Hijack Execution Flow: Перехват поиска dylib-библиотек
Other sub-techniques of Hijack Execution Flow (13)
Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| Empire |
Empire has a dylib hijacker module that generates a malicious dylib given the path to a legitimate dylib of a vulnerable application.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files. Enforce Least Privilege Permissions: - Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs. Harden File Shares: - Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): - Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions. Audit File System Access: - Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities. Restrict Startup Directories: - Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`. - On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`. |
Обнаружение
Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.
Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)
Ссылки
- Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
- Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
- Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
- Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
- Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
- Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
- Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
- Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.