Conti
Techniques Used |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1059 | .003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Conti can utilize command line options to allow an attacker control over how it scans and encrypts files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021) |
Enterprise | T1055 | .001 | Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection |
Conti has loaded an encrypted DLL into memory and then executes it.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) |
Enterprise | T1021 | .002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Conti can spread via SMB and encrypts files on different hosts, potentially compromising an entire network.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) |
Groups That Use This Software |
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ID | Name | References |
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(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021) |
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G0102 | Wizard Spider |
(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
References
- Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021.
- Cybleinc. (2021, January 21). Conti Ransomware Resurfaces, Targeting Government & Large Organizations. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
- Rochberger, L. (2021, January 12). Cybereason vs. Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021.
- Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.
- DFIR Report. (2021, November 29). CONTInuing the Bazar Ransomware Story. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
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