Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Нативный API
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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
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Нативный API

Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to Command and Scripting Interpreter, the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via Disable or Modify Tools).

ID: T1106
Тактика(-и): Execution
Платформы: Linux, macOS, Windows
Источники данных: Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution
Версия: 2.1
Дата создания: 31 May 2017
Последнее изменение: 19 Apr 2022

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
EvilBunny

EvilBunny has used various API calls as part of its checks to see if the malware is running in a sandbox.(Citation: Cyphort EvilBunny Dec 2014)

Winnti for Windows

Winnti for Windows can use Native API to create a new process and to start services.(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)
Pony

Pony has used several Windows functions for various purposes.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

Cyclops Blink

Cyclops Blink can use various Linux API functions including those for execution and discovery.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)
Bisonal

Bisonal has used the Windows API to communicate with the Service Control Manager to execute a thread.(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)
Mis-Type

Mis-Type has used Windows API calls, including `NetUserAdd` and `NetUserDel`.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Torisma

Torisma has used various Windows API calls.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)
SodaMaster

SodaMaster can use RegOpenKeyW to access the Registry.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
RainyDay

The file collection tool used by RainyDay can utilize native API including ReadDirectoryChangeW for folder monitoring.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of running shell commands without cmd.exe and PowerShell commands without powershell.exe(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Talos Cobalt Strike September 2020)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
ZxxZ

ZxxZ has used API functions such as `Process32First`, `Process32Next`, and `ShellExecuteA`.(Citation: Cisco Talos Bitter Bangladesh May 2022)
SideTwist

SideTwist can use GetUserNameW, GetComputerNameW, and GetComputerNameExW to gather information.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)
Imminent Monitor

Imminent Monitor has leveraged CreateProcessW() call to execute the debugger.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)
Babuk

Babuk can use multiple Windows API calls for actions on compromised hosts including discovery and execution.(Citation: Sogeti CERT ESEC Babuk March 2021)(Citation: McAfee Babuk February 2021)(Citation: Medium Babuk February 2021)
Cuba

Cuba has used several built-in API functions for discovery like GetIpNetTable and NetShareEnum.(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021)

Higaisa

Higaisa has called various native OS APIs.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)
QakBot

QakBot can use GetProcAddress to help delete malicious strings from memory.(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)
Clop

Clop has used built-in API functions such as WNetOpenEnumW(), WNetEnumResourceW(), WNetCloseEnum(), GetProcAddress(), and VirtualAlloc().(Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)
Aria-body

Aria-body has the ability to launch files using ShellExecute.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)
Ryuk

Ryuk has used multiple native APIs including ShellExecuteW to run executables,GetWindowsDirectoryW to create folders, and VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread for process injection.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)
Dridex

Dridex has used the OutputDebugStringW function to avoid malware analysis as part of its anti-debugging technique.(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)

TinyTurla

TinyTurla has used `WinHTTP`, `CreateProcess`, and other APIs for C2 communications and other functions.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
BackConfig

BackConfig can leverage API functions such as ShellExecuteA and HttpOpenRequestA in the process of downloading and executing files.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)
KillDisk

KillDisk has called the Windows API to retrieve the hard disk handle and shut down the machine.(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)
WindTail

WindTail can invoke Apple APIs contentsOfDirectoryAtPath, pathExtension, and (string) compare.(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019)
Ursnif

Ursnif has used CreateProcessW to create child processes.(Citation: FireEye Ursnif Nov 2017)
Pteranodon

Pteranodon has used various API calls.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
StrifeWater

StrifeWater can use a variety of APIs for execution.(Citation: Cybereason StrifeWater Feb 2022)
Ramsay

Ramsay can use Windows API functions such as WriteFile, CloseHandle, and GetCurrentHwProfile during its collection and file storage operations. Ramsay can execute its embedded components via CreateProcessA and ShellExecute.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)
Chaes

Chaes used the CreateFileW() API function with read permissions to access downloaded payloads.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)

Amadey

Amadey has used a variety of Windows API calls, including `GetComputerNameA`, `GetUserNameA`, and `CreateProcessA`.(Citation: BlackBerry Amadey 2020)

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed malware that used API calls, including `CreateProcessAsUser`.(Citation: McAfee Honeybee)
TrickBot

TrickBot uses the Windows API call, CreateProcessW(), to manage execution flow.(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) TrickBot has also used Nt* API functions to perform Process Injection.(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used the Windows API ObtainUserAgentString to obtain the User-Agent from a compromised host to connect to a C2 server.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020) Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and Process Injection.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)
MarkiRAT

