for signs of malware as they are accessed, downloaded, or executed. - Use Case: When a user downloads an email attachment, the antivirus solution scans the file in real-time, checking it against both signatures and heuristics to detect any malicious content before it can be opened. Cloud-Assisted Threat Intelligence: - Implementation: Use cloud-based threat intelligence to ensure the antivirus solution can access the latest malware definitions and real-time threat feeds from a global database of emerging threats. - Use Case: Cloud-assisted antivirus solutions quickly identify newly discovered malware by cross-referencing against global threat databases, providing real-time protection against zero-day attacks. **Tools for Implementation**: - Endpoint Security Platforms: Use solutions such as EDR for comprehensive antivirus/antimalware protection across all systems. - Centralized Management: Implement centralized antivirus management consoles that provide visibility into threat activity, enable policy enforcement, and automate updates. - Behavioral Analysis Tools: Leverage solutions with advanced behavioral analysis capabilities to detect malicious activity patterns that don’t rely on known signatures. |
Обнаружение
Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.
Ссылки
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Каталоги
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