Develop Capabilities: Malware
Other sub-techniques of Develop Capabilities (4)
ID | Название |
---|---|
.001 | Malware |
.002 | Сертификаты подписи кода |
.003 | Цифровые сертификаты |
.004 | Эксплойты |
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of Web Services.(Citation: FireEye APT29)
Примеры процедур |
|
Название | Описание |
---|---|
Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024) |
FIN13 |
FIN13 has utilized custom malware to maintain persistence in a compromised environment.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022) |
Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet has developed custom malware, including a malware delivery mechanism masquerading as a legitimate game.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024) |
Indrik Spider |
Indrik Spider has developed malware for their operations, including ransomware such as BitPaymer and WastedLocker.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018) |
During Operation Wocao, threat actors developed their own custom webshells to upload to compromised servers.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019) |
|
Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021) |
OilRig |
OilRig actively developed and used a series of downloaders during 2022.(Citation: ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023) |
LuminousMoth |
LuminousMoth has used unique malware for information theft and exfiltration.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021) |
Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has developed malware for its operations, including malicious mobile applications and destructive malware such as NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
Salt Typhoon |
Salt Typhoon has used custom tooling including JumbledPath.(Citation: Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025) |
APT29 |
APT29 has used unique malware in many of their operations.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) |
Play |
Play developed and employ Playcrypt ransomware.(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023)(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023) |
Aoqin Dragon |
Aoqin Dragon has used custom malware, including Mongall and Heyoka Backdoor, in their operations.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022) |
For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including SUNBURST, SUNSPOT, Raindrop, and TEARDROP.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021) |
|
RedCurl |
RedCurl has created its own tools to use during operations.(Citation: therecord_redcurl) |
Cleaver |
Cleaver has created customized tools and payloads for functions including ARP poisoning, encryption, credential dumping, ASP.NET shells, web backdoors, process enumeration, WMI querying, HTTP and SMB communications, network interface sniffing, and keystroke logging.(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) |
For Operation Ghost, APT29 used new strains of malware including FatDuke, MiniDuke, RegDuke, and PolyglotDuke.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019) |
|
Moses Staff |
Moses Staff has built malware, such as DCSrv and PyDCrypt, for targeting victims' machines.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021) |
In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles developed, prior to the attack, malware capabilities that would require access to specific and specialized hardware and software.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017) |
|
ArcaneDoor featured the development and deployment of two unique malware types, Line Dancer and Line Runner.(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024) |
|
For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022) |
|
Turla |
Turla has developed its own unique malware for use in operations.(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) |
For Juicy Mix, OilRig improved on Solar by developing the Mango backdoor.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023) |
|
For CostaRicto, the threat actors used custom malware, including PS1, CostaBricks, and SombRAT.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020) |
|
UNC2452 |
UNC2452 developed SUNSPOT, SUNBURST, TEARDROP, and Raindrop; SUNSPOT and SUNBURST were tailored to be incorporated into SolarWind's Orion software library.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021) |
For Outer Space, OilRig created new implants including the Solar backdoor.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023) |
|
For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used the Rising Sun modular backdoor.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018) |
|
Ke3chang |
Ke3chang has developed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021) |
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation involved the development of a new web shell variant, VersaMem.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024) |
|
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group developed custom tools such as Sumarta, DBLL Dropper, Torisma, and DRATzarus for their operations.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Lazarus Jun 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020) |
|
TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has developed custom malware such as Hildegard.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) |
Night Dragon |
Night Dragon used privately developed and customized remote access tools.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) |
FIN7 |
FIN7 has developed malware for use in operations, including the creation of infected removable media.(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Oct 2019) |
Контрмеры |
|
Контрмера | Описание |
---|---|
Pre-compromise |
Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct successful operations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Limit Information Exposure: - Regularly audit and sanitize publicly available data, including job posts, websites, and social media. - Use tools like OSINT monitoring platforms (e.g., SpiderFoot, Recon-ng) to identify leaked information. Protect Domain and DNS Infrastructure: - Enable DNSSEC and use WHOIS privacy protection. - Monitor for domain hijacking or lookalike domains using services like RiskIQ or DomainTools. External Monitoring: - Use tools like Shodan, Censys to monitor your external attack surface. - Deploy external vulnerability scanners to proactively address weaknesses. Threat Intelligence: - Leverage platforms like MISP, Recorded Future, or Anomali to track adversarial infrastructure, tools, and activity. Content and Email Protections: - Use email security solutions like Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, or Mimecast. - Enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC policies to protect against email spoofing. Training and Awareness: - Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, securing their social media, and avoiding information leaks. |
Обнаружение
Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
Ссылки
- McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
- MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
- CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
- FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.
- The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.
- Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
- Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
- KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.
- An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.
- Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
- Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.
- Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
- Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
- Weidemann, A. (2021, January 25). New campaign targeting security researchers. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
- Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.
- Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
- Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
- Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
- Cisco Talos. (2025, February 20). Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon. Retrieved February 24, 2025.
- MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.
- Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
- F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
- Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 21). Ransomware Spotlight: Play. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
- CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
- Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
- Antoniuk, D. (2023, July 17). RedCurl hackers return to spy on 'major Russian bank,' Australian company. Retrieved August 9, 2024.
- Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
- Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
- Checkpoint Research. (2021, November 15). Uncovering MosesStaff techniques: Ideology over Money. Retrieved August 11, 2022.
- Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
- Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2024, April 24). Cyber Activity Impacting CISCO ASA VPNs. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
- Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
- Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
- Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, September 21). OilRig’s Outer Space and Juicy Mix: Same ol’ rig, new drill pipes. Retrieved November 21, 2024.
- The BlackBerry Research and Intelligence Team. (2020, November 12). The CostaRicto Campaign: Cyber-Espionage Outsourced. Retrieved May 24, 2021.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020.
- MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022.
- Black Lotus Labs. (2024, August 27). Taking The Crossroads: The Versa Director Zero-Day Exploitaiton. Retrieved August 27, 2024.
- ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Cashman, M. (2020, July 29). Operation North Star Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
- Carr, N, et all. (2019, October 10). Mahalo FIN7: Responding to the Criminal Operators’ New Tools and Techniques. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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