MarkiRAT can run the ShellExecuteW API via the Windows Command Shell.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)
Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group malware can leverage the Windows API call, CreateProcessA(), for execution.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)
BoxCaon

BoxCaon has used Windows API calls to obtain information about the compromised host.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)
Turla

Turla and its RPC backdoors have used APIs calls for various tasks related to subverting AMSI and accessing then executing commands through RPC and/or named pipes.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
Taidoor

Taidoor has the ability to use native APIs for execution including GetProcessHeap, GetProcAddress, and LoadLibrary.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021)
Metamorfo

Metamorfo has used native WINAPI calls.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)
Chimera

Chimera has used direct Windows system calls by leveraging Dumpert.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)
SombRAT

SombRAT has the ability to respawn itself using ShellExecuteW and CreateProcessW.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
build_downer

build_downer has the ability to use the WinExec API to execute malware on a compromised host.(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)
Lizar

Lizar has used various Windows API functions on a victim's machine.(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)

ROKRAT

ROKRAT can use a variety of API calls to execute shellcode.(Citation: Malwarebytes RokRAT VBA January 2021)
njRAT

njRAT has used the ShellExecute() function within a script.(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018)
Volgmer

Volgmer executes payloads using the Windows API call CreateProcessW().(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
Hancitor

Hancitor has used CallWindowProc and EnumResourceTypesA to interpret and execute shellcode.(Citation: FireEye Hancitor)
Avaddon

Avaddon has used the Windows Crypto API to generate an AES key.(Citation: Hornet Security Avaddon June 2020)
WhisperGate

WhisperGate has used the `ExitWindowsEx` API to flush file buffers to disk and stop running processes.(Citation: Cisco Ukraine Wipers January 2022)
BlackTech

BlackTech has used built-in API functions.(Citation: IronNet BlackTech Oct 2021)
GuLoader

GuLoader can use a number of different APIs for discovery and execution.(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike's "beacon" payload is capable of running shell commands without cmd.exe and PowerShell commands without powershell.exe(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Egregor

Egregor has used the Windows API to make detection more difficult.(Citation: Cyble Egregor Oct 2020)

Saint Bot

Saint Bot has used different API calls, including `GetProcAddress`, `VirtualAllocEx`, `WriteProcessMemory`, `CreateProcessA`, and `SetThreadContext`.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
SideCopy

SideCopy has executed malware by calling the API function `CreateProcessW`.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)
PolyglotDuke

PolyglotDuke can use LoadLibraryW and CreateProcess to load and execute code.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)
REvil

REvil can use Native API for execution and to retrieve active services.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the `CreateProcessA` and `ShellExecute` API functions to launch commands after being injected into a selected process.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
FatDuke

FatDuke can call ShellExecuteW to open the default browser on the URL localhost.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)
SynAck

SynAck parses the export tables of system DLLs to locate and call various Windows API functions.(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky Lab SynAck May 2018)
GrimAgent

GrimAgent can use Native API including GetProcAddress and ShellExecuteW.(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)
DCSrv

DCSrv has used various Windows API functions, including `DeviceIoControl`, as part of its encryption process.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
HyperStack

HyperStack can use Windows API's ConnectNamedPipe and WNetAddConnection2 to detect incoming connections and connect to remote shares.(Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020)
Maze

Maze has used several Windows API functions throughout the encryption process including IsDebuggerPresent, TerminateProcess, Process32FirstW, among others.(Citation: McAfee Maze March 2020)

Bankshot

Bankshot creates processes using the Windows API calls: CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessAsUserA().(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)
HotCroissant

HotCroissant can perform dynamic DLL importing and API lookups using LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress on obfuscated strings.(Citation: US-CERT HOTCROISSANT February 2020)
Meteor

Meteor can use `WinAPI` to remove a victim machine from an Active Directory domain.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021)
Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has used multiple Windows APIs including HttpInitialize, HttpCreateHttpHandle, and HttpAddUrl.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)
Nebulae

Nebulae has the ability to use CreateProcess to execute a process.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
MacMa

MacMa has used macOS API functions to perform tasks.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)
RCSession

RCSession can use WinSock API for communication including WSASend and WSARecv.(Citation: Profero APT27 December 2020)
InnaputRAT

InnaputRAT uses the API call ShellExecuteW for execution.(Citation: ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018)
menuPass

menuPass has used native APIs including GetModuleFileName, lstrcat, CreateFile, and ReadFile.(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)
GoldenSpy

GoldenSpy can execute remote commands in the Windows command shell using the WinExec() API.(Citation: Trustwave GoldenSpy June 2020)

ComRAT

ComRAT can load a PE file from memory or the file system and execute it with CreateProcessW.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020)
APT37

APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.(Citation: Talos Group123)
Empire

Empire contains a variety of enumeration modules that have an option to use API calls to carry out tasks.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
FoggyWeb

FoggyWeb's loader can use API functions to load the FoggyWeb backdoor into the same Application Domain within which the legitimate AD FS managed code is executed.(Citation: MSTIC FoggyWeb September 2021)
LitePower

LitePower can use various API calls.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)

During Operation Sharpshooter, the first stage downloader resolved various Windows libraries and APIs, including `LoadLibraryA()`, `GetProcAddress()`, and `CreateProcessA()`.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018)
IcedID

IcedID has called ZwWriteVirtualMemory, ZwProtectVirtualMemory, ZwQueueApcThread, and NtResumeThread to inject itself into a remote process.(Citation: Juniper IcedID June 2020)
Bumblebee

Bumblebee can use multiple Native APIs.(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022)(Citation: Medium Ali Salem Bumblebee April 2022)
BloodHound

BloodHound can use .NET API calls in the SharpHound ingestor component to pull Active Directory data.(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound)
HermeticWizard

HermeticWizard can connect to remote shares using `WNetAddConnection2W`.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)
SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY has the ability to leverage API including `GetProcAddress` and `LoadLibrary`.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)
AppleSeed

AppleSeed has the ability to use multiple dynamically resolved API calls.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)
Sharpshooter

Sharpshooter's first-stage downloader resolved various Windows libraries and APIs, including LoadLibraryA(), GetProcAddress(), and CreateProcessA().(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018)

HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper can call multiple Windows API functions used for privilege escalation, service execution, and to overwrite random bites of data.(Citation: SentinelOne Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)(Citation: Qualys Hermetic Wiper March 2022)
KONNI

KONNI has hardcoded API calls within its functions to use on the victim's machine.(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021)

Kevin

Kevin can use the `ShowWindow` API to avoid detection.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
DRATzarus

DRATzarus can use various API calls to see if it is running in a sandbox.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT has used the `InterlockedExchange`, `SeShutdownPrivilege`, and `ExitWindowsEx` Windows API functions.(Citation: Gh0stRAT ATT March 2019)
Pillowmint

Pillowmint has used multiple native Windows APIs to execute and conduct process injections.(Citation: Trustwave Pillowmint June 2020)
RTM

RTM can use the FindNextUrlCacheEntryA and FindFirstUrlCacheEntryA functions to search for specific strings within browser history.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)
Milan

Milan can use the API `DnsQuery_A` for DNS resolution.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
SUNSPOT

SUNSPOT used Windows API functions such as MoveFileEx and NtQueryInformationProcess as part of the SUNBURST injection process.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)

Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group malware has used CreateProcess to launch additional malicious components.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)
WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT can use a variety of API calls on a compromised host.(Citation: Uptycs Warzone UAC Bypass November 2020)
Donut

Donut code modules use various API functions to load and inject code.(Citation: Donut Github)

BendyBear

BendyBear can load and execute modules and Windows Application Programming (API) calls using standard shellcode API hashing.(Citation: Unit42 BendyBear Feb 2021)
Chrommme

Chrommme can use Windows API including `WinExec` for execution.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
Denis

Denis used the IsDebuggerPresent, OutputDebugString, and SetLastError APIs to avoid debugging. Denis used GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary to dynamically resolve APIs. Denis also used the Wow64SetThreadContext API as part of a process hollowing process.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)

Netwalker

Netwalker can use Windows API functions to inject the ransomware DLL.(Citation: TrendMicro Netwalker May 2020)
Lokibot

Lokibot has used LoadLibrary(), GetProcAddress() and CreateRemoteThread() API functions to execute its shellcode.(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021)
WastedLocker

WastedLocker's custom crypter, CryptOne, leveraged the VirtualAlloc() API function to help execute the payload.(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)
LightNeuron

LightNeuron is capable of starting a process using CreateProcess.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019)
Explosive

Explosive has a function to call the OpenClipboard wrapper.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015)

Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit has used various Windows API calls.(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)
Diavol

Diavol has used several API calls like `GetLogicalDriveStrings`, `SleepEx`, `SystemParametersInfoAPI`, `CryptEncrypt`, and others to execute parts of its attack.(Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021)
FunnyDream

FunnyDream can use Native API for defense evasion, discovery, and collection.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)
HyperBro

HyperBro has the ability to run an application (CreateProcessW) or script/file (ShellExecuteW) via API.(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)
RDFSNIFFER

RDFSNIFFER has used several Win32 API functions to interact with the victim machine.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Oct 2019)
Bandook

Bandook has used the ShellExecuteW() function call.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

ShimRat

ShimRat has used Windows API functions to install the service and shim.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)

KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS can use the `LoadResource` and `CreateProcessW` APIs for execution.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
MegaCortex

After escalating privileges, MegaCortex calls TerminateProcess(), CreateRemoteThread, and other Win32 APIs.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)
NETWIRE

NETWIRE can use Native API including CreateProcess GetProcessById, and WriteProcessMemory.(Citation: FireEye NETWIRE March 2019)
PLEAD

PLEAD can use `ShellExecute` to execute applications.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)
Goopy

Goopy has the ability to enumerate the infected system's user name via GetUserNameW.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)
S-Type

S-Type has used Windows APIs, including `GetKeyboardType`, `NetUserAdd`, and `NetUserDel`.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
xCaon

xCaon has leveraged native OS function calls to retrieve victim's network adapter's information using GetAdapterInfo() API.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)

Carberp

Carberp has used the NtQueryDirectoryFile and ZwQueryDirectoryFile functions to hide files and directories.(Citation: Trusteer Carberp October 2010)
APT38

APT38 has used the Windows API to execute code within a victim's system.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)

ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL is capable of starting a process using CreateProcess.(Citation: Bitdefender APT28 Dec 2015)
Gelsemium

Gelsemium has the ability to use various Windows API functions to perform tasks.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used the CreateProcessA and ShellExecute API function to launch commands after being injected into a selected process.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro can execute through the WinExec API.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)
Flagpro

Flagpro can use Native API to enable obfuscation including `GetLastError` and `GetTickCount`.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)
BADNEWS

BADNEWS has a command to download an .exe and execute it via CreateProcess API. It can also run with ShellExecute.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)
Stuxnet

Stuxnet uses the SetSecurityDescriptorDacl API to reduce object integrity levels.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
TA505

TA505 has deployed payloads that use Windows API calls on a compromised host.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)
PcShare

PcShare has used a variety of Windows API functions.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)
ThiefQuest

ThiefQuest uses various API to perform behaviors such as executing payloads and performing local enumeration.(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)
PlugX

PlugX can use the Windows API functions `GetProcAddress`, `LoadLibrary`, and `CreateProcess` to execute another process.(Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)
Waterbear

Waterbear can leverage API functions for execution.(Citation: Trend Micro Waterbear December 2019)
PipeMon

PipeMon's first stage has been executed by a call to CreateProcess with the decryption password in an argument. PipeMon has used a call to LoadLibrary to load its installer.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)
Bazar

Bazar can use various APIs to allocate memory and facilitate code execution/injection.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)
CaddyWiper

CaddyWiper has the ability to dynamically resolve and use APIs, including `SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege`.(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)
ZxShell

ZxShell can leverage native API including RegisterServiceCtrlHandler to register a service.RegisterServiceCtrlHandler

HAWKBALL

HAWKBALL has leveraged several Windows API calls to create processes, gather disk information, and detect debugger activity.(Citation: FireEye HAWKBALL Jun 2019)
Rising Sun

Rising Sun used dynamic API resolutions to various Windows APIs by leveraging `LoadLibrary()` and `GetProcAddress()`.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018)
Mosquito

Mosquito leverages the CreateProcess() and LoadLibrary() calls to execute files with the .dll and .exe extensions.(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)
Attor

Attor's dispatcher has used CreateProcessW API for execution.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)
CostaBricks

CostaBricks has used a number of API calls, including `VirtualAlloc`, `VirtualFree`, `LoadLibraryA`, `GetProcAddress`, and `ExitProcess`.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)

ShimRatReporter

ShimRatReporter used several Windows API functions to gather information from the infected system.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)
BitPaymer

BitPaymer has used dynamic API resolution to avoid identifiable strings within the binary, including RegEnumKeyW.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
Siloscape

Siloscape makes various native API calls.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021)
BBK

BBK has the ability to use the CreatePipe API to add a sub-process for execution via cmd.(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)
Conti

Conti has used API calls during execution.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)

XAgentOSX

XAgentOSX contains the execFile function to execute a specified file on the system using the NSTask:launch method.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)
InvisiMole

InvisiMole can use winapiexec tool for indirect execution of ShellExecuteW and CreateProcessA.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Misdat

Misdat has used Windows APIs, including `ExitWindowsEx` and `GetKeyboardType`.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)

Silence

Silence has leveraged the Windows API, including using CreateProcess() or ShellExecute(), to perform a variety of tasks.(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Execution Prevention

Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Use capabilities to prevent suspicious behavior patterns from occurring on endpoint systems. This could include suspicious process, file, API call, etc. behavior.

Обнаружение

Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity.

Ссылки

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